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Abstract 
 
This work seeks to understand the conditions leading the degradation of Earth in order to 
discover pedagogy for restoration. The degradation of natural environments and of social 
conditions is identified as a significantly anthropogenic process. This suggests that degradation 
of Earth is a moral issue and thus human morality and its development are explored in depth. 
Individual moral development is found to be deeply related to socialization and provides insight 
into how and why we fail to live to our potential as a naturally moral species. However, through 
education we can achieve a greater potential. This process cannot be scripted, but certain 
elements of such pedagogy are explored as both educational processes and precursors to 
education. We must help students meet their basic needs, center their own identities and 
experience while simultaneously emphasizing community and relationships, and help them to 
find a sense of purpose. These efforts facilitate restoration by helping students reach a physical 
and emotional place that is conducive to learning and self-efficacy so that they may engage in 
the project of restoration in their own way.  
  
 
v 
Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge the Lummi Nation and the Nooksack Tribe whose land I have occupied 
throughout the course of this project. 
I would also like to acknowledge my Oma (grandmother), Rosalie Krzesni. It is significantly in her 
memory that I have been motivated both in this project and in the struggle for a better world. 
I also acknowledge Bandit, my dog-companion who has spent countless hours patiently 
watching me read and write and vigilantly reminding me that we need to take breaks to play 
outside. 
Additionally, I recognize all of those who have struggled throughout history for justice- 
especially those who are not recognized in history or academia. For every iconic hero there are 
thousands who dedicated their lives to a better world in their own way. I have furthermore 
deeply reflected on how many folks have died during the course of my graduate work as heroes, 
victims, and martyrs in this struggle. Although certainly too many to name, I want to specifically 
acknowledge Galeano. Galeano was a Zapatista educator murdered by paramilitaries in Mexico 
doing exactly the work that I have demanded in this thesis.   
Veronica Velez, Kristen French, and all of the students in the Education and Social Justice minor 
at Western Washington University.  
Gene Myers 
My family 
  
 
vi 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v 
Preface ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 14 
1.1 Positive Approach ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.2 Structure of document ................................................................................................. 18 
Chapter 1: Environmental Education ........................................................................................ 22 
1.1 Historic Dictate of Environmental Education ............................................................... 22 
1.2 Practice of Environmental Education ........................................................................... 27 
1.3 Context of Environmental Education ........................................................................... 28 
1.4 Moving Environmental Education into the Future ...................................................... 31 
Chapter 2: Oppression ............................................................................................................... 35 
2.1 Discourse of Oppression .............................................................................................. 35 
2.1.1 Oppressor-oppressed dichotomy ............................................................................ 36 
2.1.2 Entitlement and deservingness ............................................................................... 37 
 
vii 
2.2 Production of Oppression ............................................................................................ 40 
2.3 Epistemology of Oppression ........................................................................................ 41 
2.4 Ecology of Oppression.................................................................................................. 46 
2.5 Restoration ................................................................................................................... 48 
Chapter 3: Empathy and Morality ............................................................................................. 52 
3.1 Evolutionary Examination ............................................................................................ 52 
3.1.1 Social Darwinism ...................................................................................................... 53 
3.1.2 Evolution of empathy and altruism ......................................................................... 56 
3.2 Empathy ....................................................................................................................... 60 
3.2.1 Prosocial motivation ................................................................................................ 62 
3.2.2 Empathic arousal ..................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.3 Discipline and intervention ...................................................................................... 68 
3.2.4 Guilt ......................................................................................................................... 71 
3.3 Limitations of Empathy ................................................................................................ 75 
3.3.1 Empathic over-arousal and compassion fatigue ..................................................... 76 
3.3.2 Character difference ................................................................................................ 77 
3.3.3 Empathic bias ........................................................................................................... 78 
 
viii 
3.4 Morality ........................................................................................................................ 82 
3.5 Moral Development ..................................................................................................... 86 
3.5.1 Influence of parenting ............................................................................................. 94 
3.5.2 Influence of school................................................................................................... 98 
3.6 Moral Principles ......................................................................................................... 100 
3.6.1 Rights ..................................................................................................................... 101 
3.6.2 Care ........................................................................................................................ 106 
3.6.3 Justice .................................................................................................................... 108 
3.7 Moral Limitations and Conflicts ................................................................................. 113 
3.7.1 Moral exclusion ..................................................................................................... 116 
3.7.2 Cultural normative limitations ............................................................................... 128 
3.7.3 Social death ........................................................................................................... 134 
3.8 Hip Hop Interlude ....................................................................................................... 138 
3.8.1 Grandmaster Flash – The Message ........................................................................ 142 
3.8.2 Boogie Down Productions – Loves Gonna Get’Cha (Material Love) on Edutainment
 143 
3.8.3 Dead Prez - Hell Yeah on RBG (Revolutionary but Gangsta) ................................. 144 
 
ix 
3.8.4 Concluding notes on Hip Hop ................................................................................ 145 
3.9 Outlying Behavior ....................................................................................................... 145 
3.9.1 Autism Spectrum Dis/Order .................................................................................. 146 
3.9.2 Psychopaths, sociopaths & antisocial behavior ..................................................... 150 
3.9.3 Trauma & chronic stress ........................................................................................ 156 
3.10 Catalyzing Action ........................................................................................................ 167 
3.11 Section Conclusion: It Takes All Types ....................................................................... 176 
Chapter 4: Pedagogy for Restoration ...................................................................................... 182 
4.1 Introduction to Pedagogy .......................................................................................... 183 
4.1.1 Critical pedagogy ................................................................................................... 183 
4.2 Moral Education ......................................................................................................... 187 
4.3 Pedagogy of Basic Needs ........................................................................................... 191 
4.3.1 Shifting the discourse ............................................................................................ 198 
4.3.2 Educational action ................................................................................................. 207 
4.3.3 Application of pedagogy of basic needs ................................................................ 210 
4.3.4 Extending to ecological issues ............................................................................... 217 
4.3.5 Meeting basic needs mandates social change ...................................................... 218 
 
x 
4.4 Pedagogy of Identity .................................................................................................. 220 
4.4.1 Role models ........................................................................................................... 224 
4.4.2 Hispanic environmental identities ......................................................................... 228 
4.4.3 Hip Hop .................................................................................................................. 232 
4.5 Pedagogy of Purpose ................................................................................................. 242 
4.5.1 Purposes of grandeur ............................................................................................ 246 
4.5.2 Development of purpose ....................................................................................... 249 
4.5.3 Positive youth development .................................................................................. 255 
4.6 Tie back to EE ............................................................................................................. 257 
4.6.1 Beauty and wonder ............................................................................................... 257 
4.6.2 Systems approach and specific ecological knowledge .......................................... 260 
4.6.3 Sense of Place ........................................................................................................ 261 
4.6.4 Restorative experiences in nature ......................................................................... 271 
4.6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 273 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 274 
Limitations ............................................................................................................................... 274 
A Demand for action ............................................................................................................... 275 
 
xi 
The Unfulfilled Promise ........................................................................................................... 277 
References ................................................................................................................................... 279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not a reading of the word alone, nor a reading only of the world, but both 
together, in dialectical solidarity (Freire & Freire, 1992/1994, p.105).  
 
Preface 
 
The United States is a nation defined by its original sin: the genocide of 
American Indians. Everything afterward is just another chapter in the fall from 
grace. ... No reparation, no penance, no atonement can ever erase the eternity 
of genocide. Life ever after will be forever stained by the attainment of this 
“carnal knowledge.” Such an inauspicious beginning raises significant questions 
about the viability of this so-called democratic experiment: Is it possible for 
democracy to grow from the seeds of tyranny? Can the “good life” be built upon 
the death of thousands? (Grande, 2004, p.31)                  
 
 
Western Washington University is built on occupied territory of the Lummi Nation. As a 
student within this institution, I find myself to be complicit in the continuing process of 
colonization of America. But I refuse to silently collude by ignoring inconvenient and 
uncomfortable truths. Colonization is not an historic event and the oppressive, violent, tragic 
and painful results of the ongoing invasion of America are plain to see for anyone who dares 
look with a critical eye. They are also easily ignored. Many of us have the luxury to overlook or 
even deny that people are suffering and dying at the expense of our own privilege and 
ignorance. To begin a project of restoration in any other way than to acknowledge colonization 
would not only be fraudulent, but demeaning of those who suffer this injustice, to those who 
are targeted by oppression, and to all of those already working for restoration.  
I have constantly wondered if any vision for a better world is inevitably short sighted 
when imagined within the academy. As one of the great thinkers of our time, Albert Einstein 
was not only concerned with theoretical physics, but was a German Jewish refugee deeply 
 
2 
concerned with civil rights. Einstein suggested that we cannot solve today’s problems with the 
same kind of thinking that led to these problems in the first place. Einstein explicitly suggested 
that the kind of thinking in question led to use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and worried 
that it would be used again. 
Today we must abandon competition and secure cooperation. This must be the 
central fact in all our considerations of international affairs; otherwise we face 
certain disaster. Past thinking and methods did not prevent world wars. Future 
thinking must prevent wars. (Einstein, 1946) 
 
Warfare was/is much less common in hunter-gatherer societies and warfare of the scale and 
magnitude that Western society has experienced likely arose with agriculture and 
industrialization (Abrams, Coast Community College District, & KOCE-TV, 2002). The “past 
thinking” that Einstein denounced was the dominant Western way of thinking often referred to 
as Western Modern Science1 (WMS) (Ogawa, 1995). 
My own work is conducted in a manner that is congruent WMS and many consider 
these notions of science to be one of the many tools of domination within a system structured 
to produce and communicate knowledge in ways that maintain the status quo (Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 1944/2002). With this in mind, it has been said that “the master’s tools will never 
                                                          
 
1
 The use of this term is intended to contextualize the notions of science within the academy and the 
dominant American culture and makes implicit the fact that there are alternate systems of knowledge. To 
further contextualize WMS, Pomeroy (1994) suggested a different interpretation of the acronym: White 
Male Science. This term is used to emphasize the role of patriarchy and white supremacy within the 
institution of Western Modern Science. 
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dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 1984, p.110). As a Black2 lesbian feminist, Lorde (1984) 
was writing about the hierarchy, oppression and relations of power within (and beyond) 
feminism. Lorde suggested that the presence of such “tools of a racist patriarchy” would 
undermine feminist efforts ensuring “that only the most narrow parameters of change are 
possible and allowable” (Lorde, 1984).  
Many interpret Lorde’s (1984) essay more generally and suggest that academia itself is 
one of the master’s tools. I recognize the presence of hierarchy, power, and oppression in 
academia, but that doesn’t condemn the entire institution. I think Lorde (1984) was referring to 
the social relations associated with institutions such as academia rather than those institutions 
in their entirety. We must be vigilant and critical of the structures we operate within and careful 
that we don’t use the master’s tools in ways that support the master’s cause (oppression). If we 
challenge the master’s rule and refuse to conduct ourselves according to the master’s rules, I 
see no reason to suggest that we can’t fight oppression within the academy. In fact academia is 
one of many fronts where we must work to bring about structural change.  
However, it is problematic to presume that one could envision any utopian future from 
a space in which these problems exist and deeply shape our minds. Even if this could be done 
sufficiently to imagine an incremental improvement, the “timeless nature of the gap between 
                                                          
 
2
 I don’t assume any Black person to be, or to identify as, African American (cf. Dead Prez I’m A African on 
Let’s Get Free, Dead Prez, 2000). There may be an implication of citizenship and nationalism. The term 
People of Color seems much less assuming, but I will always defer to the terms of identity, status, and 
experience expressed by the authors that I cite. 
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the world of our aspirations, hopes, and dreams and the world we create with our policies 
practices, and every day actions” (Loeber, van Mierlo, Grin, & Leeuwis, 2007)  must be 
addressed and somehow bridged. Glasser (2007) offered a poem written in Egypt 4000 years 
ago by a man contemplating suicide: 
To whom can I speak today? 
       The gentle man3 [sic] has perished 
              The violent man [sic] has access to everybody. 
To whom can I speak today? 
       The iniquity that smites the land 
              It has no end. 
To whom can I speak today? 
       There are no righteous men [sic] 
              The earth is surrendered to criminals. (p.40) 
 
The tragedy is not in the identification of iniquity, but in the loss of hope. The quote clearly 
identifies the crisis as a moral one with physical manifestations realized when humans 
collectively fail to live to their potential. It also illustrates that much of our modern concerns 
over the future have plagued generations of humans and are not contemporary issues. Multiple 
religions and world views hold that there was a time in history where our potential was more 
                                                          
 
3
 I have made a deliberate attempt to use inclusive language in this work. I have quoted several historical 
texts that use archaic language where the terms “man” or “mankind” are used in a plural sense which is 
not gender inclusive. In each case I have used the Latin adverb sic to indicate that it is archaic language 
quoted exactly as it was written. Additionally, I have decided not to directly quote any text using such 
language if it was written within the past approximately thirty years because I believe that the 
contemporary use of such language is inexcusable beyond the second wave of feminism. Furthermore, I 
believe that even when using inclusive language, when gender and other markers of identity are not 
made explicit, the white male voice dominating academia may be implicit. While generally avoiding 
gender specific pronouns, I have decided to directly call attention to the claimed identities of some 
authors in some contexts. I do so at the risk of causing their knowledge to be interpreted or valued 
differently. This is absolutely not my intention and I hope that this decision is does not result in a sense of 
tokenization of those authors. I deeply apologize if I have, at any point, misidentified any of the folks 
mentioned in this paper or if I have used language that is exclusive.  
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fully realized. Much of the philosophy and religion of modern Western civilization is consumed 
with understanding how, when, and why we went wrong (e.g., The Fall in Christianity and 
critique of the Neolithic Revolution in WMS). However, as long as we are able to recognize a gap 
between the world we seek and the world we create and maintain that it can be bridged, we 
have a vision for change and a source of hope.  
The central question of this work is whether an academic investigation into the 
dominance, oppression, and exploitation by humans over ourselves and the planet could be of 
any utility. The task, within a colonized institution, on occupied territory, using the master’s 
tools, to envision a future that may be unimaginable from our current vantage point, with any 
hope to bridge the gap between that vision and its fruition, sounds impossible. Upon much 
reflection, however, I have concluded that this is no deterrent at all. There simply is no 
acceptable alternative but to attempt the project of restoration from every possible angle, 
including efforts within the structures and epistemologies of domination. As Einstein concluded: 
Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and 
hearts of men [sic]. We will not change the hearts of other men [sic] by 
mechanism, but by changing our hearts and speaking bravely… When we are 
clear in heart and mind - only then shall we find courage to surmount the fear 
which haunts the world. 
 
Thus, my aim, through this project is not to argue specific ideology but to investigate how we 
may become clear in our hearts and minds. I aim to make what is intuitive and knowable in 
every human epistemology undeniable in the epistemology of WMS. This intuitive knowledge 
relates to the ways we interact with one another and with the planet. It is a need for justice as a 
matter of survival. We can, will, and must achieve a greater potential if we are to remain a 
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viable species on planet Earth. We face crisis, but we have not yet crossed the threshold into 
oblivion. We must collectively engage in a process of restoration. 
The project of restoration is fundamentally one of hope. I am deeply inspired by 
accounts of rescuers who subjected themselves and their families to unimaginable risk in order 
to save the lives of victims of the Holocaust (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Oliner & Oliner (1988) 
described the importance of hope for those rescuers: 
If we persist in defining ourselves as doomed, human nature as beyond 
redemption, and social institutions as beyond reform, then we shall create a 
future that will inexorably proceed in confirming this view. Rescuers refused to 
see Jews4 as guilty or beyond hope and themselves as helpless, despite all the 
evidence that could be marshalled to the contrary. They made a choice that 
affirmed the value and meaningfulness of each life in the midst of a diabolical 
social order that repeatedly denied it. Can we do otherwise? (p. 260) 
 
Although the question is rhetorical, the answer is no. As Paulo Freire (1994) wrote, “there is no 
change without dream, as there is no dream without hope” (p.91). If we believe that the task of 
creating a better world is insurmountable then it will be. But if we strive to be unreasonable 
people who maintain love, hope, and courage despite all reason and reality, then love, hope, 
and courage become reality. Such an endeavor is a source of individual fulfillment in its own 
right regardless of whether our aspirations are externally realized. For example, even when 
                                                          
 
4
 I believe that the language that we use is important. I prefer the term Jewish people to Jews. Jew is not 
considered to be bad word (except when it is used as a negative attribute e.g., “Jew Lawyer,” or as a verb, 
e.g., “Jew the price down.” However, as part of an effort to use inclusive language, I find it important to 
also use life affirming language. The term Jewish people affirms life and resists dehumanization. It’s easier 
to remain disconnected when discussing “destroying Jews” because nothing about the phrase affirms life. 
It could just as well be replaced with “destroying furniture.” A phrase like, “murdering Jewish people,” 
makes the situation much more salient because the terms are human.  
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unsuccessful the Holocaust rescuers were better able to cope with reality and maintain their 
humanity even when their rescue attempts were unsuccessful. However, without the hope to 
try, there would be no possibility of success at all. Thus, if there is to be any hope at all for a 
better future it is the hope that we create ourselves. 
The struggle for a better world cannot rest on hope alone. It must be informed by 
critical understanding of what it is that is happening in the world that we find problematic, 
inspired by a dream for a better world, and fueled by the knowledge that it is possible. Freire 
(1992/1994) wrote, 
I do not mean that, because I am hopeful, I attribute to this hope of mine the 
power to transform reality all by itself, so that I set out for the fray without 
taking account of concrete, material data, declaring, “my hope is enough!” No, 
my hope is necessary, but it is not enough. Alone, it does not win. But, without 
it, my struggle will be weak and wobbly. We need critical hope the way a fish 
needs unpolluted water. (p. 8) 
 
Philosophic considerations and theoretical critique must be critically informed of dominant 
notions of reality. We can and must reject reality as enforced and defended by subjective and 
dominant WMS epistemology but we can only do so by knowing that reality. A creative and 
radical struggle for a better world does not become reactionary by its acknowledgement of 
present conditions. If in our efforts to avoid becoming reactionary, we focus entirely on the 
dream of a better world we risk ignoring the immediate and unavoidable reality (e.g., food 
insecurity) of those who change is intended to benefit the most. As we dream of a better world 
we have to react to consequences of this reality. The goal must be idealistic large scale 
structural change, but we must simultaneously be working at an individual level for and with 
those most severely targeted by oppression. 
 
8 
 
Freire (1994) found hope to be an “existential, concrete imperative” (p.8) and an 
ontological need.  The concept of hope as an ontological need, as something akin to faith, and as 
a theoretical or even poetic concept is beautiful and inspiring. However, the concrete necessity 
of hope is cemented in reality for me by knowledge that I owe my entire existence to hope 
because my paternal grandparents are Holocaust survivors. In an interview conducted by the 
University of Southern California Shoah Foundation, my grandmother, Rosalie Krzesni, gave her 
account of life before, during and after the war. She said that my grandfather and two aunts had 
been in hiding during the war and survived with the help of Dutch rescuers (Krzesni, 1997). I 
don’t know who these people were or why they did it, but the Oliners’ (1988) quote applies 
regardless. For all I know the rescuers who aided in my own family’s survival could be among 
those interviewed by Oliner and Oliner (1988).  
My grandmother was liberated from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp by the British in 
1945 (Krzesni, 1997). She stated that she believed that she had survived because she was strong 
and able to work. She reports the conditions there to have been far worse than those that she 
had experienced in Auschwitz. She talked about seeing thousands of dead bodies and surviving 
by eating leaves from the ground. Upon liberation she immediately fainted, having contracted 
typhus. My grandparents met after the war having both lost their spouses. They gave birth to 
my father Holland and then immigrated to United States in 1954 (Krzesni, 1997).  
My grandmother said that she decided to do the interview because it was something 
that my family had not talked about. She said it had been too painful but she thought that it was 
important that someone would know what happened after she was gone. In the end of her 
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interview, my grandmother was asked if there was anything else that she would like to share 
about her life and the Holocaust. She said, “have faith, and that is all that I can tell you” (Krzesni, 
1997). Although I never talked with my grandparents about the Holocaust, I was very close with 
my grandmother and she was one of the most caring, strong, stubborn, independent, and 
inspiring people that I have ever known. I think that the faith and strength that she speaks of is 
not only religious faith, but faith in ourselves and our ability to persevere. It is my grandmother’s 
hope as well as that of the rescuers that I have carried throughout this project.  
I would have likely never discovered my grandmother’s interview if my research hadn’t 
led me to the Oliners’ (1988) which inspired me to investigate the testimonials of Holocaust 
survivors as well as rescuers. There is something profoundly significant in my mind about finding 
myself in my research. I’ve always regretted that I didn’t know much about my family history 
and wished that I’d taken the opportunity to talk to her about her experience while she was 
alive. I think that has been the greatest success that my efforts could have and has moved me 
more than any academic investigation possibly could.  
My maternal grandparents were also both deeply involved in WWII. They both grew up 
working on farms in the US South. Having lost their family farm during the great depression, my 
grandfather found work throughout the south as a migrant farm worker before joining the 
Army. At the same time my grandmother went to work in a shipyard to support US war efforts. 
Both pairs of grandparents achieved middle class status in United States after the war and thus I 
have lived a life of privilege. I do feel pride in my family history and in the efforts of my 
grandparents and parents to give their children a better life. But, I haven’t offered this story to 
suggest that people who are the targets of oppression just need to pick themselves up by their 
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bootstraps. The idiom is literally and figuratively nonsense. I know that the opportunities that 
my parents and grandparents found for upward mobility are not strictly a function of their 
individual merit. They were upwardly mobile in a context that was conducive to that mobility 
and those opportunities were not and are not equitable- they were arbitrarily defined by a racial 
hierarchy.  
With the knowledge that I experience such privilege despite the fact that my ethnicity 
has been targeted by oppression and genocide, I feel a sense of duty to those who continue to 
be more severely targeted. I am extremely angry at the existence of such injustice. This is a 
natural and important response to injustice. We should all be angry. However, we must focus 
that anger and avoid becoming consumed by it. It is in anger that I dive head first and head 
strong into a struggle for justice and for a better world, but it is hope that keeps me from 
drowning.  
I believe that the best I can do is to acknowledge the problematic context of my work, 
approach it with humility, and critically hope that in the cycles of contemporaneous action and 
reflection to follow, I will find a way to have a positive influence on the planet and its 
inhabitants. This work is nothing more than my own process of reflection and if not coupled 
with action, it will be a meaningless waste of time and money that should have been directed 
elsewhere. However, my hope is that I have developed an understanding that will inform and 
direct me in the work that I feel that I need to do. If my knowledge is a product of the master’s 
tools, then I hope that I can repurpose that knowledge for liberation rather than domination. I 
want to make it absolutely clear that this thesis is not independent of my personal values. There 
is no avoiding the fact that this paper is representative of my own agenda for change. This is not 
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an esoteric project aimed at understanding some obscure phenomena, but an effort to 
mobilize existing knowledge in a struggle for a better world. That world, as the Zapatistas say, is 
a world where many worlds fit. Thus, I have tried to leave much of the definitions of change and 
of progress open ended, and focus more on how and why people engage in such efforts in order 
to help more people become engaged in their own way.  
I have tried to share the perspectives of scholars (both academic and nonacademic) of 
different disciplines and also different ethnic, cultural, and racial backgrounds, identities and 
experiences. I have tried to balance my use of empirical knowledge produced by WMS and “the 
master’s tools,” with knowledge of lived experience offered by nonacademic scholars who, by 
choice or circumstance, have concentrated their efforts on a close reading of the world rather 
than a close reading of the word. In this effort, I have tried to directly quote, rather than 
paraphrase the work of others as much as possible. Although this work is a representation my 
own voice and self-conception, I have conceptualized it as a conversation between the profound 
thinkers that I have had the pleasure of knowing directly or through written and recorded 
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words. In this conversation, I certainly comment and moderate, but my goal is to primarily be 
an active listener5.  
I know that I don’t have the time, skill, or capacity, to fairly represent all of the voices 
who have contributed to my understanding or to hear all of the voices that should contribute to 
it. It is very important to me that I get it right (empirically and morally) because this project is a 
representation of myself- more precisely, it is a representation of who I hope to be. However, 
this project is unfinished and will always remain unfinished. I don’t believe that we ever get to 
get it right, we only get to progress. In that sense, I hope I look back on this in ten years knowing 
that it was an important step, but that I overlooked and neglected more critical questions or 
explicitly had parts wrong. If I am able to say that, I will know that I have made progress in my 
efforts. Finally, I want to begin this work with an apology to anyone who I misrepresent, 
tokenize, fail to represent or fail to give credit to. I hope that anyone who reads this will provide 
me the opportunity to understand and make amends for any such mistakes.  
 
 
                                                          
 
5
 This is more aspirational than practical. One shortcoming of this method is that I have primarily selected 
my own sources (with tremendous help from my advisors). Every source is filtered through my own 
perceptual framework and shifted to fit my own interests and I have un/intentionally omitted ideas that 
have not resonated with me. My own internal conversation could never rival the diversity of thought 
offered in a genuine conversation with a distinct other. Ultimately, I do not possess anywhere near the 
cognitive prowess and theory of mind to truly reflect the voices of the many brilliant thinkers that I have 
cited or omitted detrimentally. 
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This final draft is only the first draft. 
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Introduction 
It is written in rage and love, without which there is no hope. (Freire & Freire, 
1992/1994, p.10) 
 
My interest in education is founded in belief of the fundamental role of education in 
shaping society. Although I am passionate about sharing and developing knowledge and 
constructing meaning as an ends of its own, it is education’s potential to catalyze social change 
that compels me to aspire to be an educator. The premise of this work is that social and 
ecological degradation are a single anthropogenic process. As we degrade the planet we 
degrade ourselves and as we degrade ourselves we degrade the planet. I argue that since the 
processes are inseparable, any activism or educational effort for the benefit of the natural 
environment must deeply address social justice and any activism or education towards social 
justice must significantly include the natural environment.  
What we know is no more significant than the way we know it and the way we know 
something is inseparable from ourselves and our environment. In order to deeply know 
something tacitly rather than just memorize explicit facts- to understand something and 
incorporate it into ourselves- we must experience it. We must connect our cognition, affect and 
the environment in which knowledge exists. This means that knowledge has place, time, social 
and emotional context and that it is conditional. I seek to understand the conditions of 
knowledge that may cause degradation or support restoration. By understanding the conditions 
that produce ecological and social degradation I hope to design pedagogy for restoration.  
This thesis is intended to bridge the wisdom of environmental education (EE) and social 
justice education (SJE) and apply ecological and social justice concepts to the broader process of 
education. Neither EE nor SJE can be discrete content areas. They should be themes fully 
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integrated into all facets of education and justice for the natural environment and for people 
must be a primary concern in all public and private life.  
1.1 Positive Approach 
My work is distinctly theoretical and while empirical research reinforces many of the 
concepts it is apparent that theory dominates. The potential for confirmation-bias and 
overgeneralization in research based in theory is high (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & 
Baumgardner, 1986). In order to address this, I have tried to be clear about the values and 
assumptions that define this work. The central assumptions of my work are that social and 
environmental degradation have and are occurring and that oppression exists. I am less 
interested in providing evidence to support such realities (that I have accepted as truth), than in 
understanding the conditions producing degradation and designing strategies to create a 
different reality (pedagogy for restoration). I am trying to understand under what conditions 
degradation prevails in order to design strategies for pedagogy for restoration. Condition-
seeking and design strategies are described in Under What Conditions Does Theory Obstruct 
Research Progress? (Greenwald et al., 1986).   
A central assumption in this work is that ecological and social degradation are affected 
anthropogenically. In the search to understand how and why degradation occurs, I will make no 
prefatory attempt to catalog the myriad manifestations of the human caused ecological and 
social crisis, prove that we are in a period of mass extinction, or that climate change is occurring 
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much more quickly than can be explained by natural processes6. “Awareness of consequences 
and information related to land use and social conflict” has been shown to affect moral 
reasoning about the environment (Berenguer, 2010) and 
such issues require urgent attention, [but] basic knowledge about them does 
not lead us to a clear path to action, nor does it motivate participation in their 
solution. Rather, such all encompassing negativity often leads to feelings of 
powerlessness, apathy, guilt and disillusionment, clouding the path towards real 
solutions. (Tilbury, 2007, p.124) 
 
Advocating and analyzing the specific environmental issues that we face today is not a task to be 
dismissed or trivialized. However, these issues are symptoms of larger processes that I hope to 
examine. I strive to embrace both/and7 rather than either/or logic and thus believe that both 
the specific environmental issues and systems of production of those issues must be addressed. 
The specifics have been and are continuing to be thoroughly researched so I hope to make a 
contribution through a broader treatment. For the purposes of this work acceptance (or 
openness to the idea) that social and ecological degradation are significantly caused (or even 
affected) by humans is sufficient.  
There seems to be a common structure of argumentation that begins with a shock and 
awe approach to emphasize the importance of an issue and concludes with some shred of hope.  
                                                          
 
6
 For an account on the human impact on nature see Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, and McNeill‘s (2011) 
paper proposing that the human impact on Earth is so great that it rivals geologic forces and represents a 
new epoch in Earth history that should be formally recognized as the anthropocene.  
7
 “Whenever we love justice and stand on the side of justice we refuse simplistic binaries. We refuse to 
allow either/or thinking to cloud our judgment. We embrace the logic of both/and. We acknowledge the 
limits of what we know” (hooks, 2003, p.10). 
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This is not unlike the structure of the preface to this thesis but for the remainder of this work, 
I attempt a positive approach. Harré (2011) suggested that there may be an optimal ratio 
between offering positive solutions and identifying the severity of environmental problems of 
between 3:1 and 6:1. Obviously this is difficult to quantify and attempts to do so have been 
heavily criticized (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013), but the point is that humans are likely to be 
more motivated to solve today’s problems by positive action-oriented solutions than dwelling 
on the associated threats.  
There may be an evolutionary basis for a positive psychology based in our fight or flight 
response (Haidt, 2006). We are evolutionarily disposed to react much more instantaneously and 
intensely to immediate threats than opportunities as a necessary survival strategy, because 
missing a single opportunity generally would not threaten our life, but failing to respond to a 
single threat, such as a predator, would likely result in death. Our fight or flight response served 
us well in the past and is important in certain situations. However, in the modern world where 
threats are often abstract and persistent, we are poorly adapted for coping with sustained stress 
and become easily overwhelmed by negativity (Haidt, 2006). 
My position, as taken by Harré (2011), is that an understanding of the severity of a 
problem is important to inspire action but too much information may lead to hopelessness and 
inaction. I don’t think this is something the WMS can precisely quantify, but we can take it as a 
matter of folk wisdom that we need to adaptively balance positivity and negativity and that 
neither extreme is healthy (e.g., denying that any problems exist, or feeling doomed). Thus, I will 
not shy away from the problems or in my critique, but neither will I intentionally sink into the 
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muck of hopelessness. I am striving for a balance between critique and hope that is referred 
to as critical hope.  
Critical consciousness … involves not only a critical social analysis of inequities 
and actions taken to achieve greater social justice, but also a sense of personal 
efficacy or perceived capacity to effect change. Some people, for instance, may 
be aware of systemic inequalities, but may be unlikely to take action to improve 
systems unless they believe that their actions will likely be effective. The 
achievement of critical consciousness therefore requires people to attain an 
understanding of structural and historical forces that impinge on and constrain 
collective action for social justice, yet to simultaneously maintain their hope 
that—despite these forces—their own participation in justice-focused action 
can be effective. (Christens, Collura, & Tahir, 2013) 
 
The challenges that humans and the rest of the planet face are undeniable but the problems 
identified in society and in education present opportunities for improvement.  
 Finally, in this effort to maintain a positive approach it is imperative to focus on assets, 
solutions, and opportunities on the path to restoration rather than on deficits, problems, and 
barriers in a fight against oppression. Often the more attention an author dedicates to 
identifying a problem, the weaker their proposed solution. Much of the works I’ve studied 
importantly problematize or deconstruct existing social structure, knowledge or epistemology, 
but provide little direction towards solutions. A great solution doesn’t always need to be 
prefaced with a long problem statement, theoretical critique, or philosophical deconstruction. 
This project is about onstructive and creative pursuits focused on what could be rather than 
deconstructive and overly critical accounts of reality.  
1.2 Structure of document 
Chapter 1 defines environmental education (EE) by establishing an historic dictate through 
examining its founding documents. This exploration reveals a broader interpretation of EE 
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calling for greater attention to social issues and urban environments. Additionally the 
exploration reveals that EE was intended to be an approach to education reform emphasizing 
participatory action in solving broadly defined environmental problems such as poverty. Next 
Chapter 1 investigates the current practice of EE and the context in which EE takes place with 
special attention to urban environments. The chapter concludes with a suggestion for how EE 
may move forward in consideration of its historic dictate and present context. Ultimately the 
chapter attempts to frame EE as the foundation for pedagogy of restoration. 
Chapter 2 investigates how and why oppression happens. The chapter investigates how the 
ways we discuss oppression in the work of anti-oppression may undermine our efforts. Next 
various theories on oppression are examined using the Marxist critique of capitalist production 
and distribution of goods as a foundation. Epistemological and ecological perspectives on the 
roots of oppression are also considered. I suggest that although it may be important to consider 
how and why oppression happens, it may not offer significant utility towards ending oppression. 
The chapter concludes with a consideration of restoration as an opposing force to oppression. 
Chapter 3 attempts to deeply understand human morality as the motivator for prosocial 
and pro-environmental behavior. The chapter begins by exploring how empathy and morality 
may be evolved human dispositions as well as potential pitfalls of such an approach. Next 
empathy and its development are explored as precursors to morality. Next, the limitations of 
empathy are examined which begins to shed light on why our empathic disposition does not 
result in perfect harmony among humans. With a solid foundation in empathy, the chapter 
continues by exploring human morality, how it develops, and the specific principles of rights, 
caring, and justice that we may consider in the process of determining right from wrong. Next 
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moral limitations and conflict are examined; specifically considering how we exclude 
individuals or groups from moral consideration and differing conceptions of right and wrong. 
After a brief interlude into Hip Hop’s insight on moral conflict and antisocial behavior in urban 
environments, outlying behavior is discussed. The discussion of outlying behavior takes a 
sympathetic approach to understanding how and why some may behave in a harmful manner 
and emphasizing the role of stress and trauma. The chapter concludes by exploring how people 
are triggered by certain conflicts to engage in prosocial and pro-environmental behavior and 
outlines a variety of ways in which individuals are motivated. Overall, chapter 3 is about 
understanding the human potential for goodness and how we are motivated to do good for one 
another and for the natural environment. 
Chapter 4 significantly departs from the previous chapters and attempts to detail elements 
of pedagogy for restoration. I propose that pedagogy must concentrate on helping students 
meet their physical and emotional needs and encourage a sense of efficacy. I suggest that 
learning, growth, and morality will follow if the environment is conducive to it. This approach to 
education is composed of three elements of pedagogy: pedagogy of basic needs, pedagogy of 
identity, and pedagogy of purpose. Pedagogy of basic needs suggests that meeting students’ 
basic physiological and psychological needs is prerequisite to all educational efforts. The section 
proposes that meeting students’ basic needs is morally imperative but that meeting needs can 
also be incorporated into a meaningful educational experience. The section takes hunger as an 
example and proposes how pedagogy of basic needs could reframe the discourse of need and 
transform a classroom into a community development organization whose purpose is to 
eradicate hunger. Pedagogy of identity focuses on facilitating leaning relevant to students own 
experience. Pedagogy of identity is equally focused on self-concept and relationships, employing 
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multicultural education intended to honor our similarities and our differences while 
emphasizing that we are all connected. Hip Hop is explored as an American urban culture 
relevant to many students’ experiences with examples of how Hip Hop facilitates education. 
Finally pedagogy of purpose focuses on helping students develop a sense of purpose in the 
world in order to engage in their own way and on their own terms. This pedagogy explores how 
sense of purpose develops and how educators can support students in that pursuit. The chapter 
concludes by coming full circle by illuminating that each element of pedagogy supports and 
reinforces the other. Finally, I revisit the practice of environmental education and consider how 
pedagogy of restoration may inform or be informed by environmental education.  
The work concludes with a demand for action. 
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Chapter 1: Environmental Education 
Environmental education should promote the strengthening of peace, the 
further relaxation of international tensions and mutual understanding among 
States and be a real instrument for international solidarity and for elimination of 
all forms of racial, political and economic discrimination. (UNESCO, 1978, p.26) 
1.1 Historic Dictate of Environmental Education 
 
To establish the foundation of this work in environmental education (EE) I examine the 
foundation of EE. Although education in and about the environment has almost certainly taken 
place in some form for as long as humans have, the thrust of EE field was defined in the 1970s. 
The first major document was the Stockholm Declaration in 1972 which resulted from the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which aimed to address “ the need for a 
common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the 
preservation and enhancement of the human environment” (UNEP, 1972).  The Stockholm 
Declaration identified an educational need which the Belgrade Charter attempted to address in 
1975 (UNEP, 1975). The Belgrade Charter established the framework and guiding principles for 
EE which were further developed at The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education, held in 
Tbilisi, 1977.  
The officers of the Tbilisi conference commission represented USSR, Belgium, Benin, 
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Thailand, Canada, India, Bulgaria, 
Malaysia, Sierra Leone, United States of America, Venezuela and Tunisia (UNESCO, 1978). The 
Tbilisi Declaration is a condensed summary of the conference proceedings and provides the 
most commonly used definition of EE. The definition is often paraphrased and a thorough 
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reading of the Final Report on the conference proceedings provides much broader 
conceptions of EE than such definitions usually reflect8. The Tbilisi Declaration (1978) stated: 
Environmental education, properly understood, should constitute a 
comprehensive, lifelong education, one responsive to changes in a rapidly-
changing world. It should prepare the individual for life through an 
understanding of the major problems of the contemporary world, and the 
provisions of skills and attributes needed to play a productive role towards 
improving life and protecting the environment, with due regard given to ethical 
values. By adopting a holistic approach, rooted in a broad, inter-disciplinary 
base, it recreates an overall perspective which acknowledges the fact that 
natural environment and man-made [sic] environment are profoundly inter-
dependent. It helps reveal the enduring continuity which links the acts of today 
and the consequences for tomorrow. It demonstrates the inter-dependencies 
among national communities and the need for solidarity among all mankind 
[sic]. ("The Tbilisi Declaration," 1978) 
 
The focus of Environmental Education was not strictly defined to be the natural environment. 
The emphasis was on the sustainability and quality of life as both a socially and ecologically 
focused effort. According to the Belgrade Charter and Tbilisi Declaration, EE is about the 
relationship between humans and the environment and an interdisciplinary approach rather 
than a narrow ecological one.  
                                                          
 
8
 A commonly used definition of EE that is attributed to the Tbilisi Declaration is:  
Environmental education is a learning process that increases people's knowledge and awareness 
about the environment and associated challenges, develops the necessary skills and expertise to 
address the challenges, and fosters attitudes, motivations, and commitments to make informed 
decisions and take responsible action. ("Environmental Education Framework : Creating an 
Environment to Educate about the Environment," 2003) 
Although I would not suggest that this is a misrepresentation of the Tbilisi Conference proceedings, it is 
not a complete representation and neither is it a direct quote as it is sometimes presented to be. 
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Economic development is a central concern in each of the three documents. The 
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme opened the conference by 
calling for the “sustained improvement of the quality of life, eradication of poverty and 
equitable participation of people in the benefits of development” (UNESCO, 1978, pp. 61-62).  
Environmental problems are not just those of the detrimental or irrational use 
of natural resources and pollution. They include problems of 
underdevelopment, such as inadequate housing and shelter, bad sanitary 
conditions, malnutrition, defective management and production practices and, 
more generally, all problems which stem from poverty. They also include 
questions of protecting cultural and historical heritages. (UNESCO, 1978, p.11) 
 
Thus, “poverty itself is a form of environmental degradation” (UNESCO, 1978, p.11).  
Although economic development was considered imperative, “unprecedented economic 
and technological progress” was recognized to bring “inevitable changes, improvements, but 
also environmental hazards” (UNESCO, 1978, p.40). In fact, this conflict between human 
interest, economic interest, and the well-being of the planet was the central concern of the 
Stockholm Declaration. The first paragraph of the declaration stated: 
Our generation has witnessed unprecedented economic growth and 
technological progress which, while bringing benefits to many people, have also 
caused severe social and environmental consequences. Inequality between the 
poor and the rich among nations and within nations is growing; and there is 
evidence of increasing deterioration of the physical environment in some forms 
on a world-wide scale. This condition, although primarily caused by a relatively 
small number of nations, affects all of humanity. (UNEP, 1972) 
 
The Belgrade Charter (1975) was prefaced with a statement in direct response to the Stockholm 
Declaration calling for a new international economic order,  
one which takes into account the satisfaction of the needs and wants of every 
citizen of the earth, of the pluralism of societies and of the balance and 
harmony between humanity and the environment. What is being called for is 
the eradication of the basic causes of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, pollution, 
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exploitation, and domination. The previous pattern of dealing with these crucial 
problems on a fragmentary basis is no longer workable. (UNEP, 1975) 
 
In each of the three documents the emphasis is on development that protects human rights and 
improves human welfare in a manner that is not destructive to the natural environment. Such a 
concern for detrimental influence of economic interests on both human welfare and the natural 
environment and a vision for positive development was the premise of environmental 
education.  
The goal of EE was to “ensure the preservation and improvement of humanity’s 
potentials and develop social and individual well-being in harmony with the biophysical and 
man-made [sic] environment” (UNEP, 1975). This conception of EE certainly did not arbitrarily 
identify ecological degradation as an environmental issue and social concerns as separate 
humanitarian ones. In fact, it was meant to bridge the two areas of concern and position the 
needs of humans and the needs of the planet in congruence through a new global ethic and 
educational reform (UNEP, 1975). “To improve all ecological relationships, including the 
relationship of humanity with nature and people with each other” (UNEP, 1975). This new ethic 
was intended to be global, but not static or universal. The relationships were meant to be 
interpreted on an individual basis in accordance with cultural context.  
Environmental education was not about specific learning objectives and was neither 
intended to be peripheral to public education or an addendum to it. Environmental education 
was meant to be reform all public education. The Belgrade Charter (1975) explicitly stated the 
necessity of educational reform. 
The reform of educational processes and systems is central to the building of 
this new development ethic and world economic order. Governments and 
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policy-makers can order changes, and new development approaches can begin 
to improve the world’s condition – but all of these are no more than short-term 
solutions, unless the youth of the world receives a new kind of education. This 
will require new and productive relationships between students and teachers, 
between schools and communities, and between the education system and 
society at large. (UNEP, 1975) 
 
The Tbilisi Declaration was largely consumed with expanding on the broad and sweeping 
demands of the Belgrade Charter and began to elaborate on how exactly EE might reform 
education.  
Environmental education must look outward to the community. It should 
involve the individual in an active, problem-solving process within the context of 
specific realities and it should encourage initiative, a sense of responsibility and 
commitment to build a better tomorrow. By its very nature, environmental 
education can make a powerful contribution to the renovation of the 
educational process. ("The Tbilisi Declaration," 1978)  
 
The Tbilisi Declaration clearly defined EE as a community project aimed at improving the lives of 
human and all living beings and a critical approach to reforming the educational process.  
All three documents were much more focused on the approach to EE than the specific 
practices, intuitively aware that specific application could not be context independent. Although 
certainly implicit, specific ecological knowledge was not emphasized in The Tbilisi Declaration 
(1978) or the preceding documents. Rather, The Tbilisi Declaration (1978) emphasized general 
understanding and knowledge necessary for participation in problem solving.  The UNESCO 
Report envisioned an inclusive environment where 
Active participation would … replace intellectual conjecture. Moreover, the 
varied origin of participants, which, in conventional education might be 
regarded as a difficulty, would then become an advantage, since it would be 
possible to achieve the spontaneous integration of different disciplines and 
different ways of thinking in a joint experience directed towards the solution of 
problems. (UNESCO, 1978, p.22) 
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Without explicitly using such terminology Tbilisi and Belgrade screamed for popular 
educational approaches demanding reform such as integrative education, participatory action 
research and critical pedagogy.  In summary, “environmental education must adopt a holistic 
perspective which examines the ecological, social, cultural and other aspects of particular 
problems” (UNESCO, 1978, p.12).  
1.2 Practice of Environmental Education 
The early vision for EE detailed in the UNESCO Final Report and Tbilisi Declaration is 
quite radical in its relation to the practice of EE and environmentalism today. Gruenewald (2004) 
calls EE “politically sanitized” and suggests that EE should “not be content with the self-inflicted 
narrowness that the adjective [environmental] inevitably conveys” (p.101). The North American 
Association for Environmental Education (NAAEE) “adopts language and concepts associated 
with conventional standards: grade-level performance, achievement, and effectiveness” 
(Gruenewald, 2004, p.80). Alignment with conventional standards may have improved the 
credibility and receptivity of EE and increased its reach and presence in mainstream education. 
However by such alignment, EE may have been reformed and disciplined by conventional 
education rather than reforming education as it was intended to. Gruenewald (2004) suggested 
that alignment with standards and institutionalization of EE “serve to legitimize, rather than 
challenge, educational practices that are problematic, that in fact create the need for 
environmental education” (p.76) Such alignment of “EE with the official, high-status content-
area standards of general education has become a trendy means of legitimization, one that may 
work against transforming the ecologically problematic thrust of general education” 
(Gruenewald, 2004, p.80). The alignment of EE with economic values of “individualistic 
competition and nationalistic success in the global economy… rather than emphasizing that EE 
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calls for a new (or ancient) ecological way of knowing” (Gruenewald, 2004, p.80) may, indeed, 
be a problematic thrust significantly contributing to social and ecological degradation.  
The narrowness and political neutrality that Gruenewald (2004) criticizes in EE (whether 
or not it is accurate) is not dictated by the Belgrade Charter or Tbilisi Declaration. The UNESCO 
Report calls for EE to “consider the environment in its totality - natural and built, technological 
and social (economic, political, technological, cultural-historical, moral, aesthetic)” (UNESCO, 
1978, p.27). I broadly conceptualize the environment as the space in which life exists. This space 
is equally subject to and constructed by ecological and social forces from climate change to gun 
violence. Henceforth, I intend this broad interpretation of the term environment unless 
otherwise specified. Furthermore, all education takes place in the environment, is informed by 
the environment, and applies to the environment, so all education is environmental education.  
Thus, my use of the term education is intended to reflect the broad process of education which 
takes place inside and outside of traditional classrooms. The broad process of education 
certainly includes the specific practice of EE today and concept of EE described in the UNESCO 
Report.  
1.3 Context of Environmental Education 
 
The case has been made for a broad concept of EE, based on its founding documents 
and as a mostly theoretical pursuit. Now I examine the social environment in which EE takes 
place. Garbarino (1996) described the environment in which many people in economic poverty 
live as both socially and physically toxic. 
Poor children live in the kinds of socially toxic environments that generate 
multiple threats to development- academic failure, child maltreatment, learning 
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disabilities, and others. That is one clear meaning of being poor in America. 
Interestingly, this social toxicity parallels physical toxicity; low-income 
populations are more likely to be exposed to chemical and radioactive waste 
and polluted air and water. (Garbarino, 1996) 
 
I hope to make the case that EE must attend to the social as well as ecological environment 
more salient using a study on environmental perceptions in a high economic poverty region in 
the United States. Kahn (1999) interviewed children about their perceptions of the environment 
in a school in Houston, Texas9 predominately attended by Black students (99%), where most 
students received free and reduced lunch (91%) and the majority of the children were labeled as 
low achieving (60% based on state tests). One student was asked a preliminary question about a 
bayou that flowed within a mile of the school. 
Tell me Trina, do you know what a bayou is? Yes… it’s where turtles live and the 
water is green because it is polluted. People-some people need to, um, some 
people are nasty. Some people, you know, like some people go down there and 
pee in the water. Mm hmm. Like boys, they don’t have nowhere to pee, and 
drunkers, they’ll go do that, too. Okay. And sometimes they’ll take people down 
and rape them, and when they finished, they might throw ‘em in the water or 
something. So, what does it look like? How would you describe it? A bayou? It’s 
big and long and green and it stinks … And turtles live in it. (p.96) 
 
Trina was in third grade. It is clear that her basic knowledge of the ecosystem was entirely 
interwoven with the realities of the city. This study will be revisited as it relates to moral 
judgments later, but here, even if merely anecdotally, I wanted to illustrate that the distinction 
between social and ecological problems is arbitrary. It is from a position of significant privilege 
that one could suggest that, as an environmentalist, certain social issues are not within the 
                                                          
 
9
 Kahn (1999) specifies that the majority of the participants in the study preferred to be referred to as 
Black. 
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scope of their concern. I doubt Trina had the luxury to dismiss concerns about rape and 
murder to focus attention on turtles, for which she did seem to have some affinity. 
An interesting result from a complementary study where Kahn (1999) interviewed the 
Houston children’s parents was that 57% of parents considered drug education and 
environmental education to be equally important and 29% of parents considered environmental 
education to be more important. I wonder if the curricula of drug education programs might 
have influenced the parents’ judgments. However, one parent explained that drug problems and 
environmental problems both threatened lives in their community. For that reason they found 
environmental and drug education equally important.  
With the drugs, we’re nothing. Without the environment, we’re nothing. And 
drugs is something I see every day. There are dealers across the street from me. 
So I see this every day and it’s just killing us. I mean, it really is killing us, and 
with the drugs we’re not going to have any youth… With the drugs you’re not 
going to have a future and without any environment you’re not going to have a 
future. 
 
Well let’s put it like this here. If you don’t take care of one [drugs], it’s going to 
kill you. If you don’t take care of the other [the environment] it’s going to kill 
you. (Kahn, 1999, p. 122) 
 
To further contextualize, parents described garbage piling up in the streets, sewage backing up 
into their yards, and the prevalent stench of air pollution.  
In this example, I have tried to illustrate that in the daily lives of many (most) folks there 
is little distinction between the social and natural environment. I have also tried to make a case 
for a broader conception of EE (with greater attention to social issues) by dictate (UNESCO 
Report). And in the following chapter, I make a theoretical argument for the relationship 
between social and environmental degradation.  
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1.4 Moving Environmental Education into the Future 
In the modern era, economic growth and development have always depended 
on exploiting natural and human resources for the sake of economic production 
and the creation of wealth. Such is the history of nation building: imperialism, 
colonization, cultural violence, and ecological rape10. Growth, development, 
resources, production, wealth- all of these metaphors have taken on positive 
value in modern culture, yet each is linked to destructive and oppressive 
relationships with human and nonhuman others. (Gruenewald, 2004) 
 
It is crucial to understand where knowledge accepted as truth comes from and how it 
has changed over time. Knowledge that we take for granted may, despite our intentions, carry 
with it a history of degradation that we subtly drag forward by not interrogating the roots and 
assumptions of that knowledge. However, Tbilisi provides a definition of EE satisfactory for the 
project of restoration. I was certainly pleasantly surprised by the content of EE’s founding 
documents which I assumed a certain level of familiarity with (without having read) based on 
how prominently they are referenced by others.  As I discovered, the foundations of EE - upon 
which I construct a pedagogy for restoration - are very supportive of such an effort. But while it 
is important to examine the past and present definitions of EE, there is no reason to remain 
constrained by those definitions. As Noam Chomsky frequently reminds us, the world is too 
complex for history to ever reproduce itself. Context changes and history is not static so our 
approach to restoration must always be adaptive. I very decisively look to the imaginary to chart 
                                                          
 
10
 I don’t condone using language of sexual violence to describe exploitation of the earth. I think it is 
hyperbolic and contributes to a culture of rape. However, however the nature of our affiliation with 
nature isn’t always a loving. What is the significance that “raping the earth,” is such a common phrase? In 
the next section I examine Bookchin’s (1982) hypothesis that the subjugation of the earth follows the 
subjugation of women.  
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my own path into the future with an understanding that the task would be impossible 
without knowing the past and present context of education and of the issues that must be 
addressed.  
I critically and hopefully look to the future but not to change for the sake of change or to 
blind progress. Sandy Grande, an Indigenous scholar who identifies as a Quechua woman11, 
sharply critiqued whitestream12 education’s influence on American Indian sovereignty and 
identity and discussed the fallacy of “belief in progress as change and change as progress” 
(2003, p.69). Grande (2004) provided nuance to the role of Indigenous knowledge in education 
by reminding us that Indigenous knowledge is not historic and static, but that change isn’t 
universally progress. She suggested that there is much to learn from the past and the present 
but never denied the need to look to the future. What Grande (2004) insisted was that we look 
critically and holistically to past, present, and future in attempt to transcend the confines of 
modernism, capitalism, and colonialism without tokenizing or dismissing traditional and 
                                                          
 
11
 Grande (2003) prefaces Red Pedagogy with the following: 
I am a Quechua woman. This is not only who I am but also, in these “postcolonial” times, an 
identity I feel increasingly obligated to claim. At the time of Spanish invasion, the Indigenous 
population of Peru was approximately twelve million but after the first one hundred years of 
conquest, numbers dwindled to 150,000- a decimation of nearly 80 percent. Despite centuries of 
genocide, Peru today remains a majority Indigenous population, a statistic that speaks more to 
the fortitude and resilience of Quechua and Aymara peoples than to the virtues of colonialist 
regimes. This is evident in the fact that although Indigenous peoples continue to comprise the 
majority, the historical-material spoils of imperialism (economic and political power) belong to 
the white and mestizo minority. (p.ix) 
12
 Grande (2003) often uses the term whitestream rather than mainstream or Western. Although she does 
not provide an explicit definition of the term, it effectively centers Indigenous thought and experience by 
denying the assumption that dominant, mainstream, or Western ways of knowing and being include or 
represent Indigenous knowledge and experience.  
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contemporary Indigenous knowledge. We must carefully consider the relationship between 
place, culture, and epistemology with the knowledge that Indigenous culture and epistemology 
has forever been inseparable from place, as has been the case for most ways of knowing and 
being throughout human history but is not the case for dominant Western culture. 
There is a further interpretation of the fallacy that Grande (2004) identified that needs 
to be considered. The juxtaposition of the impact that the original inhabitants of the land 
currently occupied by the United States have had since time immemorial with the immense 
social and ecological degradation that the “progress” introduced by white settler colonialism of 
the past few hundred years paints a certain picture. It seems that the obvious question that 
such juxtaposition raises is; what would the United States look like if it had never been colonized 
by Europeans or if the relationship between European settlers and Indigenous peoples had 
developed differently? It seems trivial to speculate either that it would be a perfect utopia in 
harmony with nature or that a similar trajectory of technology, domination, and destruction 
would have emerged and equally degraded the land13. In my mind, it is not trivial, however, to 
examine counterexamples to the modern and imagine alternative trajectories.  
                                                          
 
13
 Indigenous peoples of the land now occupied by the United States and more broadly the western 
hemisphere are anything but homogeneous and it is important to avoid overgeneralization. Although vast 
trade networks facilitated cultural and material exchange, development of cities, agricultural systems, and 
governance varied significantly according to region. As in all places, pre-colonial powers rose and fell and 
new societies emerged (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). However, no force before colonization ever threatened the 
sovereignty of the peoples to such a great extent. 
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In constructing a pedagogy for restoration the relation between past, present, future, 
and imagination must all be continually addressed in relation to one another. Thus, I have begun 
this paper by looking to past concepts of EE, present concepts of EE, and how that plays out the 
context of US poverty in order to understand how we can begin looking to the future. Such 
poverty is a symptom of social degradation that must be addressed through pedagogy for 
restoration. In the Chapter 2 I attempt to understand the nature of degradation as both an 
outcome of dominant Western epistemology and social structure. In Chapter 3 examine how we 
develop our sense of morality in the context of degradation in order to understand how and 
why we take restorative action. Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore a pedagogy for restoration.  
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Chapter 2: Oppression 
Even before I ever read Marx I had made his words my own. (Freire, 1998a, 
p.115) 
 
In this chapter I attempt to understand, at a structural level, how and why oppression 
happens. I begin by considering discourses of oppression and the implications of the oppressor-
oppressed dichotomy. Next Marxism is briefly introduced as a central theory on the nature of 
human oppression and as a foundation upon which to investigate other social theories. 
Following Marx, I delve into Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944/2002) critique of the modes of 
production of knowledge which raises fundamental questions of the relationship between 
epistemology and oppression. Then ways of knowing in Indigenous and eastern philosophies are 
considered in search of a way to proceed beyond the deconstructionism that critical theory 
inspires. Finally Bookchin’s (1982) theory of human ecology positing that oppression is the result 
of a departure from nature is investigated. I conclude the chapter by trying to put together the 
social theory, epistemology, and social ecology in order to move beyond an effort to understand 
the roots of oppression towards an understanding restoration. 
2.1 Discourse of Oppression 
Before proceeding with this investigation into oppression, I want to consider the 
importance of language and discourse. Often the way we say something is no less significant 
than what we say. Although our words don’t always match our intentions, if we’re not precise in 
our use of language, we are not precise in our thinking. In this section I consider discourses 
related to oppression and how language aligned with the status quo may detract from efforts to 
challenge oppression.  
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2.1.1 Oppressor-oppressed dichotomy 
By calling people oppressed, without carefully considering what that implies we may 
subtly validate oppression and undermine our intentions to fight oppression. The oppressor-
oppressed dichotomy labels some as oppressors and some oppressed (or colonizer-colonized, 
dominator-dominated, etc.). The oppressor-oppressed dichotomy isn’t an accurate descriptor of 
status or identity for most people. There are people who enact oppression and people targeted 
by oppression. They are first and foremost people and their identities do not reduce to 
oppressor or oppressed. Most people experience both to some degree but the significance of 
either experience to one’s experience or identity certainly varies.  
If people targeted by oppression are referred to as if it is part of their identity, it subtly 
justifies their mistreatment by implying that their mistreatment is dictated by their identity. An 
example may make the point more clear. If someone is referred to as a bum, hobo, or even with 
a more life affirming term such as homeless person, we are not only communicating that they 
do not have a home (as defined by the status quo), we are also communicating that they are the 
type of person who is homeless. If we refer to someone without such labels, but as a person 
who does not have consistent access to adequate shelter (or may choose not to utilize it for 
various reasons), we make it clear that homelessness is not necessarily part of their identity, but 
part of the experience that they are having. By avoiding such essentializing labels and seeing a 
person having a particular experience, rather than someone whose identity dictates that 
experience, we afford them the basic human dignity of self-determination. The experience of 
having inadequate shelter may or may not be transient and one’s own agency (or perceived) 
agency in the matter could only be determined on an individual basis. We should not assume 
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that ‘homeless’ people need or want rescuing. Neither should we assume that they will 
inevitably be ‘homeless’ because it is part of who they are.  
Inflicted labels of identity are easily internalized and refusing essentialist concepts of 
identity allows the person experiencing homelessness to speak back to their experience rather 
than being defined by their experience. Thus, support efforts are can be undermined from the 
start by the way we define the identity of those we aim to support. I see the task as one of 
ensuring that everyone has access to basic shelter, support and services that they may need 
while allowing them the freedom to choose how, when, and whether they utilize those 
resources. When we aim to help people while inflicting and enforcing labels of identity, defining 
their experience and their needs, and presuming that they need or want our help we may 
unintentionally maintain an imperialist discourse of oppression that negates our well-
intentioned efforts by maintaining the status quo and disempowering ‘oppressed peoples’.  
2.1.2 Entitlement and deservingness 
Lisa Marie Cacho (2012) similarly discussed how discourse on justice may undermine 
work for justice. Cacho’s (2012) areas of concern are primarily the relationship between identity 
status and rights. She suggested that those identified as illegal immigrants, gang members, or 
terrorists are considered ineligible for rights based on assumptions of their status, regardless of 
their actions. Cacho (2012) suggested that by arguing that people deserves rights by distancing 
them from such statuses, we comply with a racist ideology that suggests some people should 
have to prove their deservingness for rights while others are entitled to rights. For example, 
“these people are not criminals, they are just trying to earn a living” is a frequently expressed 
sentiment intended to illustrate categorical deservingness of rights for People of Color. 
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However, expressions like, “not all white people are criminals” are so universally accepted 
that they don’t need to be said because whites14 are entitled to rights. This is not to say that 
there are not identities and statuses among whites who are also unjustly forced to prove their 
deservingness of rights, but that the rights of whites are not categorically called into question. 
The baseline should be that everyone deserves rights and that rights should not be contingent 
on status or identity.  
When we distinguish ourselves from unlawful and outlawed status categories, 
we implicitly insist that these socio-legal categories are not only necessary but 
should be reserved and preserved for the “genuinely” lazy (welfare recipients), 
“undoubtedly” immoral (marrying for citizenship), and “truly” dangerous (gang 
violence). When we reject these criminalized others of color, we leave less room 
for questioning why such status categories are automatically and categorically 
                                                          
 
14
 APA guidelines dictate that racial/ethnic identifiers be capitalized including White and Black (Publication 
manual of the American Psychological Association, 2010).However, I intentionally challenge this 
precedent by capitalizing racial/ethnic identifiers of People of Color but not whites. As a result of white 
supremacy, whites rarely identify accordingly with skin color (a notable exception may be White 
Supremacists) and have the privilege to racially and ethnically self-identify to a much greater degree than 
People of Color and thus may identify as Jewish, European American, Irish American, etc.(Visconti, 2009) 
while many diasporic Peoples of Color in America do not know their ethnicities so specifically due to 
colonization and the enslavement of Black peoples (Potter, 1995). 
 
Potter (1995) suggested that capitalization essentializes and homogenizes Peoples of Color. This is 
absolutely not my intention; my attention is to address oppression and call attention to the prevalence of 
culturally imposed markers of identity in a racialized society by avoiding colorblindness. My intent is to 
challenge rather than essentialize racial determination. 
 
Finally, I use the term whites in contradistinction to my earlier notes on using life affirming language. I do 
this because (1) it makes me uncomfortable to be categorically referred to (as a white person) in such a 
way while similar language is rarely questioned when categorically referring to ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Blacks’. That 
discomfort is good and important and healthy and reminds me to use language carefully. (2) Oppression 
and racism are unilaterally enacted by the dominant group (whites), so the rights and humanity of whites 
are never categorically violated in the way that the rights of People of Color are. Thus, every time I use the 
word whites in contradistinction to life affirming terms, I intend for it to serve as a reminder of the nature 
and presence of oppression in life and in language. 
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devalued. While these tactics may be politically strategic and even necessary at 
times, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that they work because a 
sympathetic public can register that some people are the wrong targets of 
legitimate laws. They work only if a sympathetic public already accepts that 
discrimination against not-valued others is legitimate and necessary. (Cacho, 
2012, p.18) 
 
These sorts of comparisons are symptomatic of an unjust dichotomy where some folks are 
entitled to rights while others are required to prove their deservingness of rights. By making 
implicitly comparative arguments of race and relation and insisting that one person or group 
deserves rights we are implying that some other doesn’t.  
However, as Cacho (2012) pointed out, it is sometimes practically necessary, and even 
unavoidable to make such relational arguments. For example, in immigration law, and in US 
more generally, heteronormative conceptions of family are highly valued (Cacho, 2012). For 
example immigrants facing deportation are often portrayed and valued in accordance to 
heteronormative family values (e.g., the father struggling to earn money to his family back 
home, or the mother facing deportation which would tear apart her family). Certainly, I am not 
in support of tearing apart families and I think it is a noble effort for someone struggling to make 
ends meet to send money home. Thus, advocacy and activism related to immigration reform 
often (maybe unavoidably) emphasize family values because they are likely to be effective. 
However, such arguments are likely to be effective at the expense of less valued others (e.g., 
single transgender refugees). Cacho (2012) ultimately did not argue that, in practice, such 
arguments are ineffective or entirely problematic, but that we must be extremely cognizant of 
the ways the language of social justice may undermine social justice. “What’s at stake is figuring 
out the criminalized and racialized parameters of rights discourses by realizing that the ways in 
which a group’s demands for rights and recognition can highlight an/other racialized group’s 
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ineligibility for those same rights”(Cacho, 2012, p.82). Because what we may ultimately be 
constructing is a politics of misrecognition “that relies on tactical arguments that construct only 
some members of a group targeted for state violence as having been falsely and unfairly 
misrecognized by US law” (Cacho, 2012, p. 28) and more generally targeted and misrecognized 
in society.  
2.2 Production of Oppression 
I begin my exploration of the mode of production and reproduction of environmental 
destruction with a nod to the influence of Karl Marx. Marx is one of the influential thinkers of 
my own worldview and the influence of Marx in the schools of thought of the majority of the 
authors that I have referenced is easily recognizable (if not overtly stated). However, I have 
made an effort to avoid an intransigent take on Marxism or any particular ideological allegiance 
in order to look forward both critically and imaginatively.  
Marx’s basic presumption was that the class struggle, with its associated oppression, 
propels history and explains the nature of all social structure. Marx suggested that revolution 
was necessary to redistribute the means of production which would in turn dissolve class 
structure (Marx & Engels, 1847/2010). Marx certainly expressed great concern for the 
exploitation of workers and (if only as a digression) expressed some concern for the natural 
environment:  
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more 
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man [sic], machinery, 
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, 
electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of 
rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had 
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even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social 
labour? (Marx & Engels, 1847/2010, p.17) 
 
Marx identified the owners of material means of production as perpetrators of the exploitation 
of human beings, but rarely (or never) examined the relationship between the processes of 
production and destruction of nature. As vapid critic of the “idiocy of rural life,” and a vehement 
proponent of industrialization, Marx did not consider that the very materialist nature of 
production may inevitably be exploitative to humans and the natural environment (Marx & 
Engels, 1847/2010). Thus, Marx may have had some awareness that exploitation of the planet 
was a problem, but didn’t question the nature of a worldview that holds the earth as a resource. 
Still, Marxist theory does provide the inspiration for the argument that social and environmental 
degradation are deeply related to social structure and are readily analyzed as a single issue.   
2.3 Epistemology of Oppression 
Following Marxist thought, critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) 
sought to understand the nature of oppression in a time when modern science very prominently 
enhanced the scale of atrocity in WWII. In the midst of domination of Nazi fascism, Horkheimer 
and Adorno (1944/2002) concluded that the production and distribution of knowledge rather 
than capital (as Marx thought) was the fundamental source of oppression. 
Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement of 
creation or in its deference to worldly masters. Just as it serves all the purposes 
of the bourgeois economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the 
disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins. (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1944/2002, p.2) 
 
While Marx critiqued capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno critiqued modernism. They believed 
that enlightenment, even in pursuit of liberation, disenchanted the world and that by 
“conquering superstition” humans established rule over nature. They suggested that “What 
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human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and 
human beings” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2002, p.2). Enlightenment established hierarchies 
of knowledge where experts or “masters” held the power. Thus where Marx primarily critiqued 
material distribution in accordance to social relations through capitalism, but not the means of 
production, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) critiqued both the production and distribution 
of knowledge. Ultimately, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) felt that knowledge destroyed 
meaning and enlightenment itself was domination.  
Since Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) saw the very concept of progress as 
domination, they looked to the past and particularly held art as a liberatory form of expression. 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) wrote “The urge to rescue the past as something living, 
instead of using it as the material of progress, has been satisfied only in art, in which even 
history as a representation of past life, is included” (p.25). Rather than suggest that historic 
knowledge is a source of progress, Horkheimer & Adorno are suggesting that, through art, the 
past lives in the present. In that sense, I think Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) saw the 
study of history as encapsulated in art not as knowledge, but transcendence. It may not be too 
much of a stretch, then, to suggest that Horkheimer and Adorno, amidst a world torn by WWII, 
found their only escape and fulfillment in the transcendence that one can experience while 
engrossed in great art. In that sense, their utopia was not externally realizable, but potentially 
experienced internally, if only briefly.  
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may be best known for their paradoxical assertion 
that “myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 1944/2002). In the context of dominant US American cultural mythology the myth of 
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human nature, the myth of pristine nature, and the myth of socially constructed nature have 
profound implications that should be considered15. In my own experience, and popular among 
certain environmental educators and writers such as David Sobel, the sort of transcendence that 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have experienced through art is also satisfied in the 
wonder of nature (Sobel, 2008). However, it may be that art encompasses our interpretation of 
nature just as it does our interpretation of history. There may, indeed, be a deep connection 
between ethics and esthetics where justice is an expression of beauty and beauty itself is justice. 
In fact, Moore (2005) in an ode to Rachel Carson concluded: 
There is moral significance in the search for meaning, and virtue in the life of 
one who seeks- like Carson, attentive and grateful, careful with science and 
open to mystery, humble and respectful, rejoicing in the fact of things, willing to 
be surprised. I don’t know if humans are the only beings who wonder. But I do 
know that we have a great capacity to wonder at the world that ticks and sighs 
around us, and it may be that we will find the fulfillment of our potential as 
                                                          
 
15
 This is intentionally left open ended and the fundamental mythologies of American civilization are 
potentially and endless pursuit. However, I will briefly introduce some of the complexity surrounding the 
myth of pristine nature as it relates to oppression. Early Western concepts of the wilderness or the wild 
often regarded it as dangerous and undesirable. Throughout the colonization of America concepts of 
wilderness contributed to the myth that America was a wild frontier to be settled. In reality, America was 
not a wilderness and European and American settlers relied on the developed networks of trails, and 
managed grasslands to establish settlements. The ‘wilderness’ settlers did encounter likely resulted from 
their own role in disabling the Indigenous peoples from tending to the land. The policy of settling 
wilderness was later formalized in 1823 by the doctrine of discovery which ruled that all land lay claim to 
the first Christian Europeans to explore and settle it. This concept of wilderness was fundamental to the 
colonization of America and genocide of native peoples. Additionally, the myth of pristine nature 
continues to be a source of justification for the continued dispossession of Indigenous peoples of lands 
promised by treaties following the invasion of America. This is now done in the name of preserving 
wilderness rather than conquering it. A contemporary example that remains in dispute between the 
sovereign Republic of Lakota and US over Black Hills (the site of Mt. Rushmore) which was established in 
violation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The US government currently holds over a billion dollars in 
trust as restitution, however the Lakota refuse to accept the payment because the land was never for sale 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). 
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human beings in our awareness of the astonishing world, our care, and our 
thanksgiving. 
 
I can’t help but speculate that Horkheimer and Adorno would dig such a sentiment. My take is 
that they were so consumed by the atrocity of WWII that the potential to appreciate any 
element of the present was overshadowed. 
I favor a take on enlightenment founded in ancient Chinese and Buddhist traditions. 
Enlightenment is accepting each moment exactly as it is (Garbarino, 2011). It is “intrinsically and 
inevitably incomplete and approximate” (Garbarino, 2011, p.73) because it is an aspiration 
rather than an outcome. While enlightenment is about accepting each moment exactly as it is, 
understanding is inevitably subjective. The understanding associated with such enlightenment is 
more about acceptance, peace and harmony than domination. The state of enlightenment that 
Garbarino (2011) described as transformational grace is a sustained state of transcendence 
quite similar to the transient state that Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have found 
only in art. Garbarino (2011) suggested that transformational grace is a way of being in and with 
the world where life itself is the source of wonder and transcendence. I like the juxtaposition of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944/2002) concept of (modernist/scientific) objectivity as 
domination and Garbarino’s Eastern concept of objectivity as acceptance. Both views converge 
in rejection of positivism with acceptance of myth and appreciation of esthetic.  
Garbarino’s (2011) thoughts on enlightenment help us out of the hopelessness that 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may arouse. However, they were correct to criticize 
dominant Western epistemology and Garbarino (2011) did not speak to structural change. 
Grande (2004) is certainly very well versed if not significantly influenced by critical theory and 
postmodern thought but she’s firmly rooted in Indigenous epistemology and ontology which 
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seems to fuel her vehement cultural critique without the commonly resulting descent into a 
deconstructionist, fatalist, or nihilist condemnation of every element of human experience and 
knowledge as meaningless social construct. Grande (2004) identified colonization as the source 
of oppression rather than capitalism and critiqued modern(ist) colonial modes of knowledge 
production without assuming that alternative modes of knowledge production do not and 
cannot exist. She suggested that “both Marxists and capitalists view land and natural resources 
as commodities to be exploited, in the first instance, by capitalists for personal gain, and in the 
second by Marxists for the good of all” (p. 27). Her critique of Marxism is aimed not at Marxism 
in its entirety, but at what she considers to be a “profoundly anthropocentric notion that 
presumes superiority of human beings over the rest of nature” rooted in humanism (p.27). She 
concludes that “the real source of environmental destruction” is “colonization and the ill-effects 
of its consuming habits” (Grande, 2004, p.65).  
It seems many of the postmodernists and critical theorists including Horkheimer and 
Adorno (1944/2002) were stumped upon realizing that oppression is a consequence of the 
dominant epistemology with little conception of alternatives. Although I found Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s (1944/2002) conception of art to be deep and poetic, they didn’t have much to offer in 
the way of positive solutions. As Grande (2004) suggested, it may be that solutions to the 
problems produced by epistemologies of domination cannot be solved in the same manner of 
thinking. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have lacked the necessary cross-cultural 
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perspective to imagine solutions to the problems that their critique identified. Luckily as both 
indigenista16 and academic, Grande (2004) is not bound by the confines of modern Western 
social theory and identified Indigenous cultures as living counterexamples to the status quo. In 
this way, Grande (2004) refuses the impossibility of what Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) 
considered theoretically utopian but practically unrealizable in the present: an alternative 
trajectory.  
2.4 Ecology of Oppression 
Epistemology is culturally influenced and although our way of knowing may be 
conducive to oppression, it does not explain how the gears were set in motion. What led to the 
colonial mentality? Bookchin’s (1982) work on social ecology begins to chip away at the source 
of oppression. Bookchin’s (1982) work followed directly from Marxist thought, but Bookchin’s 
departure from (or advance of) Marxism exposed a fundamental weakness in Marxist theory: 
What puzzled a few highly sophisticated Marxists in later years was how the 
repression and disciplining of external nature could be achieved without 
repressing and disciplining internal nature: how could “natural” nature be kept 
in tow without subjugating “human nature?”  (Bookchin, 1982, p.10) 
 
                                                          
 
16
 Grande uses the term indigenista in contradistinction to whitestream feminism.  
Though Indigenous women share with other women a position of marginality and the experience 
of structural subordination, I believe their distinct subjectivity as colonized peoples ad members 
of “domestic dependent nations” places the historical materiality of their lives more on a par 
with Indigenous men than any other sub-category of “women.” I do, however, recognize the 
salience of gender as a category as well as the importance of a gendered, pro-woman, antisexist 
analysis. (p.156) 
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Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002), Bookchin (1982) saw a relationship 
between domination of nature and domination of humans, but did not suggest that knowledge 
necessarily detaches us from nature or causes domination. Bookchin (1982) asserted that “the 
very notion of the domination of nature by man17 stems from the real domination of human by 
human” (p. 1). Bookchin (1982) believed that the process begins with patriarchal morality and 
wrote that 
even before man embarks on his conquest of man – of class by class- patriarchal 
morality obliges him to affirm his conquest of woman. The subjugation of her 
nature and its absorption into the nexus of patriarchal morality forms the 
archetypal act of domination that ultimately gives rise to man’s imagery of 
subjugated nature. It is perhaps not accidental that nature and earth retain the 
female gender into our own time. (p.121) 
 
Bookchin (1982) hypothesized that in the process of developing human society, hierarchies 
among humans were established and that differential class advancement among humans serves 
as the means to exploit nature. As indicated in the quote above, Bookchin (1982) believed that 
the fundamental source of all oppression is rooted in the oppression of women. However, the 
development of society represents a departure from a natural order which may precede the 
oppression of women. It becomes a bit of a chicken and the egg debate. There may be a single 
root cause of all oppression or there may be many roots.  
                                                          
 
17
 Bookchin (1982) does not use the term man in the archaic and plural sense, but asserts that “the split 
between humanity and nature has been precisely the work of the male” (Bookchin, 1982, p.18). 
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 Finally, as Johnston (1994) concluded in the edited volume Who Pays the Price: The 
Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis surveying international conflicts between 
ecological health and human rights: 
Environmental quality and social justice issues are inextricably linked. Efforts to 
protect a “healthy environment” may, in some cases, result in human rights 
abuse, and depending upon subsequent social response, may ultimately fail to 
meet original environmental integrity objectives. And conversely, responding to 
human rights needs while ignoring the environmental context infers temporary 
intervention rather than substantive solution; it may thus serve to initiate or 
perpetuate a cycle of human rights abuses. (p.235) 
 
Johnston’s (1994) conclusion is pragmatic and actionable. While it is fascinating to examine 
whether human exploitation of nature is at the root of human exploitation of humans or vice 
versa, it may be unanswerable. It may also not be the most productive area of inquiry if the goal 
is to end oppression. Even if we could be sure that the subjugation of women was at the root of 
all oppression, that wouldn’t necessarily provide much insight towards ending all oppression. 
However, some understanding of the interconnectedness of the oppression of nature and of 
humans does provide insight towards the ultimate goal of restoration. 
2.5 Restoration 
One is not fully human until one acknowledges and affirms the humanity of 
others—including one’s enemies. Ultimately, the enemy is within the human 
family and not without. And once we acknowledge that, we will all have the 
courage . . . [to] move beyond the darkness of mutually destructive hatred and 
revenge into the light of reconciliation and forgiveness. (Mathabane, 2002, p. 
A21, as cited in Gibbs, 2014, p.120) 
 
 
As Johnston (1994) suggested our collective struggle against social and ecological 
degradation must constantly and simultaneously consider environmental quality and social 
justice issues. At its currently advanced stage, the social crisis and ecological crisis are entirely 
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intertwined as are development and degradation. Social degradation directly causes 
ecological degradation and ecological degradation causes social degradation. I hypothesize that 
oppression, like a virus infects our way of perceiving the world (e.g., colonial epistemology and 
internalized oppression) and thus spreads through all of our social structures regardless of 
where it begins. In the effort for social and ecological restoration it is important to realize how 
interconnected different expressions of oppression are. I don’t believe that we can make much 
progress by approaching symptoms of this virus as singular and isolated issues. Ending any 
oppression requires ending all oppression. Thus we must simultaneously focus on individual 
instances and structural causes of both social and ecological degradation.  
Bookchin (1982) found the end of human domination to be an ecological imperative 
“because [human domination] threatens the integrity of organic nature, it will not continue to 
do so given the harsh verdict of … nature” (p. 37). To be clear, Bookchin (1982) was suggesting 
that feedback mechanisms of the ecosystem will remove or drastically reduce human 
populations if we do not make significant changes. In my attempt to maintain a positive 
approach, I reframe Bookchin’s (1982) prophecy. The iniquity that was described in the poem 
from Egypt four thousand years ago and that Bookchin similarly referred to is not so simple as a 
question of moral or amoral behavior but one of great complexity. A large portion of the 
remainder of this paper is devoted to the philosophical, psychological and sociological 
exploration of morality. I believe that human concepts of justice have been selected for by 
evolution and as part of human ecology morality is not detached from the greater ecosystem. If 
humans establish just ways of living and interacting with one another and with the planet, as I 
will argue is part of human nature, we will not face the “harsh verdict of nature.”  
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As Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) and later Grande (2004) suggested the social 
systems of knowledge production are colonized by the virus of oppression. However, I don’t 
believe that that the possibility of transcendent enlightenment is lost. I don’t believe knowledge 
has to be domination but we do need a shift in our concept of knowledge. I believe that there is 
an epistemology of domination and there is an epistemology of esthetic, of love, and of 
association. I want to know the world the way I know a loved one, where the more I know them, 
the more affinity I feel for and with them and the more I want to know them. The more I begin 
to understand their internal states, their needs, their motivations, and the more deeply I care. 
This way of loving knowledge and knowing love is an episteme of beauty and is the vocation of 
humans. It is a way of being with the planet rather than on the planet. Freire (1998) wrote, 
Women and men [sic] by the mere fact of being in the world are also necessarily 
being with world. Our being is a being with. So, to be in the world without 
making history, without being made by it, without creating culture, without a 
sensibility towards one’s own presence in the world, without a dream, without 
song, music, or painting, without caring for the earth or the water, without 
using one’s hands, without sculpting or philosophizing, without any opinion 
about the world, without doing science or theology, without awe in the face of 
mystery, without learning, instruction, teaching, without ideas on education, 
without being political, is a total impossibility. (p.58) 
 
As Freire said, we are unfinished humans who may become aware of our own unfinishedness 
and to be human is to search for completeness (Freire, 1998). Such an episteme is generative, 
but never destructive. It cannot destroy an epistemology of domination but it allows a process 
of healing.  
Our struggles against oppression must begin with processes of decolonizing our own 
minds (cf. Yellow Bird & Wilson, 2012) because domination is both epistemic and fundamental 
to our discourse. I remain skeptical of all notions of modern development (e.g., economic 
 
51 
development, resource exploitation, technology) as inherently and inevitably a form of 
domination. However, this skepticism is based in my own tendency towards deconstructionism 
and is likely symptomatic of a lack of perspective resulting from my own entrenchment in 
modern Western epistemology. Such skepticism is the hurdle that we must each individually 
overcome by decolonizing ourselves as part of the effort to end oppression in all of its forms. In 
this way, pedagogy of restoration is both a process of self-restoration and the broader process 
of restoration of the planet. 
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Chapter 3: Empathy and Morality 
If we are to live in a world free from the threat of Holocausts, we will need to 
create it. If we can understand some of the attributes that distinguished 
rescuers from others, perhaps we can deliberately cultivate them. (Oliner & 
Oliner, 1988, p.xviii) 
 
This chapter explores the complex relationship between the development of an 
individual’s moral principles, the natural environment and the social environment. Reciprocally, 
the environment shapes and is shaped by human reality. Moral development takes place in this 
dynamic environment and moderates an individual’s participation in, and construction of, social 
structure. Social and ecological degradation, as a single issue, are outcomes of the way we as 
individuals, groups and as a species, internalize or adapt and adjust social structures.  An 
understanding of the moral development process, as it relates to the process of socialization, 
sheds light on the entire process resulting in the degradation of Earth. Through an 
understanding of human morality, pedagogy for restoration begins to illuminate itself.  This 
chapter begins by examining what may be evolutionary roots for human empathy and the 
potential pitfalls of such an approach. The following section explores the empathy and moral 
development process including potential limitations to human empathy and morality and 
philosophic concepts of morality. The remainder of the chapter explores how and why people 
may act prosocially or antisocially as a result of their moral development. 
3.1 Evolutionary Examination 
Empathy is a necessary prerequisite for altruism and compassion, therefore, the 
roots of human morality can be traced through our biology to the evolution of 
our species. We are, by nature, moral creatures. (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, & 
McShane, 2006, p. 504) 
 
An evolutionary approach to moral development suggests that “helping genes” have 
been necessary for the survival of the human species (Hoffman, 1981). As social creatures the 
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human species’ survival required that we not consider only our own self-interest in our 
interactions with one another. Only by working together and considering one another’s needs 
were we able to survive the test of time (Hoffman, 2000). Humans are thinking and feeling 
beings “built in such a way that they can involuntarily and forcefully experience another’s 
emotion – that their distress is often contingent not on their own but someone else’s painful 
experience” (Hoffman, 2000, p.5). I find it incredibly profound that the human desire for justice 
(as a consequence of empathy) is not rooted in an egoistic self-interest, or logical understanding 
of the need for reciprocity, but an involuntary emotional component of our genetic makeup.  
3.1.1 Social Darwinism 
 Before delving into a discussion on the evolutionary basis for human empathy, I want to 
consider the potential pitfalls of such an approach.  
The reality is that evolutionary perspectives on human behavior frequently 
incite controversy, even among the scientists themselves. Evolutionary theory is 
one of the most fertile, wide-ranging, and inspiring of all scientific ideas ... 
However the legitimacy of this exercise is at the center of a heated controversy 
that has raged for more than a century. Ultimately, the disquiet traces back to 
past misuses of evolutionary reasoning to bolster prejudiced ideas and 
ideologies … Most researchers within the social sciences and humanities remain 
extremely uncomfortable with evolutionary approaches (Laland & Brown, 2011, 
p. 2). 
 
Early theories of natural selection were misinterpreted and distorted into Social Darwinism and 
became instrumental in the formalization of the concept race and racial hierarchies as scientific 
concepts (e.g., Morton, 1839) and inspired eugenics movements in the United States as well as 
the Holocaust (McWorter, 2010). Although “past misuses of evolutionary reasoning” do not 
condemn all modern evolutionary theory, we have not escaped (scientifically or socially) the 
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legacy of racism and eugenics. Therefore we must be extremely cautious and critical when 
utilizing evolutionary theory. 
I want to consider Darwin’s own role in the distortion of the theory of natural selection. 
Darwin did not share significant application of natural selection to humans publicly until he had 
spent nearly ten years carefully considering it because he was well aware of the potential 
implications of doing so (Laland & Brown, 2011).  
It is largely by distorting Darwinian thinking that evolution has been used to 
justify prejudice and inequality. Most of the negative features sometimes 
unfairly attributed to evolution, including prejudice, racism, sexism, genetic 
determinism, and Social Darwinism, do not come from Darwin but from others 
who twisted his theory. (Laland & Brown, 2011, p. 47) 
 
When Darwin did publish on the ways that natural selection acted on humans, some of those 
considerations of race and sex reflect prejudice by today’s standards (Laland & Brown, 2011). 
However, Darwin explicitly rejected Social Darwinism and much of the distortions of natural 
selection would be unfairly attributed to him.  
It was largely the work of Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton who distorted natural 
selection into a theory of eugenics (Laland & Brown, 2011). However, the path from Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection to atrocity would be unfairly attributed to any single individual. It 
was a long progression of distortions of Darwin’s theory into a hierarchical conception of life 
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where some species are ‘higher’ and some ‘lower18’ and the formalization of races among 
humans that led to conceptions of racial hierarchy. This racial hierarchy was used to establish an 
ideology of white superiority by suggesting that Europeans had larger brains and were the most 
evolved race (Morton, 1839). Such racial hierarchy was used to justify the oppression of ‘lower’ 
humans, and in the most extreme cases, the genocide of undesirable races.  
Ultimately, this warped concept of human evolution was the ideology behind the 
Holocaust. However, there was an active eugenics movement in United States preceding the 
Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust was a result of already widely prevalent Social Darwinism and 
racial hierarchy (Edgcomb, 1993; McWorter, 2010).  In fact, the Nazis explicitly stated that they 
were enacting what US American eugenicists were writing and mocked the United States in 
propaganda for calling Nazis barbaric while racism and eugenics (primarily through sterilization, 
however, US American eugenicists were considering euthanasia) were enacted in US at the 
same time (Edgcomb, 1993; McWorter, 2010). Furthermore, the Jewish refugees were accepted 
in the United States based on racial quotas. Not only was the policy based on perceptions of the 
number of Jewish people who could be racially assimilated, but they also considered the genetic 
desirability of the refugees. Those from Western Europe and accomplished academics and 
professionals were considered genetically superior and more assimilatable (Edgcomb, 1993; 
McWorter, 2010). 
                                                          
 
18
 Laland & Brown (2011) discuss notes written in Darwin’s own posthumously published journals where 
he reminded himself to avoid higher or lower forms of life. By their accounts Darwin was very concerned 
about potential misinterpretation and misuse of his theories. 
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Clearly the misuse of evolutionary theory can result in atrocity. Modern genetics and 
evolutionary theory share the same roots as those from which such atrocity grew. However, I do 
not think this is cause to condemn all evolutionary theory and genetics or their potential. What 
is necessary is that we interpret meaning critically and seek knowledge for the sake of wisdom 
(cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001 on phronesis) rather than explicitly technological or economic progress. It 
isn’t enough to come to empirically based judgments regarding epistemic truth. We must 
consider where certain truths come from and how such truths have and can be used. We have 
to consider practical application and implication of knowledge as both ethical and empirical.  
The theory of evolution properly understood, could be imagined as a branching tree 
where each branch represents speciation, but not progress towards some end goal or higher 
species. Social Darwinism and eugenics reduce that tree to a branchless snag: “a linear, 
progressive concept of change perhaps inevitably engenders prejudice as some evolved forms 
must be regarded as more advanced, or ‘higher,’ than others” (Laland & Brown, 2011, p. 46). 
3.1.2 Evolution of empathy and altruism 
With the previous qualification, some understanding of what may be innately human 
does provide insight into the nature of empathy and human morality. However, we must 
constantly keep in mind that evolutionary dispositions do not dictate modern behavior in a 
deterministic sense. It is likely that such genetic influences do relate to our evolutionary context 
but innate and acquired behavior can never be considered independent of each other. Human 
behavior is channeled but not predetermined by evolved predispositions (Laland & Brown, 
2011). 
 
57 
Altruism, simply defined, is voluntary behavior that promotes the needs of another at 
some expense of the altruistic actor (Hastings et al., 2006) with no expectation of external 
reward (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). There is fossil evidence in human history to suggest “early 
humans did not live alone but in small, nomadic hunting and gathering groups. Such groups 
produced more offspring (who presumably continued to live in groups) than those individuals 
not living in groups” (Hoffman, 1981, pp. 111-112). Altruism is posited to be an adaptation to 
group living. The Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest may appear very individualistic, 
placing each individual in competition with one another. This would suggest an evolutionary 
basis for egoistic, self-serving behavior – the opposite of altruism. The least altruistic individuals 
would be the most likely to reproduce and any genetic disposition towards altruism would be 
selected away (Hoffman, 1981). However, current understanding evolution recognizes the role 
of natural selection in promoting both group and individual adaptations. In the case of 
predation, a member of a social group may defend the group or draw the predator away at the 
risk to their own life (Hastings et al., 2006). Conversely, in an entirely nonaltruistic social group 
the individual may escape predation but reduce overall group survival. Furthermore, all 
“individuals benefit when the group cooperates to defend itself from predators” (Hastings et al., 
2006, p. 485). Therefore natural selection would favor the social group with a predisposition for 
altruism and cooperation because it would increase group survival (Hastings et al., 2006).  
The evolution of concern for others (empathy) may be connected to the evolution of 
mammals 180 million years ago. Mammals, especially, but not exclusively, nurture, nourish, and 
protect their young, in contrast to most reptiles who abandon their eggs shortly after laying 
them. Hastings et al. (2006) suggested that in these longer term relationships between parent 
and offspring, the parent would be more frequently exposed to the feelings associated with 
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pain, separation, and suffering of their offspring. Any trait that improved the ability of a 
parent to detect and respond to their offspring’s feelings would improve their survival chance. 
With this increase in survival of offspring, a predisposition for empathy as an affective and 
cognitive process may have been selected for. This may also be supported by evolutionary 
changes in the mammalian brain (Hastings et al., 2006). 
Although I primarily focus on social dynamics among and between humans, I want to 
note that empathy is not a uniquely human characteristic. Altruistic behavior has been observed 
in other animal species from primates to rats. “Cooperation and helping behavior are observed 
in species other than humans including several types of nonhuman primates, birds, hunting 
dogs, dolphins, and whales” (Hastings et al., 2006, p. 485). Humans may also feel empathy or 
similar feelings of compassion or concern based in moral principle for non-human animals and 
the natural environment (Opotow, 1990; Plous, 2003).  
There are many influences determining when and whether an individual will act 
altruistically or cooperatively. In some species kin selection disposes individuals to favor those 
most genetically similar to them (Laland & Brown, 2011). Considerations of reciprocity certainly 
are also very influential in social species. Vampire bats for example, will regurgitate food for 
other bats who return to the roost at risk of starvation having not found enough food. Since 
they live in relatively stable groups, it seems that although no immediate benefit is observed, 
the bats have some expectation that the favor will be returned if they find themselves facing 
starvation. In that way, their altruism is constrained by a demand for reciprocity (Laland & 
Brown, 2011). Among early humans, such reciprocal altruism likely involved identifying cheaters 
who receive benefits and do not reciprocate and may have influenced group selection. 
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Reciprocal altruism may also be fundamental to human concepts of justice (Laland & Brown, 
2011).  
Simple theories of social and biological determination dictated by evolutionary 
predispositions towards helping one another are not able to account for the complexity of social 
dynamics among modern humans. Furthermore, I don’t see utility in determinism which seems 
to me like a slippery slope to fatalism. Genetics alone rarely influence human behavior 
independently of our unique accumulation of life experience. Even if sociobiology and related 
fields eventually provide a complete understanding of human nature, there would be no reason 
or even possibility to submit to it. As Freire (1998) suggested, we are conditioned but not 
determined and by becoming aware of the ways we are conditioned we can transcend those 
conditions. Still, keeping Horheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) in mind, it’s difficult to reconcile 
the relationship between knowledge and domination. They suggested that to know nature was 
to dominate it and the same could potentially be true of human nature (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1944/2002). I remain in Freire’s (1998a) corner with critical hope and believe the more we 
understand human nature, the better equipped we will be to circumvent some aspects (e.g., 
selfish genes) and foster others (e.g., altruism) through socialization.  
Furthermore, we should not consider elements of ‘human nature’, such as altruism, 
cooperation, and morality as static. Certainly if these dispositions evolved they continue to 
evolve. Human nature two million years ago certainly is not the same as human nature is now, if 
such a thing even exists. At best early human history can provide clues, but not answers to the 
timeless questions of human nature.  
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Bookchin (1982) suggested that civilization itself is a potentially deterministic 
influence on human behavior and wrote that civilization almost autonomously shapes humans 
and advances not with humanity, but despite us. Bookchin (1982) meant that we have 
established a society structured in a way that humans internalize and reconstruct social 
structure without consciously doing so and thus civilization is capable of reproducing itself 
without anyone explicitly consenting. Humans have become uniquely disconnected from the 
natural world and are no longer governed exclusively by the laws of nature. The governance of 
humans now plays a significant role, alongside the laws of nature, in shaping the future for 
human society and the entire planet. I hypothesize that humans can move beyond, or into 
alignment with, what may or may not be human nature through education, socialization, and 
governance.  
3.2 Empathy 
As discussed in the previous section, it is likely an interaction between genetic 
dispositions and the socialization process that determines our behavior. Regardless of the 
influence that genetic disposition has on behavior, educators can’t do much to influence 
anyone’s genetics, but we can certainly be influential in the socialization process. The following 
is an attempt to understand the processes that ultimately cause people to care about the 
ecological integrity of the planet and the wellbeing of fellow humans. With occasional 
digressions back into evolutionary influences, I focus on an understanding of social on 
psychological processes of empathy and moral development. I believe that this model for moral 
development offers significant insight for educators, but all models by definition, represent 
processes that are not entirely understood. The following model of moral development cannot 
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possibly account for the development or actions of all people. It offers a unique insight along 
specific dimensions, but provides little or none along others.   
Hoffman’s (2000) theory suggests that empathy is an involuntary and emotional process 
that leads to feelings of distress when witnessing another’s pain. Such distress encourages one 
to assist the person in pain and to avoid causing others pain. According to Hoffman (2000) this 
process is the basis for human morality. The model provides incredible insight into human 
behavior and I examine it very thoroughly.  
Empathy is most simply described in terms of its outcome where someone experiences 
feelings more congruent with another’s situation than with their own (Hoffman, 2000) One 
outcome is state matching: feeling what another feels. However as Garbarino (2011) suggested, 
empathy is never complete and someone can never know exactly what another is experiencing 
(cf. Decety & Jackson, 2006). State matching is an affective (feeling) process. There is also a 
distinctly cognitive (thinking) form of empathy: an awareness or recognition of another’s 
internal states (Hoffman, 2000). In reality cognitive and affective empathy are generally 
experienced in tandem. Strictly cognitive empathy could cause someone to empathically feel 
anger on behalf of another who was treated unjustly even though that person may feel pain or 
fear.  Strictly affective empathy should dictate that the observer has similar feelings of pain and 
fear to the victim. In reality, the observer may empathically feel some combination of anger, 
fear, and pain. Hoffman (2000) emphasizes affect, but conceptualizes empathy as a process of 
thinking, feeling, and acting rather than a simple outcome (e.g., affective state matching). 
Hoffman’s primary concern is empathic motivation for prosocial behavior and does not 
generally disambiguate empathy and sympathy. Thus, before continuing, I find it important to 
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explicitly make the caveat that an affective response is not necessary for one to feel concern 
(sympathy) for another (Decety & Michalska, 2010). As explored in the following section, 
empathic over-arousal (too much empathy) may actually reduce sympathy. 
3.2.1 Prosocial motivation 
The human capacity for empathy leads people to have feelings of empathic distress 
when others are hurt or mistreated (Hoffman, 2000). The long term outcome for the observer is 
the formation and internalization of moral principles that function to avoid or alleviate future 
empathic distress and associated feelings of guilt. Hoffman (2000) described guilt as “a painful 
feeling of disesteem for oneself, usually accompanied by a sense of urgency, tension, and regret, 
that results from empathic feeling for someone in distress, combined with awareness of being 
the cause of that distress” (p.114). 
 Guilt is a powerful motivator, but there are other possible motivators. For example, 
reciprocal altruism suggests that we may be motivated to help one another by the expectation 
that if we help someone, they will return the favor when we are in need (Laland & Brown, 
2011). However, I want to consider the possibility of intrinsic motivation to help others without 
any associated survival strategy or feelings of guilt. I want to briefly consider joy. Guilt more 
significantly than joy motivates us to avoid harming one another and the ways in which we do 
nice things for one another may be less empathically and morally motivated. Still, I want to take 
a moment to consider the importance of positive motivation. Writing of involvement in social 
and political activism, Berman (1997) posited that “joy comes from living in such a way as to 
promote good in the world, being fully present in one’s efforts, and experiencing a sense of 
connection with others with a struggle, and with the welfare of the planet as a whole” (p.78).  
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Haidt (2003) considered “an emotion triggered by people behaving in a virtuous, 
pure, or superhuman way,” such as helping someone in need, and referred to it as elevation. 
Haidt (2003) suggested that elevation is experienced affectively as warm, pleasant, tingling 
feelings, or openness. Upon witnessing such virtuous acts and experiencing elevation, one is 
uplifted and motivated to behave virtuously and help others (Haidt, 2003). Studies following 
Haidt’s (2003) concept of elevation have supported the relationship between witnessing a good 
deed, experiencing elevation, and engaging in prosocial behavior (Thomson & Siegel, 2013). 
Garbarino (2011) similarly referred to “transformational grace,” which could be described as a 
state of being intensely and perpetually positively motivated.  I suspect that we can only come 
to know joy and grace through guilt and shame and that neither pair could exist in the absence 
of the other. However, despite the significant prosocial role of guilt, much of the contemporary 
work of positive psychology suggests a greater human potential through positive motivation. 
3.2.2 Empathic arousal 
Hoffman (2000) identified five ways in which empathy is aroused in humans: mimicry, 
classical conditioning, direct association, mediated association, and role taking. Mimicry is a 
two-step process that occurs in rapid succession. Humans tend to (1) automatically imitate the 
facial expression, vocal expression, and posture of one another, and then (2) experience 
feedback based on that imitation which causes them to feel a related emotional state. Mimicry 
could be considered an egoistic experience of empathy because the observer’s feelings result 
from their own imitation of someone else’s expression, but not from their recognition of the 
other’s feeling. Mimicry is considered the most basic form of empathy and has been observed in 
infants in their first day of life. It may also underlay all of the other ways in which empathy is 
aroused. A final note on mimicry- the simple act of mimicry, not only arouses empathy as a 
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prosocial motive, but may in itself, be a prosocial act. Mimicry communicates awareness, 
involvement, connection, and understanding, of another’s emotional state and even solidarity 
between the observer and the other (Hoffman, 2000).  
Classical conditioning can also be interpreted similarly to mimicry, as a two-step process 
occurring in rapid succession. However, rather than the first step being imitation, the observer 
associates the observed situation or display of emotion with emotions that they have previously 
experienced. The second step is a similar process of feedback, which is again quite egoistic, 
where the observer experiences the emotion that they associate with that observation. The 
conditioned emotion isn’t necessarily the same emotion that the observed other experienced. 
Classical conditioning has been observed in one day olds when a sucking response was 
conditioned to stroking the newborn’s forehead (Hoffman, 2000). 
Direct association is an empathic response to a situation where the observer has had a 
similar experience. The observer associates the similar experience directly with the situation 
that they are observing and feels empathy related to their recollection of the similar experience 
(Hoffman, 2000). For example, a child could feel empathic pain in response to seeing their 
parent cut themselves, because of their recollection of the pain of having been cut in the past. In 
the same example, mimicry might be at work if the child winced in response to their parent’s 
facial and vocal expression of pain and experienced empathic distress as a direct result of their 
own expression of pain. Also in the same example, classical condition might be at work if the 
child became afraid because they had frequently observed that their parent becomes angry 
when they get hurt. These three modes of empathic distress are considered to be automatic, 
quick acting, and involuntary (Hoffman, 2000). The preceding affective forms of empathy are the 
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earliest to “come online” in the course of infancy and early childhood development (Decety & 
Michalska, 2010).  
Mediated association generally requires language and is a more developmentally 
complex process (Hoffman, 2000). Most frequently the empathic feelings are moderated 
verbally. For example, someone could arouse an empathic response by saying, “I am sad.” The 
observer would process this information and may feel empathic distress that would likely 
involve some component of the other modes of empathic arousal. Mediated association can 
also be cognitively mediated. Hoffman (2000) gives an example where someone regularly spoke 
to their grandmother who was in a coma. The grandchild felt empathy based on their previous 
relationship with their grandmother, knowledge of the patient’s situation and the assumption 
that their grandmother could hear them, while receiving no cues indicating their grandmother’s 
internal state.  It becomes clear that mediated association requires a certain level of abstraction 
and theory of mind (conception of others as distinctly unique from the self with their own 
internal states and goals). Theory of mind is not necessarily prerequisite to the first three modes 
of empathic arousal which could conceivably be entirely egoistic. Most neurotypical adults have 
a theory of mind. Other animals, such as chimps, also have a theory of mind (Call & Tomasello, 
2008). Interestingly, much of the evidence that supports Call & Tomasello’s (2008) conclusion 
involves chimps attributing theory of mind to humans. However, as humans, we have hotly 
debated whether chimps have a theory of mind for 30 more than years (Call & Tomasello, 2008). 
The final mode of empathic arousal that Hoffman (2000) discussed is role-taking 
(perspective taking). This is the act of cognitively putting yourself in another’s place and 
imagining how they might feel. Role-taking is developmentally advanced and the ways in which 
 
66 
an observer practicess role-taking is reflective of their personal development. Role-taking may 
be either self-focused or other-focused. Self-focused role-taking is the act of observing someone 
else and imagining how you would feel in their situation. It is possible, but not ensured that this 
will lead to the observer having empathic feelings that are similar to the other.  Other-focused 
role-taking is the act of observing someone else and imagining how they feel. This requires the 
observer to have the ability to conceptualize others as separate and unique individuals. Other-
focused role-taking can be enhanced by the observer’s knowledge about the person that they 
observe.  
For example, if someone witnessed a mugging, self-focused role-taking could lead the 
observer to feel angry while the victim feels unsafe and frightened. It is easy to imagine how this 
could lead to victim blaming, especially if the observer was an able-bodied master of karate who 
would feel safe confronting the mugger. If the victim was a less able-bodied or elderly individual, 
other-focused role-taking might result in the observer feeling a more empathic understanding of 
the victim’s fear. How and why folks act on empathic distress will follow, but in the former case, 
if the master of karate chose to help, a self-focused role-taking might lead them to help by 
confronting the mugger and other-focused role-taking might be more likely to lead them to 
focus their effort on comforting or protecting the victim.  
Self-focused and other-focused role-taking can both be prosocial motives and neither 
necessarily results in the empathic observer having similar feelings to the one who they observe. 
While other-focused role-taking is a more cognitively advanced task, both can serve as prosocial 
motives. Commonly role-taking is a combination of self and other-focused.  Additionally, all of 
the modes of empathic arousal complement each other and may be experienced in various 
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combinations. In the case of the mugging example, it is likely that the observer would feel 
empathy not only based on role taking, but also by observation of the victim’s reaction in the 
form of mimicry, classical conditioning, or direct association, or the victim’s verbal response, 
through mediated association. 
In relationship to ecological degradation mediated association and perspective taking 
warrant further exploration. Plous (2003) observed humans feeling empathy for other animals 
depicted being beaten. (Franklin et al., 2013) provided neurological support for Plous’(2003) 
claim that humans feel empathy for non-human animals and that many of the same regions of 
the brain associated with empathy become active whether observing a human or other animal 
suffering. However, Franklin et al. (2012) noted that the processes are not a match and that 
different regions of the brain are significantly more active when observing human suffering. 
Franklin et al. (2012) suspected that this difference may be related to the way humans 
differently perceive animals which may relate to culture and individual differences. It seems 
conceivable that some humans would directly associate a non-human animal’s pain with their 
own experiences of pain. However, knowledge or beliefs about other animal species (for 
example beliefs about similarity to non-human animals) probably do cognitively mediate the 
empathy that we feel for them (empathic bias is explored in the following section). Thus, by 
encouraging people to take the perspective of a non-human animal, they feel greater empathy, 
and thus concern for the animal (Berenguer, 2010; Schultz, 2000). 
In the case of application of empathic arousal to broader environmental issues, certain 
environmental (social & ecological) knowledge related to the consequences of our actions likely 
mediates our empathic arousal regarding environmental issues (Berenguer, 2010). Furthermore, 
 
68 
although the welfare of animals is intrinsically important, concern for an individual non-
human animal has been shown to increase concern, more generally for the environment (Myers, 
Saunders, & Garrett, 2003, 2004). Thus, encouraging empathic concern for animals is important 
not only for animals as individuals and as a species, but for ecological restoration as a whole. I 
revisit concern for other animals in the Moral Limitations and Conflicts section. 
3.2.3 Discipline and intervention 
Hoffman (2000) suggested that feelings of empathic distress motivate prosocial or 
helping behavior and moral internalization through a translation from empathy to sympathy and 
associated feelings of guilt. The modes of empathic arousal that have so far been discussed, 
primarily assume that the empathic observer is an innocent bystander and has not been 
involved in the transgression that resulted in the emotional state of the target. Hoffman 
suggests that children develop morally through their own transgressions and resulting 
disciplinary action. Based on those experiences, children begin to make inductions to more 
general situations and self-discipline through guilt. Moral development through induction builds 
capacity for feelings of guilt over inaction or anticipatory guilt over inaction that encourage 
helping behavior in situations where the actor is an innocent bystander. It also fosters a 
conception of one’s role as a virtual transgressor in situations where one may feel complicit in a 
transgression that they are not directly involved in.  
Socialization is the key to understanding moral internalization. Hoffman (2000) 
specifically investigates the role of power in discipline/intervention, most significantly by 
children’s parents, but not exclusively. The way that children are disciplined in situations where 
they are the transgressor hugely influences how and when they will feel guilt and how helping 
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behavior will be triggered or catalyzed in the future. An understanding of this aspect of the 
socialization process in moral internalization will set the stage for understanding the myriad 
forms of guilt that humans feel, empathic biases, moral exclusion, and the moral principles that 
guide our interactions with one another. 
Hoffman (2000) defines three forms of discipline: power assertion, love withdrawal, and 
induction. Power assertion can be physical, as punitive or constraining discipline, or non-
physical. Power assertive methods of discipline may be softened with explanations but all rely 
primarily on an assertion of power of a guardian or other authority figure over the child. An 
example of a punitive-physical power assertion is spanking a child and an example of 
constraining is picking up and moving the child. An example of a non-physical power assertion is 
a firm and authoritative correction, like, “No! Don’t ever do that again.” While this is the least 
conducive method to empathy development, Hoffman (2000) points out that unqualified power 
assertion is necessary in emergencies. Power assertion can also be used in conjunction with 
other discipline methods. Love withdrawal may be silent or explicit. An example of silent love 
withdrawal is ignoring a child who is misbehaving and an example of explicit love withdrawal is 
sending a child to their room, or saying, “I don’t like you when you act that way.” While power 
assertion is more likely to result in a child feeling fear, love withdrawal is more likely to result in 
anxiety. 
Inductive interventions are most conducive to empathic and moral development. In 
inductive intervention, the child’s guardian or other authority figure helps a child who has acted 
as transgressor to understand how their actions affect others. An example is a guardian telling a 
child, “when you hit them, it hurt them and made them cry. You should never hit someone 
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because it hurts them. If you said you were sorry, they would feel better.” Developmentally 
appropriate inductive-interventions accomplish two things that the other forms of discipline do 
not. First, they call attention to the emotional distress of others triggering the child’s own 
empathy and fostering the child’s empathic distress. Second, they help the child understand 
their role in causing the emotional distress of the other and helps the child to feel empathy-
based guilt. This encourages children to avoid the transgression in the future and to make 
reparations when they do transgress. This establishes an emotional guilt-script that children 
eventually internalizes and follows without the guidance of a guardian or authority figure: 
Transgression -> Induction -> Empathic Distress and Guilt -> Reparation.  
As with the modes of empathic arousal, methods of discipline rarely fall neatly into just 
one category. Often discipline involves components of all three. I recall an incidence of bullying 
on a nature hike that I led. One of the kids had been consistently bullying the others and at one 
point the kid picked up a stick and chased another other down the trail with it. The immediate 
need was to stop the dangerous situation. I’ve rarely raised my voice to children, but I yelled for 
them to stop and put down the stick. They stopped near me and started arguing. I said 
something to the effect that I didn’t care who started it but it needed to stop. Once it seemed 
like the immediate danger was diminished we discussed what had happened. Both kids were 
still angry and I was also upset and our attempt to discuss the situation was not very productive. 
I had the entire group hike silently for the next ten minutes or so and asked them to think over 
what had happened. This also gave me a chance to calm down and think about the situation. 
When we stopped, we gathered in a circle and I explained that I didn’t mean to yell at them, but 
that I was scared someone was going to get hurt. As a group we discussed what had happened 
and brainstormed how to get along better and resolve disagreements as a group for the rest of 
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our time together. At the time, I wasn’t thinking about different methods of discipline or how 
they relate to moral development. I was just reacting. I share this story because I think it 
illustrates the types of discipline and their relationships in a common situation. My initial 
reaction was very power assertive, then I attempted induction, which was unsuccessful because 
tensions were too high, so I used something like love withdrawal by asking them to hike silently 
for 10 minutes. After that, I tried to soften this love withdrawal with an explanation and apology 
and then tried induction for the second time which seemed more successful than my first 
attempt. I don’t know if I handled the situation well and I often worry that the kid who had 
chased the other with the stick will wind up in trouble in the future. However, I’ve better 
understood the concepts of moral development through consideration of my own life. I doubt 
that one experience on a class field trip significantly affected the kid’s established behavior and 
bullying often correlates with anti-social behavior in adult and the consequences are much more 
significant.  
3.2.4 Guilt 
With an understanding of the complexities and abstractions involved in guilt and the 
related empathic biases, the ways in which we come to establish our moral principles and 
specifically our concepts of justice become apparent. Hoffman (2000) identified the 
prerequisites for guilt as: an awareness of another’s distress, a sense of control over one’s 
actions, an awareness of the consequences of one’s actions, the ability to attribute causality to 
those actions, and the ability to tell the difference between intentional actions and accidents. 
This begins to extend the concept of guilt beyond guilt associated with transgression (having 
directly caused the pain of another) and anticipatory guilt (relating to guilt felt prior to or in 
contemplation of a potential transgression), and guilt over inaction (guilt felt for not helping in 
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bystander context) to guilt in a more abstract sense, such as guilt over virtual transgressions. 
Virtual transgressions are transgressions where a transgression isn’t directly committed, 
however the transgressor (reasonably or unreasonably) perceives that their behavior caused 
harm. 
Relationship guilt occurs in close personal relationships (Hoffman, 2000). It can result 
from transgressions, ranging from forgotten appointments to betrayals of confidence, or it can 
relate to a feeling guilty for another’s distress when there is no indication that it is the result of 
one’s own transgression. This is commonly, but not exclusively, felt in romantic relationships, 
when someone feels that their partner is upset and assumes, even when told otherwise, that 
they must have done something wrong and they feel guilty for it. Similarly, responsibility guilt is 
related to feelings of responsibility for another’s wellbeing. Responsibility guilt doesn’t 
necessitate a close relationship. For example, in a disaster, a city official might feel responsibility 
guilt for the suffering of folks in that city, despite evidence that there was nothing the official 
could have done to prevent it (Hoffman, 2000).   
Developmental guilt includes guilt related to separation from friends and family, guilt 
over achievement, and guilt over affluence. Hoffman (2000) stated that 
an individualistic, competitive society like ours can make growing up and 
pursuing normal personal goals and interests the context for virtual 
transgressions involving ‘developmental guilt.’ (p.182) 
 
It is important to understand that virtual transgressions result in real guilt and are only virtual in 
the sense that they are not perpetrated with an intention or awareness of their potential for 
harm (Hoffman, 2000). I think virtual transgressions are easiest to understand in the context of 
separation guilt. When a young person leaves home for the first time to attend college and 
 
73 
leaves behind friends and family, they may experience a feeling of guilt. This is a virtual 
transgression, but there is a very real chance that their friends and family will miss them and 
suffer emotional distress. Assuming that the student is not attending college out of malice or 
contempt for their friends and family, this would not be considered to be a transgression in the 
dominant US American culture. It is considered a developmentally normal process for young 
people to leave home to attend college so it is a virtual transgression. 
Guilt over achievement is incrementally more complex with regard to the virtual nature 
of virtual transgressions (Hoffman, 2000). Rooted in social comparison, achievement is 
commonly a competitive endeavor. In school, kids may feel guilty for earning high grades while 
other students are less academically successful because they recognize the effect of social 
comparison on a peer’s self-esteem. In other cases, achievement may be earned at the direct 
expense of another. Receiving a top scholarship, winning first place in a competition, or earning 
a promotion, all dictate that someone else didn’t get the scholarship, didn’t win, or didn’t get 
the promotion.  
Guilt over affluence requires some form of exposure to folks who are less fortunate and 
cultural context that does not provide justification for disparities in wealth and racial 
superiority. Guilt over affluence is guilt felt  having more than others. While transgression guilt 
may be alleviated by a single act of restitution, those who feel guilt over affluence may feel 
compelled to participate in sustained activity to relieve human suffering (Hoffman, 2000). 
As with bystander guilt, if one does nothing one continues to feel guilty; blames 
victims; cognitively restructures to justify inaction, deny or justify ones 
affluence: “They have their pleasures and enjoy the way they live”; “I worked 
hard for what I have.” (Hoffman, 2000, p.186)  
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Guilt over affluence begins to push the limits of the virtual nature of virtual transgressions- at 
least to those with socialist perspective. Many transgressions only remain virtual, in a capitalist 
system, with norms of meritocracy, and with the contribution of ignorance, moral bias and 
moral exclusion. Without such defenses, I find affluence and the following transgressions are 
not virtual because they are at the direct expense of other people. Guilt by association refers to 
guilt caused by association with a particular social group that one considers culpable. In the case 
of affluence, it may be class association. Guilt by association could also relate to association with 
a political or religious group. More generally, guilt over affluence and guilt by association are 
guilt felt over relative advantage (Hoffman, 2000). This might more aptly be referred to as 
privilege guilt in a social justice context. 
 A final consideration, as alluded to in the description of guilt over affluence, is victim 
blaming. Victim blaming is a process of justifying the suffering of others. Especially in a 
bystander situation, victim blaming “puts psychological distance between bystander and victim 
and reduces the bystander’s empathic distress and motivation to help” (Hoffman, 2000, p.94). 
This is especially common when the bystander doesn’t feel able to help. 
What may transform empathic distress into guilt feeling, is that one cannot 
justify and therefore does not deserve the advantages one has over the victim; 
that one’s advantage, surviving or being affluent while others starve or die, 
violates the principle of fairness, justice, or reciprocity. One has an empathic 
feeling of injustice that is transformed into guilt feeling, because one is the 
beneficiary of the injustice. (Hoffman, 2000, p.190)  
 
An illustration of the role of guilt is provided by one of the Holocaust rescuers interviewed by 
Oliner & Oliner (1988): 
It was unfair that I was safe simply because I was born a Protestant. That was 
the main reason for me. What I did was a question of justice. It was a humble 
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thing because I was in a privileged situation compared with other people who 
didn’t deserve their situation at all. (p.166) 
 
In summary, there are four categories of guilt arousing processes, according to Hoffman 
(2000): (1) guilt resulting from external intervention such as induction with children, (2) guilt 
spontaneously (as a result of internalization) following a perceived transgression, (3) guilt 
spontaneously following an ambiguous situation such as relationship guilt, (4) guilt following 
inaction as a bystander. Finally, “empathy-based transgression guilt may be the prototype for all 
empathy-based guilt, real or imagined” (Hoffman, 2000, p.193). According to our feelings of guilt 
and the inductions that we make in response we begin to construct moral frameworks regarding 
appropriate ways of interacting with one another.  
3.3 Limitations of Empathy 
Hoffman’s (2000) examination of the limitations of empathy is strictly in consideration 
of empathy as a prosocial motive. Empathy is addressed as a process including empathy and 
sympathy rather than the simple outcome of emotional state matching. Hoffman (2000) did 
explicitly refer to humans as highly or less empathic, in reference to capacity for an empathic 
outcome such as feeling what another feels. However, the value of understanding the 
limitations of empathy is in understanding empathy as a process where the most important 
outcome is not state matching but motivation to help. Although the intensity of emotion 
experienced by an empathic witness may be a significant motivator, those who Hoffman (2000) 
suggested are less empathic may be motivated cognitively. Thus the focus on empathic 
limitations is focused on ways in which (cognitive and affective) empathy may preclude helping 
behavior.  
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The limitations of empathy include potentially self-destructive and certainly limiting 
reactions to empathic distress, differences in the character of the empathic individual, and 
empathic biases that may interfere with the guilt-scripts that motivate us to help each other. 
The limiting reactions to empathic distress include empathic over-arousal, compassion fatigue, 
individual character differences, and empathic bias.  
3.3.1 Empathic over-arousal and compassion fatigue 
Empathic over-arousal is an “involuntary process that occurs when [an] observer’s 
empathic distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is transformed into intense feelings 
of personal distress, which may move the person out of the empathic mode entirely” (Hoffman, 
2000, p.198). Instances of empathic over-arousal may also result in egoistic drift, where the 
empathic distress triggers a process where someone gets so caught up in their own feelings that 
they are forced to attend to their personal distress and disengage from the from the feelings 
associated to the person experiencing distress. However, empathic over-arousal can also serve 
as a prosocial motive by intensifying a person’s attention and helping behavior, even to the 
point where it becomes all-consuming if the situation does not become so overwhelming that 
they disengage entirely (Hoffman, 2000).   
Compassion fatigue results from prolonged or continuous states at or near the point of 
empathic over-arousal. These processes may also result in “vicarious traumatization” (trauma 
and empathic disorders are briefly discussed following the discussion of limitations to empathy). 
One way that folks defensively cope with or avoid compassion fatigue results from habituation. 
Continued exposure to another’s distress over time, may result in a process of habituation, 
which diminishes empathic distress to the point where a person may become indifferent to 
 
77 
another’s suffering (Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman (2000) primarily used examples of medical 
professionals to illustrate these concepts such as a medical student unable to cope with regular 
interactions with a terminally ill patient and a doctor who seems unaffected. However 
compassion fatigue, habituation and trauma also relate to situations where youth are regularly 
experiencing violence (see 3.9 Outlying Behavior p.145) (Garbarino, 1996). Berman (1997) and 
Oliner & Oliner (1988) both discussed the importance of community in overcoming compassion 
fatigue, among contemporary US American activists by the former, and Holocaust rescuers by 
the latter. Many of the folks, who continually placed themselves in situations arousing severe 
empathic distress discussed their reliance on a supportive community (S. Berman, 1997; Oliner 
& Oliner, 1988). 
3.3.2 Character difference 
There are also individual characteristics that affect how an individual might respond to 
the emotional distress of another. The first is described as empathic tendency and suggests that 
some folks are more empathic than others (Hoffman, 2000). This refers to the empathic 
outcome of emotional state matching. Those who are considered highly empathic, in some 
cases, may be less able to help, due to their empathic distress (Hoffman, 2000). Those who are 
better equipped to regulate their emotions, handle anxiety, and cope with empathic distress are 
better able to avoid empathic over-arousal (Hoffman, 1981). One method of regulating 
emotions is distancing oneself from a patient or victim (Hoffman, 2000). By recognizing the 
other as distinct from the self and “maintaining a sense of whose feelings belong to whom,” 
(Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.56) empathic over-arousal may be reduced or avoided. The process 
of distancing may result in more pronounced dissociation. Oliner & Oliner (1988) found feelings 
of dissociation from Holocaust victims to be equally common among rescuers and non-rescuers. 
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Finally, a sense of self-efficacy also contributed to helping behavior and reduced the risk of 
empathic over-arousal (Hoffman, 2000). Those who feel more able to help are more likely to 
help and feel less overwhelmed by the empathy that they feel. This is easy to understand in the 
context of guilt scripts and in the identification of empathy as a prosocial motive. Empathic 
distress is relieved by helping. However, helplessness and hopelessness can be exacerbated by 
the described character differences in increase empathic bias.  
3.3.3 Empathic bias 
Empathic bias may be related to human nature but are also deeply related to 
socialization. Empathic bias falls into two categories, familiarity bias, and here-and-now bias. 
Familiarity bias refers to an empathic bias towards those who one is familiar with including bias 
that favors one’s in-group, one’s friends, and those who one finds to be similar to one’s self. The 
evolutionary argument for familiarity bias is that humans evolved in small groups where 
resources were scarce and the small groups of early humans were in competition for resources 
so an empathic bias towards one’s own in-group favored group survival (Hoffman, 2000).  
Hoffman (2000) cites in-group bias as a factor in violent crimes where perpetrators feel 
diminished transgression guilt by distancing themselves from their victims by derogating them 
or even viewing them as subhumans. This was certainly the case during the Holocaust (Oliner & 
Oliner, 1988). The nature of the relationship between friends fosters greater understanding of 
one another and a stronger sense of preference for one another and is referred to as friendship 
bias. It remains unclear, however, in Hoffman’s (2000) work, whether the actual feelings of 
empathy are stronger between friends, or if the bias is due to the voluntary and reciprocal 
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nature of friendship. Still, the bias towards prosocial behavior between those who we have 
close personal relationships with (e.g., friends and family) is evident.  
Similarity bias can also be considered more generally. Real or perceived similarity (with 
examples in gender and personality) results in greater expressions of empathy (Hoffman, 2000). 
Oliner & Oliner (1988) found that many rescuers seemed to assume Jewish people were similar 
to them, regardless of any experience with them. Actual familiarity with the Jewish people as 
measured by rescuer accounts of social relations with Jewish people and knowledge of Jewish 
culture was not found to be an indicator for or against rescue. I posit that an observer must feel 
some sense of connection to the target in order to feel empathy. A perception that the target is 
similar to ones self (even in the vaguest way) establishes some affinity with (if not for, as in 
friendship bias) the target. Such an association may be necessary for empathy. Increased 
familiarity with the target may further increase the empathic connection, especially if the 
observer is fond of the target. Similarity bias has also been shown to affect human empathy for 
non-human animals. We feel greater empathy for animals that we perceive to be more similar 
to us such as monkeys than animals that we perceive to be less similar like pheasants (Plous, 
2003).  
Empathic bias is likely a significant factor in racism. In non-human species kin-selection 
suggests a bias towards the most genetically similar members of a species (Laland & Brown, 
2011). However in humans, it has been well proven that similarities in phenotypic variation such 
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as skin color do not correlate with genetic similarity (Guest, 2014). Humans have never 
become genetically different enough from other contemporaneously living humans to prevent 
interbreeding19 thus significant genetic drift among any sub-population of humans is extremely 
unlikely (Guest, 2014). Homo sapiens have always shared the same genetic pool and genetic 
variation has occurred in geographic clines (Guest, 2014). Archaic Homo sapiens (Neanderthals) 
are believed to have coexisted with modern Homo sapiens for around 4,000 years from 32,000 
years before present (yBP) to 28,000 yBP, and a consensus on the cause of disappearance of 
Neanderthals has not been reached (Guest, 2014). However there is evidence that Neanderthals 
and modern Homo sapiens did interbreed and Neanderthal genes may be present in the modern 
human gene pool (Guest, 2014).  
There may have never, at any point in human evolution, been a genetic basis for 
multiple races among humans (if the inability to interbreed defines speciation). Evolved bias 
towards one’s own family and friends is reasonable, but an evolved preference for a larger 
ethnic or racial group, beyond a concept of an extended family, must be primarily socially 
influenced. None of this denies the very real existence of familiarity bias, but if causality for a 
racial in-group bias was attributed to genetics rather than socialization it would it would imply 
                                                          
 
19
 Definitions of speciation are quite controversial. The commonly held definitions of speciation is that 
cross-breeding is either impossible, sterile, or results in sterile offspring (e.g., mules) (McWorter, 2010). 
As race was beginning to being scientificly formalized in the United States it was proposed in 1943 that 
humans of mixed race suffered from health problems and were generally infertile  (McWorter, 2010). As 
discussed in the section on the evolution of empathy, the use of concepts of species to establish races 
among humans is a distortion of genetics as a tool for racial oppression. As a final note, McWorter (2010) 
notes that the commonly held definition of species (based in sexual reproduction) is frequently used to 
derogate non-heterosexual and transgender individuals.  
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that there is some evolutionary basis for race. Race is entirely socially constructed but 
empathic bias based on familiarity may be biological. If, through socialization we are racialized 
then racial in-group bias becomes real even if there is no genetic precedent for it. Simply stated: 
“situations defined as real are real in their consequences” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.260).   
We may feel more similar to others based on familiarity or in-group membership and 
thus be disposed to empathic bias. For humans to have a sense of familiarity based on likely 
common experiences related to the process of racialization seems reasonable. At the individual 
level, and when not taken to the extreme, this is not necessarily problematic and can quite 
healthy (e.g., affinity groups). Obviously, this becomes problematic when one person views 
another as so dissimilar they fail to feel any sympathy (see 3.7.1 Moral exclusion p.116). This 
becomes extremely problematic when a powerful group acts drastically according to their own 
in-group bias and systematically denies justice to those outside their group.  
The final type of empathic bias is here-and-now bias and suggests that humans have 
heightened receptivity to the events that are spatially and temporally immediate (Hoffman, 
2001). This suggests that people would feel a greater sense of empathy in a situation where they 
are a bystander or transgressor than in virtual transgressions. During the Holocaust, 70% of the 
rescuers made their decision to help within minutes of consideration and more than half were 
motivated to help by the immediacy of the violation of the social norms that they valued (Oliner 
& Oliner, 1988). Furthermore, 78% of rescuers took their first action because someone asked 
them for help, making the situation real and immediate (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). 
Although this chapter is dedicated to a descriptive investigation of the moral 
development process, I refuse to leave this section on the limitations of empathy stand as an 
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account of human deficits. Regardless of whether empathic limitations part of human nature, 
we are not bound by them. The limitations to human empathy present educational opportunity 
to strive with our students to reach a greater potential. It is clear, even before delving into 
human morality and the moral development process that fostering and facilitating empathic 
induction is a significant point of behavioral intervention. We can facilitate experiences to build 
self-efficacy and teach coping skills to encourage sympathetic action and reduce empathic over-
arousal. We can help students to see the connections between their local actions and global 
consequences and the interconnectedness of the world to reduce here-and-now bias. We can 
also support students in exploring their own identities and honoring world cultures with cross-
cultural curriculum and encourage appreciate the similarities and difference among all peoples 
to encourage empathy by positively utilizing similarity and familiarity biases (see 4.4 Pedagogy 
of Identity p.220). Finally, the limitations to empathy are functionally necessary to a certain 
extent. We simply don’t have the capacity mentally, emotionally, or practically, to feel empathy 
and sympathy and to take restitutionary action in response to every transgression and injustice 
in the world. As Hoffman (2000) suggested,” if people empathized with everyone in distress and 
tried to help them all equally, society might quickly come to a halt” (p. 14).  
3.4 Morality 
The development of empathy and its relation to guilt, in consideration of empathic bias, 
and contemporaneous cognitive development shape one’s moral development (Hoffman, 2000). 
According to one’s experience throughout the empathy and moral development process one’s 
sense of morality may differ significantly from others. Thus, it is useful to disambiguate morality 
into distinctly philosophical and psychological components. The psychological component 
relates to how one’s sense of morality develops and the philosophical component relates to the 
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nature of morality (Peter H. Kahn, 1999).  Hoffman (2000) generally proceeded without such 
disambiguation and favors a psychological approach to morality focused on development. 
According to Hoffman (2000) one’s philosophic concept of morality is significantly a result of 
socialization in the moral development process (following David Hume20).  
I proceed with Hoffman’s (2000) framework for morality which provides significant 
depth and insight, but it will be useful to begin with a brief exploration of morality as a more 
distinctly deontological idea. Kahn (1999) considered morality more philosophically than 
Hoffman (2000) and suggested that morality is objective (Immanuel Kant as interpreted by Eliot 
Turiel). Kahn (1999) defined two categories of moral judgments: obligatory moral judgments 
and discretionary moral judgments. Obligatory judgments are defined to be (1) universally 
applicable to all morally similar situations, (2) not contingent on societal rules, laws or, 
conventions, (3) justified by principles such as fairness, justice, welfare, or rights. However, Kahn 
(1999) did not ignore cultural context in the universality of obligatory moral judgments as 
illuminated by the following example: devout Hindus believe that is immoral for a widow to eat 
fish. At first glance there seems to be nothing universal about this, but in the context of Hindu 
culture, if the widow eats fish it would torment her husband’s spirit and cause the widow to 
                                                          
 
20
 As discussed in the introduction and in the context of the evolution of empathy, I find it important to 
know the history of ideas. I would have loved to have explored the history of moral philosophy, moral 
psychology, and human development more fully in order to understand how our understanding of these 
topics may have developed in social and historical context. However, these are timeless questions, and 
the body of work is too vast to even adequately cover current understandings. With this in mind, I have 
tried to at least mention some of the influences of the scholars those more familiar with the field (or 
those seeking to learn more) have a sense of the traditions that are being explored.  
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suffer. Kahn (1999) pointed out that these beliefs may differ from our own personal beliefs 
but that the “underlying concern for the welfare of others is congruent with our own” (Peter H. 
Kahn, 1999, p.204). Kahn’s (1999) pluralistic considerations are very strictly limited by the 
concept of moral universality, though. 
The second qualification that obligatory moral judgments are not contingent on societal 
rules, laws, or conventions relates to the universality of the principles. Children seem to easily 
conceptualize this. When presented with a scenario where the principal of a school has 
announced that it is OK to hit other students, and asked if it would be OK to hit another student, 
most children will respond that would still not OK because it is never OK to hit someone. 
However, if presented with a scenario where the principal has declared that is OK to call 
teachers by their first names rather than Mr. or Mrs. and asked if that OK, most children 
respond that would be as long as it is ok with the teacher. The distinction is that the first case 
violates a moral that most children learn and internalize early in life and the second is just a 
social convention and that violating the first causes harm while the violating the second does 
not cause harm. The former is considered the moral domain and the latter is the conventional 
domain.  
Social conventions and moral norms are culturally constructed and may serve to 
maintain order and structure to social interactions and thus may be prosocial. For that reason, 
following norms and conventions is often a moral judgment even if the norms or conventions 
are not morally obligatory. However, moral norms are not necessarily prosocial or aligned with 
one’s individual moral judgments which may lead to significant conflict. Thus, it may be very 
difficult to determine which domain a conflict resides in and may not be as objective as Kahn 
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(1999) and the social domain theorists suggest, where the moral domain always trumps the 
conventional. If morality is relative, then what is posited to be morally universal is actually 
relative to the status quo and obligatory moral judgments would largely reduce to a matter of 
conformity. I explore moral relativism in greater detail in the Moral Limitations and Conflicts 
section. 
Discretionary moral judgments are beyond what is obligatory or what is demanded by a 
situation. They may be judgments that would encourage morally “good” (or supererogatory) 
actions that are not morally mandated (obligatory judgments). Thus, inaction wouldn’t be 
considered immoral. One example of a discretionary moral judgment that Kahn (1999) gives is 
the decision whether or not to make a charitable donation. Not donating to charity isn’t 
generally a moral transgression (in Western culture), but many would suggest that it is a good 
thing to do. 
Kahn (1999) also categorized moral judgments into positive and negative morals (i.e., 
do’s and do-not’s). Kahn (1999) found that positive-discretionary moral action to be the most 
praiseworthy, followed by positive-obligatory moral action, and negative obligatory moral action 
least praiseworthy. The interpretation that Kahn (1999) focused on is that the least 
praiseworthy actions are so stringently applied that they are not praiseworthy. Thus, we place 
greater emphasis on negative morals (Kahn, 1999). This seems consistent with Hoffman’s (2000) 
emphasis on guilt as a motivator because it primarily motivates folks to avoid transgressions. It 
also reflects an orientation towards action over inaction (e.g. picking up litter over not littering). 
For example, action in accordance with a negative-obligatory morals, such as not littering 
doesn’t win praise, while violation of a negative-obligatory moral (littering) brings scorn. In 
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contradistinction action in accordance with positive-discretionary morals, such as picking up 
litter is praiseworthy, while inaction (not picking up every piece of litter we pass) usually 
warrants neither praise nor scorn.  
In consideration the reality of degradation in the world, Kahn’s (1999) presumption that 
morality is universal led to its logical conclusion: “it is less the case that societies differ morally, 
and more the case that some societies (ours included) are involved explicitly in immoral 
practices” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, pp.205-206). I refuse such a deficit approach and find it 
imperative that this be reframed. Kahn’s position is a rational conclusion given the assumption 
of obligatory moral judgments that are always entirely salient. Rather than believing in “iniquity 
that smites the land21,” I follow Hoffman (2000) in more nuanced exploration of moral 
development. As Hoffman (2000) explained, in the course of moral development, differing 
experiences (and character differences) may cause people recognize and respond to moral 
conflicts differently and with greater or lesser influence on different moral principles. Hoffman’s 
(2000) approach leaves more room for a sympathetic perspective on human behavior and 
seems less conducive to such broad condemnation of societies as explicitly immoral. However, 
bear in mind that while Hoffman (2000) attempted to understand variability in moral judgments, 
Hoffman (2000) also rejected moral relativism.  
3.5 Moral Development 
                                                          
 
21
 As the author of the poem cited by Glasser (2007) did. Recall that he was contemplating suicide. 
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The moral development process that Hoffman’s (2000) theory modeled is very similar 
to the empathy development process. Hoffman’s (2000) theory assumes affective primacy and 
focuses most significantly on socialization but does not ignore the influence of cognitive 
development as explored by Piaget and Kohlberg. In this section I center Hoffman’s moral 
development model, while attempting to consider, critique, and integrate multiple moral 
development models. Moral development begins with personal experiences as a bystander or 
victim and socialization-primarily in the home through induction guided by a parent or guardian 
(Hoffman, 2000). The induction step continues with socialization beyond the home: in peer 
interactions, in school, and by media. Thus begins a process of abstraction and organization of 
moral principles based on those experiences. Finally a phase of commitment takes place, where 
the moral principles are accepted and internalized. Beyond that point triggering events may 
make the principles more concrete and dictate moral action or restructuring of moral principles. 
The nature of triggering or catalyzing events will be examined at the end of the chapter. 
The foundation of moral development as conceptualized by Hoffman (2000) is empathy 
development. The capacity for (or more precisely tendency towards) empathy develops in 
accordance with the brain’s development. Infants experience empathy globally and do not 
distinguish others emotions from their own. For example, the newborn reactive cry is a 
tendency for newborn infants to cry when they hear another infant cry (Hoffman, 2000). 
“Indistinguishable from the spontaneous cry of an infant who is in actual discomfort,” it is “an 
innate, isomorphic response to a cry of another being of the same species” (Hoffman, 2000, 
p.65). Later in early childhood, children become aware of others distress but they respond as if it 
were their own. Thus, their response to another’s distress is to seek comfort for themselves. 
Next the child’s experience with empathy becomes quasi-egocentric (generally early in their 
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second year). In this stage, the child is able to distinguish another’s distress from their own, 
however they still have difficulty conceptualizing others as having unique inner states. Thus, a 
prosocially motivated quasi-egocentric child would attempt to comfort another child by the 
same means that they would comfort themselves. Finally, by late in the second year children 
begin to understand others as unique individuals with distinct needs and motivations and begin 
to more significantly practice more developed forms of empathy (i.e., mediated association and 
other-focused role-taking). Later, and into adulthood children begin considering not only the 
immediate distress of an individual, but their life condition (Hoffman, 2000). 
An early concept of right and wrong that precedes significant empathic and moral 
development is deference to authority (Gibbs, 2014). A child in the egocentric stage of empathy 
development may not significantly consider how their actions affect others, but they will likely 
be aware of rules and the consequences for breaking those rules (e.g., never hit because you get 
in trouble if you hit). The moral development process most significantly begins when the child 
starts to make inductions in accordance with empathic distress or guilt experienced as observer 
or transgressor. These inductions lead young children to generalized conclusions about the 
consequences of their behavior and ultimately, based on those consequences, the child begins 
to formulate concepts of right and wrong. For young children, empathic induction likely 
addresses the most immediately salient elements of the transgression and the target’s response 
(e.g., never steal sister’s toy because she will cry). As children cognitively develop their induction 
process becomes more encompassing and the inductions are integrated into a more 
comprehensive moral framework. As children enter school their social environments and 
influences begin to expand. Children continue making inductions, achieve a greater social 
understanding beyond the home, and their perspectives become less egocentric. This process is 
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the result of cognitive and affective development as well as socialization (Gibbs, 2014; 
Hoffman, 2000).  
The abstraction and organization stage involves peer interactions where a child begins 
to accommodate other perspectives and claims (Hoffman, 2001). This decentering and demand 
for social reciprocity enables the child to understand bias in their own and others’ claims, and 
induction helps the child become receptive to others claims and forms empathy-based concepts 
of fairness (Hoffman, 2001). However, theorists such as Kohlberg suggested the cognitive 
development process leads to universal tendencies in human cognition, and in turn morality 
(Gibbs, 2014). Gibbs (2014) seeks a middle ground and argues for affective-cognitive co-primacy. 
Following Gibbs (2014) I favor co-primacy. Depending on one’s own experiences and cultural 
context different emphasis on various moral principles may take precedent (Hoffman, 2000). 
However, cognitive development likely increases a child’s tendency22 towards greater social 
understanding (Gibbs, 2014). Furthermore there may be elements of morality that universally 
result from the way our brains develop and function (i.e., objective morality). The most 
important conclusion for my purposes is that all but the most extreme of outliers (see 3.9 
Outlying Behavior p.145) develop a moral framework through some process of abstraction and 
organization.  
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 Gibbs (2014) according with neo-Piagetian thought, does not consider such cognitive development to 
limit children’s capacities, but to influence their tendencies. 
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 The demand for reciprocity among humans may a universal process. Although 
interpreted and emphasized differently among individuals and cultures, reciprocity seems to be 
universally considered among humans (Gibbs, 2014). It is possible that reciprocity is a social 
norm that is widely (or universally) present in human societies for its “functional value for 
promoting and stabilizing social relationships” (Gibbs, 2014, p.56). It may also be that reciprocity 
is universally a result of cognitive construction and “a natural preference for balance and 
harmony” (Gibbs, 2014, p.56). I favor Gibbs’ (2014) conclusion that reciprocity is both cognitive-
developmental and normative. An affective response to violations of reciprocity and motivation 
to restore harmony may not be significantly influenced by the domain in which reciprocity 
resides. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect that regardless of degradation of society 
some social norms must be aligned with the moral judgments of the majority of individuals. 
After all, social norms are socially constructed. Regardless of the subjectivity implicated by a 
moral model that maintains the primacy of socialization, there must be a universal need for 
some sort of fairness or harmony among (but not exclusively among) humans. 
 On the point of reciprocity and subjectivity, the cognitive-developmental theory 
warrants more attention. As one advances through Kohlberg’s moral stages, their concept of 
reciprocity is expected to change. Hoffman (2000) saw reciprocity as neutral and with the 
potential for prosocial or non-prosocial motivation. However, based on Kohlberg’s theory, Gibbs 
(2014) suggested that reciprocity becomes distinctly and universally prosocial because the 
emphasis shifts from the ‘immature’ tit for tat mentality to the ‘mature’ consideration of how 
one prefers to be treated in one’s treatment of others. Essentially, the ‘mature’ form of 
reciprocity is a merged form of reciprocity and perspective taking without a strict (or vengeful) 
demand for reciprocation from others. This advancement through the stages is characterized by 
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a transition starting with deference to authority, to the recognition of multiple perspectives 
(relativism) and then to a universal moral framework.  
Kohlberg cunningly established a universal invariant sequence of moral development 
that suggested a universal concept of morality was a result of advancing through a hierarchical 
concept of morality. Thus, 
Unbridled relativism seemed to Kohlberg to be inherently unstable from internal 
contradictions: if all morality is subjective, arbitrary, and relative, then why 
wouldn’t those characteristics apply to the attendant claim that one should not 
impose one’s morality on others? Accordingly, relativism undermines itself. 
Hence, sooner or later (at least for reflective adults, postmodernists 
notwithstanding) … the internal contradictions of meta-ethical relativism should 
eventually “disequilibrate” or perplex the thinker and prompt a 
“reequilibration” leading to movement beyond unbridled relativism to the 
achievement of post-skeptical rationalism. (Gibbs, 2014, pp. 87-88) 
 
Finally, Kohlberg posited that such rationalism would give way to universal moral judgments in 
the highest levels of moral development which are reached only by a minority of individuals. 
“Even in the adult years, only 13% fully or partially reached [the highest stages], and all of those 
had some graduate education” (Gibbs, 2014, p.90). As Gibbs (2014) suggested, this is extremely 
problematic “because any theory-defining level, even in broadened form, misrepresents moral 
judgment maturity as the exclusive province of [those who are] philosophically or theoretically 
articulate” (p.90). 
 Hoffman (2000) did not dictate a hierarchical or invariant sequence, beyond basic 
assumptions of human growth and development. However, nothing (to my understanding) 
about Hoffman’s (2000) theory suggests the impossibility of a cognitively influenced tendency 
towards specific developmental results as Kohlberg posited. In fact, co-occurring cognitive 
development is assumed throughout the model. As Hoffman (2000) also explicitly rejected 
 
92 
relativism, some ideal result of the developmental process is implicit (e.g., objectively correct 
moral judgments23). As Berman (1997) suggested, children selectively appropriate the material 
provided to them and their moral judgments are not entirely dependent on socialization. Thus, 
the theories are not a match, but neither are they incompatible. I see both deontological and 
consequentialist theories as important pieces in a puzzle that remains unentirely solved. In a 
complex physical and social world it is certain that multiple influences including and beyond 
those that we have explored influence the development of our sense of right and wrong. 
 Finally, once someone forms moral principles (described in the following section) they 
begin to commit to them. Commitment represents internalization, self-image, and a sense of 
responsibility associated with moral principle (Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman (2000) noted that 
during adolescence abstraction and organization process is significantly reconsidered when “one 
constructs one’s own set of general, relatively abstract, though emotionally charged moral 
principles” (p.260). However, once one has committed to and internalized moral principle, those 
principles are relatively stable.  
Profound confrontations which test our commitment to moral principles are referred to 
as triggering events (Hoffman, 2000). Triggering events may produce emotional responses that 
cause one to reexamine their life choices and may produce new moral perspectives and sense of 
responsibility (Hoffman, 2000). Such triggering events may threaten an individual’s self-image 
(Hoffman, 2000). In the case of the Holocaust some rescuers expressed that they could not have 
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 Moral relativism is considered apart from the moral development process later in this chapter. 
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lived with themselves if they had not helped (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, while one’s 
commitment to moral principle may motivate consistent behavior, it may also encourage an 
individual to interpret their own behaviors in a biased way in order to maintain a perception of 
moral consistency and reduce cognitive dissonance (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Many non-
rescuers interviewed by Oliner & Olinner (1988) were appalled by events that they witnessed 
during the Holocaust but felt that there was nothing that they could do. One possibility is that 
those non-rescuers maintained that belief as a defense against threats to their own self-image 
after inaction. I do want to be clear that I do not mean to condemn non-rescuers. Simply stated, 
it is easy to believe that you are the type of person who would have been a rescuer, but few are 
faced with a conflict of such profound significance where a definitive moment puts that self-
conception to the test (Hoffman, 2000). Catalyzing action is discussed further at the end of this 
chapter. 
In summary, children develop their sense of morality through socialization where they 
come to generalized moral conclusions through empathic arousal, associated feelings of guilt, 
and induction. This process is facilitated by the cognitive development process and furthermore 
children may come to logical understanding of morality that is independent of socialization as a 
direct result of the development and function of their brain. They organize these moral concepts 
into a moral framework which becomes internalized and relatively stable. Beyond that point, 
triggering experience may facilitate reassessment of one’s moral principles.  
Before continuing to discuss specific moral principles as outcomes of the moral 
development process, I will briefly consider the influence of school and the influence of 
parenting on children’s development. The implications of both digressions are discussed further 
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in Chapter 4: Pedagogy for restoration. However, I feel that both influences may be significant 
to the development process and thus warrant consideration here. 
3.5.1 Influence of parenting 
The guardian(s) or parent(s) who raise a child was considered by Oliner & Oliner (1988) 
to have the greatest influence on the child’s moral development (following Bowlby’s attachment 
theory). Some go so far as to suggest that one’s personality is largely determined and stable 
from a very young age and this position remains prominent today (e.g., Nave, Sherman, Funder, 
Hampson, & Goldberg, 2010). This is not universally accepted, neither is it always interpreted 
deterministically, but it does warrant some consideration of the influence of parenting on moral 
development despite the focus of this paper on education. Furthermore, much of the insight 
derived from Oliner & Oliner’s (1988) consideration of parenting may also apply to teaching. 
Specific insights on parenting also serve as contextual understanding for educators in a 
schooling environment. 
 The use of power assertion by parents, guardians or other authority figures is significant 
in a child’s character development (S. Berman, 1997; Freire & Freire, 1992/1994; Hoffman, 
2000; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). As explored in preceding sections, power assertive intervention by 
an authority in children’s conflicts does not promote the use of induction which is vital for moral 
development. Such intervention emphasizes obedience, an external locus of control, and does 
not facilitate learning of skills to cope with and resolve future conflicts. Oliner and Oliner (1988) 
suggested significant developmental consequences of excessive power assertion which would 
cause children to become “constricted” 
Constricted persons are described as those who  
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are centered on themselves and their material needs. They tend to see 
relationships in terms of exchanges of material goods and benefits rather than 
in terms of connectedness or ethical responsibility. Their failure to act on behalf 
of others is an expression of their tendency to distance themselves from 
relationships that impose burdens on them. In the social and political arena they 
tend to define the world in terms of hierarchy of power and feel powerless to 
influence change. They tend to be passive and externalize blame for their 
circumstance. (S. Berman, 1997, pp. 88-89) 
 
By contrast, extensive personalities are described as those who 
increasingly [incorporate] standards for personal integrity and care within their 
own value systems. While they may articulate such standards as cognitive 
principles, they experience them viscerally. They provide an organizing 
framework for their life activities and assignments of right and wrong. Even 
minor infractions distress them, and fundamental violations threaten them with 
a sense of chaos.  (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.250) 
 
Less power assertive and more inductive parenting techniques were considered more conducive 
to extensive personalities (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Extensive persons were posited to have what 
Berman (1997) called “leaky margins” where “ego boundaries sufficiently broadened so that 
other people were experienced as part of the self”  (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.183). Oliner & 
Oliner (1988) considered extinsivity a quality conducive to altruistic behavior. Einolf (2010) 
followed Oliner & Oliner’s (1988) work and attempted to measure extensivity and correlate it 
with prosocial behavior. Einolf (2010) found “quantitative evidence to support of the validity of 
the construct of extensivity, and the theory that extensivity motivates prosocial behavior.” 
Notably, Einolf (2010) correlated extensivity with prosocial behavior less profoundly altruistic 
than the actions of the Holocaust rescuers such as donating time or money to charity. 
 I see constricted or extensive personalities as two extremes of a conceptual spectrum 
that all people exist within. I believe that Oliner & Oliner (1988) offer these archetypes as a way 
to recognize the influence of power and the importance of the use of induction for children. 
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However, Oliner and Oliner (1988) did not find that those involved in rescue efforts were 
exclusively extensive (see 3.11 Section Conclusion: It Takes All Types p.176).  
I do not suggest that parents should be informed by academic theory in order to avoid 
raising constricted children. I posit that all parents, by social, moral, and evolutionary dictate 
want the best for their children. In this regard, Friere (1994) shared an important lesson on the 
application of moral development theory to the practice of parenting. Friere (1994) had 
observed “the almost complete absence, not only of violent corporal punishment, but any 
punishment of children” (p.13) in coastal fishing communities in Brazil and compared it to the 
emphasis on corporal punishment in inner-city Recife. Friere (1994) thought that the way of life 
in the fishing communities “had some connection with the taste for a liberty diametrically 
opposed to the use of violent punishment” (p.13). Friere (1994) considered this to be a 
“problem of the relationship between authority and freedom, which would necessarily involve 
the question of punishment and reward in education” (p.22). Inspired by Piaget’s theory on 
moral development, Friere (1994) eagerly gave a talk on role of power assertive parenting in 
fighting oppression. In response a member of the audience who Friere (1994) describes as a 
peasant said: 
It’s one thing to come home, even tired, and find all the kids bathed, dressed 
up, clean, well fed- not hungry- and another to come home and find your kids 
dirty, hungry, crying, and making noise. And people have to get up at four in the 
morning the next day and start all over again- hurting, sad, hopeless. If people 
hit their kids, it’s not because people don’t love their kids. No, it’s because life is 
so hard they don’t have much choice. (p.25) 
 
Friere (1994) calls this “class knowledge” and described how this lack of understanding had 
offended the audience. 
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It was the culmination of the learning process that I had undertaken long ago – 
that of the progressive educator: even when one must speak to the people, one 
must convert the “to” to a “with” the people. And this implies respect for the 
“knowledge of living experience” of which it is possible to go beyond it. (p.26) 
 
Freire (1994) was reiterating the importance of popular education which he had first written 
about in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970). This concept will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
The lesson that Freire (1994) shared speaks to the necessity of attention to social 
context. I don’t suggest the man in the story was advocating for parents to hit their kids, but 
that “hurting, sad, hopeless” people see few good options. The man communicated how deeply 
insulting it is to insinuate that parents don’t know or want what’s best for their children and that 
someone unfamiliar with the context of their own lives could prescribe solutions. A similar 
sentiment, often expressed in regard to education, is that a student’s parents don’t care about 
their children’s education. However, those who make such accusations rarely consider the 
context of the families they refer to. Again, I posit that every parent cares about their children’s 
education, but that many parents are faced with few good options where attending to their 
family’s basic needs takes priority over school. Furthermore schools may not be providing the 
education that parents need or want for their children. We learn from Friere (1994) that theory 
doesn’t simply and universally apply to the real world. It must be applied and adjusted in the 
context of a relationship with those we work with.  
In summary, parenting is influential in the moral development of children. Increasing the 
use of inductive methods of discipline and reducing power assertion and especially punitive 
discipline almost certainly, but not exclusively, fosters extensive personalities. In turn, these 
children may be more likely to participate in democracy, to help others, and generally to be 
engaged citizens (S. Berman, 1997). This is not, however, the only path to such behavior. Finally, 
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as learned from and by Friere (1994) it is not enough to simply state that parenting should be 
done “better” and to assume that parents don’t know or want what is best for their children. An 
extensive society is conducive to extensive parenting and this is where the discussion of 
parenting ends and the discussion of a restorative pedagogy begins.  
3.5.2 Influence of school 
Hoffman (2000) discussed the changing emphasis of moral principles in schooling that 
takes place at around fifth grade. Around that time the earlier emphasis from parents and early 
primary schooling shifts from self-improvement to social comparison. Before the shift, caring 
and achievement apply in different contexts. After the shift caring and achievement often apply 
in the same context and conflict with each other due to the competitive nature of school and 
society in US America.  
The principles of “equality” and “need,” associated with caring early in life, are 
largely left behind; the shift to social comparison adds competitiveness to peer 
relationships and prepares children cognitively and emotionally for the merit 
based justice orientation that will dominate their adult lives. (Hoffman, 2000, 
p.258)  
 
This led Hoffman (2000) to question the impact this shift has on children:  
That children are socialized initially to share but later taught to value merit 
suggests a discontinuity in justice socialization: children must begin to unlearn 
“equality” in favor of “merit.” We can only guess the long-term effects of 
discontinuity between “equality,” intense motivation to compete, and 
achievement guilt, until research provides more definitive answers.” (p.258) 
 
I appreciate that Hoffman (2000) identified this discontinuity and wish it had been explored 
further. As Gibbs (2012) argued, descriptive accounts may downplay the severity of issues and 
become value specific in their attempt at neutrality. The psychological, philosophical, and moral 
nature of moral research dictate that empiricism must be coupled with wisdom and 
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furthermore, must be value specific and always focused on improving life. This means that 
moral researchers must focus on prescription as well as description.  
While more knowledge, especially in moral conflicts, might be desirable, our knowledge 
is already practically infinite (Haidt, 2006). We collectively know more than anyone can know 
individually and we certainly know enough to be doing things better. If the drive for empirical 
knowledge is simply a vocation and not the pursuit of wisdom that would improve lives and 
furthermore prevents action through the endless call for more research, then empiricism 
maintains the status quo and is a tool of oppression. It would be true, as Horkheimer and 
Adorno (1944/2002) wrote, “On their way toward modern science human beings have discarded 
meaning” (p.3). Indeed, such empiricism would be one of the master’s tools. However, if such 
empiricism contributes to a greater understanding and to wisdom and action then it can be a 
tool of liberation. This is not to suggest that no one in or beyond the field is doing anything, but 
that we all need to do more. Neither do I intend to condemn Hoffman (2000). If anything my 
critique is aimed at modernism and academia. 
I find this to be the conflict that I have struggled with throughout my career as a student 
and especially in the course writing this thesis. The analysis paralysis that has plagued my life as 
a graduate student is a source of constant frustration and not actively working for what my 
research dictates is immensely frustrating.  I imagine that the frustration Berman (1997) 
expresses to such issues may be similarly motivated: 
With current educational practices focused primarily on individual competence 
within a competitive society, treating social responsibility in most school 
districts is a rhetorical slogan rather than a practical reality. Current methods of 
instruction and current classroom and school structures promote obedience and 
alienation rather than thoughtfulness, engagement, and commitment. We have 
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lobotomized children, separating their social consciousness from their individual 
identity. (p.185)  
 
We are actively harming our children and investigations into how we are harming them are 
important, but it is crucial that we actively work to reduce and stop the source of harm. If we do 
not take action, we might very well continue to identify the conditions that will lead us into 
oblivion as we march into the abyss. This concern is revisited in the conclusion of this work. 
3.6 Moral Principles 
Thus far, human morality (including empathy) has been considered to be a fundamental 
component of humanity. Human morality encourages us to cooperate and to resolve conflicts 
between our own self-interest and the interest of others without harming one another. 
Obviously, conflict resulting in significant harm continues to occur in human civilization (see 3.3 
Limitations of Empathy p.75 and 3.7 Moral Limitations and Conflicts p.113). The fact cannot be 
ignored that some act with malice or without regard to the interests of others (see 3.9 Outlying 
Behavior p.145). However, aside from such outliers and deviants, most of us develop a set of 
principles which act in consideration of (if not accordance with). 
 As already stated, Hoffman (2000) generally conceptualized moral principles as 
psychological outcomes of moral development through affective socialization 
(consequentialism), while others see them as purely philosophic and absolute concepts 
(deontology). However, the principles themselves are significantly cognitive. Once empathy and 
moral principle ‘bond,’ the cognitive task of identifying or recognizing violations of justice can 
trigger affective or empathic responses. The bonding of affect and cognition that Hoffman 
(2000) described is referred to as “hot cognition.” Since moral principles are stored in long term 
memory and require more cognitive processing and affective empathy (e.g., mimicry, 
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conditioning, and direct association), is a nearly instantaneous process, empathy can be a 
powerful retrieval cue for moral principles (Hoffman, 2000). Empathy and upholding moral 
principles both have the capacity to motivate prosocial action and both in tandem often 
motivate people to a greater degree than either alone. However, it is also possible for empathy 
and upholding moral principle to conflict causing diminished motivation (Decety & Cowell, 
2014). In some cases, empathy for an individual may overcome considerations of fairness for a 
collective. This is certainly evident in the human tendency towards nepotism (see 3.7 Moral 
Limitations and Conflicts p.113). Thus, the following exploration of moral principle should be 
considered in relation to human empathy. 
In this section the moral concepts of rights, caring and justice will be explored. Three 
principles of justice are presented: merit, equality, and need. Next social and ecological 
implications of each concept are briefly considered. I take the position that none of the concepts 
are naturally more or less prosocial, but that they can be interpreted in myriad ways. The 
following moral principles motivate both obligatory and discretionary judgments. If any 
objective morality does exist, it seems that there must be multiple ways of coming to such 
universal judgments.  
3.6.1 Rights 
In this section rights are explored as the fundamental set of rules regarding how we 
treat one another. Rights may be the most fundamental moral principle underlying all moral 
judgments. Most individuals, in the context of their own culture, have an intuitive sense of rights 
which they hold to be universal. The central consideration in this discussion of rights is whether 
universal rights exist or if they are simply social conventions. The implications of universal rights 
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versus those of rights dictated by consensus are then considered. Finally, I identify specific 
rights that are either universal or nearly universally agreed upon social conventions.  
Rights must protect and limit self-interest and collective interest. Universal rights (e.g., 
human rights) apply equally to everyone while conventional rights are specific to the context of 
a particular group (e.g., civil rights). The ideal role of conventional rights is to both protect 
universal rights and to establish specific context-dependent rules for society, but the distinction 
is not always clear. Conventional rights may be socially constructed in consideration of 
philosophic ideals of universal and unalienable rights. For example, the right to bear arms is not 
guaranteed to all people in all societies. It does, however, relate to what many consider to be a 
universal right to liberty. But, most humans consent to limitations of their personal liberty and 
the personal liberty of others in order to promote and optimally protect the liberty and safety of 
all. It seems that unqualified human right to liberty is neither universal nor conventional24.  
Many philosophic approaches to rights attempt to identify the nature and universality of 
rights. A foundationalist approach to rights seeks to find a basis for universal human rights 
beyond social construction and consensus (Schapiro, 2005). One such philosophic approach 
suggests that the laws of nature dictate certain rights (natural law and natural rights). In this 
philosophic tradition natural law is considered to be the law of God. Others have sought 
ecologically or biologically dictated foundations for rights (Fruehwald, 2010). Many reject a 
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 Maybe anarchists, most profoundly assert the right to freedom. However, although anarchism includes 
diverse schools of thought, all but the most individualistic concepts seek harmony and mature reciprocity. 
Thus, the personal right to freedom is limited by moral consideration of others. 
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foundationalist approach entirely and prefer practical considerations of rights in order to 
establish a baseline for human by consensus (Freeman, 1994). Some even suggest that the only 
reasonable basis for rights is to construct rights in reaction to historical violations. Finally, others 
see rights as entirely subjective social conventions with no possibility of universality.  
Although a deep exploration of the foundations of rights cannot be accomplished here, I 
explore such a possibility very tentatively as an illustration of foundationalism. I make a basic 
assumption throughout this paper that all life is worthy of life. A cursory interpretation of such 
an assumption would be that every living thing has the right to continue living. Predation and 
natural causes present obvious exceptions to that right. However, natural selection dictates no 
natural right for a species to exist. In fact, species who do not adapt to environmental changes 
or who are outcompeted go extinct. This becomes a treacherous position as a foundation for 
human rights because it may be that there is no foundational right for any species to live.  
Obviously the above was a contrived example, however it illustrates the controversy 
over a foundational approach to rights deferring to a higher power (natural selection, cognition, 
God, etc.). The foundational approach may call into question or even deny practical rights that 
are clearly prosocial. However, the opposite extreme where no foundation can be accepted may 
suggest that rights are entirely normative and contingent. Lack of foundation for international 
human rights efforts may call the validity of their judgments into question when identifying 
human rights violations. Practical investigation of the function of rights in consideration of one’s 
own moral position, offers more utility. If a right functions to protect human welfare regardless 
of context it could be considered a universal right. 
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In return to the central question introduced at the beginning of this section: are 
rights universal? There can be no simple conclusion.  
A conception of human rights should be flexible enough to allow space for the 
human creativity it seeks to defend and to address the changing conditions of 
the world that may threaten its values … One must make a nonrational decision 
either to accept or reject solidarity with humanity. (Freeman, 1994) 
 
It is not the identification of universal rights, but the commitment to protecting and respecting 
the welfare of others that must take precedent. The only entirely and unquestionably universal 
right is the right to be morally considered. Thus, I favor a universal ethic of care to universal 
considerations of rights. However, this is no excuse not to construct and consent upon practical 
rights. As in other pragmatic considerations of human potential throughout this work, I suggest 
that rights should be iteratively consented upon, evaluated, and reassessed at the individual 
level, among communities and nations, and globally in accordance with changing conditions on 
Earth.  
 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be the most prominent 
effort towards reaching universal rights by consensus (UN General Assembly, 1948). 
Jacques Maritain, a leading French philosopher and one of the participants in 
the negotiations that resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
illustrate[d] [the] nonfoundational approach. In response to expressions of 
surprise at mustering widespread agreement to the Universal Declaration, 
Maritain stated … "yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks 
us why." (Schapiro, 2005) 
 
Maritain was acknowledging the fact that the authors and signatories were motivated by 
differing theoretical considerations but found consensus in the function of rights. The 
declaration makes no appeals to God or the law of nature. Indeed, such explicit foundations 
would be grounds for much debate and empirical criticism. Instead, it is an entirely functional 
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and context-independent document proposing freedom and dignity for all humans- subject 
to broad interpretation. Some of the rights dictated by the declaration are the right to life, 
dignity, security of person, and the denouncement of slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention 
or exile (Assembly, 1948).  
 Finally, I want to consider the possibility and implications of extending the concept of 
rights beyond humans. Based on my previous analysis I suggest that rights are a human 
construct. I don’t dismiss the possibility of natural rights which would apply to animals, or the 
possibility of such formalized moral concepts among other animals. However, regardless of 
foundation, human conceptions of universal rights should apply to our consideration of non-
human animals and the earth. Most human societies do establish conventional rights (e.g., laws) 
for the treatment of animals. We similarly have laws and agencies dedicated to protecting 
natural environments. A universal declaration of animal rights or planetary rights may not exist 
as such, but many international agreements do protect ‘rights’ of animals and the environment. 
For example, the International Whaling Convention universally banned commercial whaling. I 
propose that human concepts of rights exclusively apply to human behavior.  For example, 
sharks do not observe the internationally consented upon right of whales not to be hunted. 
Thus, animal rights would be unnecessary the absence of humans not because non-humans lack 
intrinsic value, but because animal rights focus on protecting non-humans from humans.  
 In summary, I suggest that rights are near-universal. In the complexity of human social 
interaction and environment, rights can neither be static, nor context-independent. However, 
promoting and protecting human welfare (and the welfare of non-human animals) by 
establishing a set of near-universally consented upon rights serves great function in society. For 
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example, someone may observe another’s right to security of person despite being very 
angry at them and potentially even feeling that they would justified to hurt that person based 
on considerations of the other’s merit. Thus, although rights are impersonal, such general 
agreement on rights moderates the potential subjectivity of individual moral judgments (see 3.7 
Moral Limitations and Conflicts p.113). By establishing rights, certain harmful behavior on the 
part of individuals or governments is universally discouraged. In the resolution of conflict folks 
likely consider multiple moral principles in their judgments25. 
3.6.2 Care 
Care extends beyond rights which may be considered morally obligatory into the realm 
of ‘goods’ (discretionary judgments). Rights encourage consideration and protection of one’s 
basic needs while care encourages both broad consideration of wellbeing and attention to 
individuals’ needs. Hoffman (2000) defined caring as a somewhat utilitarian (consequentialist) 
principle that aims to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. However, Oliner & 
Oliner (1988) defined an ethic of care as “a dominating sense of obligation to help all people out 
of a spirit of generosity and concern for their welfare” (p.217). I see care as a potentially 
universally prosocial moral principle dictating that everyone deserves to have their basic 
physiological and psychological needs met. Thus, care is a mature concept of reciprocity and 
neglect and abandonment are moral violations of care because everyone has a duty to help 
                                                          
 
25
 Most people probably do not consider moral principles explicitly or discretely, but such principles likely 
make up a holistic concept of morality. 
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anyone in need. Oliner & Oliner (1988) indicated that 76% of the interviewed rescuers were 
motivated by an ethic of care. 
The ethical values of care and inclusiveness that distinguished rescuers were not 
merely abstract or philosophical preferences. Rather, they reflected a key 
dimension of rescuers’ personalities – the way they characteristically related to 
others and their sense of commitment to them. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.169) 
 
Some of the sentiments expressed by those rescuers were: 
I think if somebody is in a bad situation, you have to help them. (p.170) 
 
We had to give our help to those people in order to save them. Not because 
they were Jewish, but because every persecuted human needs some help, just 
as my father found help when the Turks killed the Albanians26. (p. 169)  
 
One rescuer who risked their life to help a Nazi soldier said that “the moment the man was 
badly wounded, he was not an enemy anymore but simply a human being in need” (p.288). This 
rescuer was certainly motivated by care and empathy. An observer may be empathically 
motivated to help someone in need and also feel obligated to help based on a principle of caring 
(Hoffman, 2000). Affectively motivated induction may have also been fundamental to the 
formation of one’s principle of care. However, a principle of care alone, in the absence of 
significant empathy, has been found to be a sufficient prosocial motivator (Oliner & Oliner, 
                                                          
 
26
 Oliner & Oliner (1988) focused heavily on the role of parenting in personality development as discussed 
in the previous section. The ethic of care is associated with, but not exclusive to, extensive personalities. 
Oliner & Oliner do investigate normative sources of motivation such as religion and culture.  However, 
Oliner & Oliner (1988) did not significantly investigate the role of one’s knowledge of family history. 
Recall, that I found myself significantly motivated by my family history (specifically the Holocaust). My 
intuition is that many committed to practical and theoretical work for justice are motivated by knowledge 
of family history. This may be worthy of deeper investigation, but I have not pursued it in this paper.  
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1988). Hoffman (2000) concluded that “empathy and caring principles are thus independent, 
mutually supportive, hence congruent dispositions to help others” (p.255). 
 Finally, an ethic of care easily extends to non-human animals and the planet. Animal 
shelters, sanctuaries, and rehabilitation centers represent an ethic of care for animals. Such 
efforts tend to focus on animals valued by humans based on our perceived similarity, cuteness, 
or in the interest of preserving biological diversity. However, this is not exclusively so, and some 
animal protection efforts may exclusively represent and ethic of care. It becomes more difficult 
to gauge the role of self-interest in humans on ecological protection efforts, however many do 
see intrinsic value in nature. 
3.6.3 Justice 
Considerations of justice are often made in consideration of rights and care which 
dictate that a basic standard of behavior and treatment of others applies broadly. However, the 
primary concern of justice considerations is what is fair. Justice considerations potentially reflect 
more immature reciprocity, however mature reciprocity is not incongruent with any justice 
principles. I focus, as Hoffman (2000) did, on distributive justice and the principles of merit, 
equality, and need. Hoffman (2000) described distributive justice as the correlation between 
reward and deservingness in the distribution of resources. However, Clayton & Opotow (1993) 
conceptualized that distribution of resources is not strictly material but includes “such socially-
valued goods and resources as love and caring, services, goods, money, information, and status” 
(p.300). Thus, other conceptions of justice such as punitive and procedural justice are readily 
considered within a broad conceptualization of distributive justice.  
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Punitive (or retributive) justice is readily examined as the distribution of punishment 
where relations of power are particularly influential. Punitive justice is largely based on an 
immature form of reciprocity where the severity of punishment is reflective of the 
egregiousness of the offence. However, the Māori concept of restorative justice provides an 
alternate to punitive justice. Restorative justice is focused on making amends for transgressions 
and restoring justice rather than punishing injustice. In the restorative justice process the victim 
and offender meet with their families, community, and facilitators to have a discussion about 
the incident. The offender is provided the opportunity to make restitutions, restore damaged 
relationships and potentially be accepted back into the community. The process of restitution is 
not predetermined by the facilitators, but the offenders may voluntarily offer apologies, gifts, or 
money.  
In the documentary, Restoring Hope: An Indigenous Response to Justice, Mike Hinton, a 
restorative justice facilitator in South Auckland said:  
Restorative justice isn’t about forgiveness, alright? That’s a byproduct of what 
happens at the conference. It’s about communication. And I’m probably gonna’ 
upset a few people by saying this: an eye for an eye probably doesn’t work that 
well. And maybe it’s a practice that we should not look at. Maybe something 
like communicating, understanding, respecting, and acknowledging differences; 
taking responsibility for hurt and harm, and making amends would work a little 
bit better, today. We can grow as people. Our process helps people grow. It 
helps them heal and grow. (Carnachan & Parnell, 2013) 
 
By denouncing “an eye for an eye” (‘immature’ reciprocity) Hinton illuminated restorative 
justice as a form of ‘mature’ reciprocity. In New Zealand, the restorative justice process is in 
conjunction with the penal system and outcomes of the restorative justice process are 
considered by courts, but some offenders also face jail time. However, the intention of 
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restorative justice is to restore balance, heal, and move forward rather than to punish the 
offender.  
 Similarly, distributive justice relates to the fairness of social interactions and decision 
making and can be considered distributive because distributive justice begins with the 
distribution of membership into a community (Opotow, 1990). One’s membership in the 
community (in the moral sense) influences whether or not they are considered to have the 
rights of community members including moral consideration (see 3.7.1 Moral exclusion p.116). 
Thus, I proceed with considerations of justice based on principles of distributive justice.  
Oliner & Oliner (1988) stated that around 15% of the rescuers they interviewed were 
motivated primarily by a broad sense of justice congruent with Kahn’s (1999) definition of 
obligatory morality and significantly cognitive. Some of the sentiments expressed by those 
rescuers were:  
I found it incomprehensible and inadmissible that for religious reasons or as a 
result of religious choice, Jews would be persecuted. It’s like saving somebody 
who is drowning. You don’t ask what God they pray to. You just go save them. 
(p.166) 
 
Jewish people had as much right to live as I did. (p.167) 
 
All men [sic] are equal and are free and equal by right. Consequently I am 
against all dictatorial systems. (p.167) 
 
The above quotes appeal to ‘fairness’ based on appeals to rights and caring. Other justice 
considerations appeal more clearly to the specific principles of justice, however, generally 
judgments of fairness are made in consideration of multiple principles.  
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A merit based principle of justice reflects consideration of one’s deservingness in 
determination of fairness. The basic sentiment is that “you reap what you sow”. Hoffman (2000) 
finds merit to be the dominating moral principle in modern Western culture. In the distribution 
of goods, merit may dictate a capitalist system where some deserve more material wealth than 
others based on their contribution to the economy. In a more procedural sense, the merit of 
one’s behavior may determine what is considered fair treatment. In the most severe cases 
judgments of merit may be used to strip someone of their rights. Merit based considerations 
may be conducive to victim blaming. For example, if someone is suffering one may judge that 
either not worked hard enough or they have done something to deserve their circumstance. 
Although I have raised potential pitfalls of merit based considerations, justice considerations 
based on merit are not intrinsically non-prosocial, especially when considered along with 
principles of rights and care. It is prosocial to recognize positive contributions of others. Humans 
may not be so intrinsically motivated that we would all strive for ‘goodness’ in the absence of 
any external consideration of merit. I only argue, that merit must be moderated by other moral 
considerations.  
An equality based principle of justice dictates that everyone deserves the same rights, 
resources, and rewards. In the distribution of goods, equality may dictate a communist system 
where everyone deserves equal material wealth. In a more procedural sense, judgments of 
equality would likely defer to appeals of equal rights and dictate that everyone should be judged 
on the same basis with less consideration of their personal experience and needs.  It is 
important to understand the difference between equality and equity. Equality suggests that 
everyone deserves the same thing, while equity is a more general concept of fairness in 
consideration of the individual needs. Equality, like rights, may sometimes encourage 
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impersonal judgments. In consideration of equity, equality it is not necessarily universally 
prosocial to treat everyone equally. 
A need based principle of justice dictates that people deserve to have their basic needs 
met regardless of their personal merit or contribution. This is similar to the moral voice of care. 
An ethic of care would likely encourage considerations of justice based on need, but care is a 
broader concept of morality and need is specifically related to justice. In the distribution of 
goods, need may dictate a socialist system where the emphasis is on meeting individuals basic 
needs (e.g., universal healthcare!). The basic sentiment is encapsulated by the slogan 
popularized by Karl Marx, “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.”  
Merit, equality, and need represent a spectrum of the emphasis of fairness 
considerations from deservingness (merit) to entitlement (need). Prototypical examples of an 
emphasis on a particular principle exist, but I have argued that moral judgments usually reflect 
more complex consideration involving multiple principles. Furthermore, a particular situation 
may encourage emphasis on different moral principles depending on the nature of the 
interaction and the relationship between the parties (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). For example, in 
close personal relationships, a strict demand for reciprocity may communicate a lack of value of 
the relationship (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Merit may be more congruent with a strict demand 
for reciprocity (immature reciprocity) and need with mature reciprocity, however, this is not 
exclusively so. 
 As already noted, moral principles and empathy have the potential to enhance or 
diminish each other (Decety & Cowell, 2014). As Hoffman (2000) explored, the prominence of a 
particular principle and it’s congruence with empathy depend on the situation. Consider two 
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examples: (1) A classmate asks you for answers to an assignment that you worked very hard 
on (2) You witness a drunk driver have a collision. In the first case, some might help their 
classmate without question out of a sense of care. Others might consider their classmate’s 
merit, it would make a difference whether they had made an effort or spent the previous night 
drink beer and playing video games while you spent the entire night on the assignment. Even if 
one lacked merit, you may be persuaded by need if they lament that they risk failing the class. 
Finally, they may make an emotional appeal causing you to help despite it being unfair. Helping 
someone with their homework is potentially good (discretionary judgment) but not obligatory. 
In a situation of greater gravity, such as the second example where a drunk driver may be in 
significant danger, their clear lack of merit may be less influential in one’s decision to help. One 
may simultaneously believe the driver deserves punishment and that they deserve to be helped 
regardless of their merit depending on the severity of the accident. 
 Justice considerations shed more light on the complexity of judgments regarding 
ecological degradation. One must judge whether animals and planet deserve consideration 
(explored in the following section) and balance human interests with ecological interests. These 
considerations become much more subjective than universal rights or care for non-humans. For 
example, considerations of merit may determine that some species or habitats are more worthy 
of consideration and protection than others. Similarly, one may consider humans superior such 
that human interest always trumps ecological interest. 
3.7 Moral Limitations and Conflicts 
So convenient a thing is it to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to 
find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do. (Benjamin Franklin 
as cited in Haidt, 2006, p.66) 
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Just as empathy as a prosocial motive has limitations, so does moral principle. I 
choose to believe that very few humans deliberately engage in antisocial behavior or otherwise 
deliberately cause harm to one another without justification (see 3.9 Outlying Behavior p.145). 
Instead, I believe that the process of moral development, in the context of social norms, 
influences the primacy of conflicting moral principles, conception of moral encounters, and 
moral judgments and actions.  
Turiel (2005) discussed the events surrounding the integration of University of 
Mississippi in 1962 and suggested that those supporting and opposing the integration of the 
University were acting on commitment to principles. It would be easy to suggest that Governor 
Barnett’s attempt to block integration of the University and causing President Kennedy to bring 
in the National Guard (more than 30,000 troops) were symptoms of some gross iniquity 
prevalent at that time in the South (of USA.). However, Turiel (2005) considered Governor 
Barnett’s defense of segregation to represent moral “conviction, commitment, and courage” 
(p.17). Similarly, James Meredith, an African American man, struggled for equality and 
integration displaying the same (I believe greater) “conviction, commitment, and courage.” 
Meridith took his case to the US Supreme Court who ordered his admission into the University 
of Mississippi (Turiel, 2005). Although Turiel (2005) does not does not explicitly refer to either 
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Meredith or Barnett’s actions as moral, I want to consider the possibility that both were 
acting morally27.  
It is possible that Barnett was acting morally. But first, I want to consider the possibility 
that he wasn’t. Barnett expressed pride as a Mississippi segregationist and defended his 
position, but it is impossible to understand his motivations based on historical accounts. In many 
cases the appearance of moral conviction is more important to an individual than actual moral 
conviction (Haidt, 2006) and that must be doubly true for politicians. Furthermore, humans have 
a tendency to fabricate post-hoc explanation and justification for our behavior, often without 
actually understanding our motivations (a process called confabulation). We are not necessarily 
even aware that our justification or explanation was not the true motivation of our behavior 
(Haidt, 2006). Additionally, people have a self-serving bias where we often see our own actions 
through “the rose-colored mirror,” justifying actions that we would almost certainly condemn if 
carried out by anyone but ourselves. There is no reason to assume Barnett was acting morally. 
However, Barnett may have been acting morally. How could it be possible that 
Meredith, an African American man fighting for civil rights, and Barnett, a white man fighting to 
defend the discriminatory practice of segregation, both be acting morally? Regardless of 
                                                          
 
27
 I want to be absolutely clear that I do not approve of Barnett’s stance on segregation. Neither, do I 
accept an entirely relativistic stance where his actions were permissible according to cultural and 
historical context. Moral relativism is explored later in this section. For now, suffice to say that I think it is 
possible that Barnett acted morally and that what he did was wrong. I don’t consider moral action to be 
universally right. I consider it to be action in accordance with one’s own moral judgment (i.e., the belief 
that it was the right thing to do).  
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whether Governor Barnett acted with conviction, commitment, and courage, it was not the 
same as Meredith’s. Although the most deplorable tyrants and heroic liberators of history may 
be similarly motivated by a sense or partisanship and their actions judged through a particular 
socio-historic lens, the tyrant co-opts justice while the liberator loves and serves justice. If 
anything could ever be considered universally wrong, it must be oppression. However, the 
remainder of this section explores how and why moral behavior may fall short. My presumption 
is that the majority of people do act morally, but that the way we perceive and respond to moral 
conflicts is very subjective. I neither accept morality as universal nor do I resign to the 
permissiveness associated with moral subjectivity. For now, I simply suggest that moral behavior 
can be harmful. 
3.7.1 Moral exclusion 
In the case of Governor Barnett and James Meredith, it is likely that Barnett did not 
believe that, as an African American man, Meredith deserved the same rights as whites. Such 
exclusion may be justified by a principle of merit. Thus, the concept of moral exclusion sheds 
some light on the case.  
Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the 
boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. 
Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or 
undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or 
just. Moral exclusion... links a wide range of social issues, such as abortion, 
species conservation, nuclear weapons, and immigration policies, because our 
position on these issues depends on whom we include or exclude from our 
moral boundaries. (Opotow, 1990) 
 
Opotow (1990) found three “attitudes that comprised moral inclusion: (1) believing that 
considerations of fairness apply to another, (2) willingness to allocate a share of community 
resources to another, and (3) willingness to make sacrifices to foster another’s wellbeing.” These 
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attitudes are all compatible with Hoffman’s (2000) theory on moral development driven by 
guilt. However, Opotow (1990) offers significant insight in how human boundaries of moral 
exclusion and inclusion expand and contract. These borders change with the status quo and with 
conflict, and are not absolute, but better thought of as degrees of inclusion or exclusion.  
 One of the psychological origins of moral exclusion is conflict. Danger of any type, 
conflict, and stress “reinforce group boundaries and change information processing strategies 
and choice of justice rules” (Opotow, 1990). With conflict group cohesion increases and concern 
for justice to those outside of the group decreases. Outsiders may be increasingly endangered 
and subject to extreme forms of oppression such as exploitation, slavery, and extermination, but 
the less overt forms of dominance should not be overlooked. In situations of conflict, resolution 
looks very different between folks who consider one another to be within their own scope of 
moral inclusion. In these cases, conflict is “regulated competition of equals, conducted 
according to rules of fair play, such as a duel or bidding war; with those outside, conflict is 
unregulated, no-holds-barred power struggle among unequals, such as guerilla warfare” 
(Opotow, 1990). Conflict also tends to constrict ones borders for moral inclusion, while 
diminished conflict offers opportunity for the borders to expand (Opotow, 1990). This is 
consistent with the in-group empathic bias and its evolutionary hypothesis that conflict over 
completion for resources in human evolution produced preferential selection of human traits 
favoring in-group bias. However, this suggests that the bias is not hard coded in our DNA, or 
even explicitly social, but a result of immediate and present conflict. It seems that through 
efforts to reduce conflict, such as reparation, compensation, or simply helping folks meet their 
basic needs, we would all create space for our moral borders to extend. 
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The other psychological origin of moral exclusion that Opotow (1990) discussed is 
unconnectedness. This stems from the innate human tendency to differentiate and categorize 
objects. When this is applied to social categorization it may rationalize injustice by affirming a 
sense of separateness between a witness and someone experiencing injustice. Oliner & Oliner 
(1988) discussed how Nazis used different tactics in each country in accordance with the prewar 
status of Jewish people in those countries. For example, in the Netherlands Nazi efforts to 
morally exclude Jewish people preceded efforts to enact genocide. 
The Nazis did not want to shock Dutch sensibilities and provoke widespread 
resistance. Instead, they gradually disenfranchised, impoverished, and isolated 
Jews in a period when German domination over Dutch gentiles was still 
relatively tolerable, thereby dissociating the later as much as possible from 
Jewish suffering. (p.133) 
 
Opotow (1990) explained that conversely to this sense of unconnectedness, perceiving someone 
as connected to oneself hinders moral exclusion. This may include “belonging to the same 
community,  perceiving another as a worthwhile being, or discerning any thread of 
connectedness” (Opotow, 1990). This connection leads to increased empathy and ultimately 
helping behavior. This sense of connectedness is highly sensitive to conflict and increased 
severity of conflict corresponds with increased feeling of unconnectedness and reduces helping 
behavior (Opotow, 1990). Oliner & Oliner (1988) discussed the effects of social categorization 
independently of its potential for producing feelings of unconnectedness, stating that “both 
positive and negative stereotypes lend to thinking of Jews as a group rather than as individuals” 
and that “rescuers saw Jews more frequently as individuals” (p.151). In Opotow’s (1990) 
discussion of the intersection of psychological and sociological forces at work in moral exclusion, 
they conclude that, “the bidirectional influence between individuals and society in perpetuating 
moral exclusion suggests possible ways to interrupt the cycle of harm” (Opotow, 1990). 
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Opotow (1990) reviewed various conceptions of the boundaries of moral inclusion 
suggesting that one of the more prevalent conceptions is that the boundaries should be drawn 
around membership status of the human species. A prevalent outcome of this conception is 
debate over who can be considered human. Categorizing humans by race, class, and gender has 
been a common tool in the enactment of oppression to deny the humanness of a person, 
people, or peoples in order to deny their inclusion in moral considerations. Singer (1975) 
instead, believed that the boundaries should be constructed around cognitive awareness and 
that nonhuman sentient beings deserve inclusion in moral consideration. Opotow (1990) also 
discussed the belief that all life should be treated with reverence, and thus, considered to be 
within the moral boundaries as, for example, Jains believe. This begins to illustrate that societal, 
cultural, and religious norms heavily influence not only the construction of moral principle, but 
also its application. As discussed in the construction of moral principles, there is certainly an 
individual, non-deterministic element influencing how we define our own moral boundaries.  
3.7.1.1 Moral exclusion and ecological issues 
Many controversial issues can be considered issues resulting from differing moral 
boundaries. The central issue in the abortion debate is also readily reduced to a consideration of 
moral inclusion. The point at which a fetus is considered worthy of moral inclusion and the 
impact that has on the degree of moral inclusion of the pregnant woman encapsulate all of the 
arguments in this debate from both sides (Opotow, 1990). Opotow (1990) also gave an example 
regarding whaling and suggested that many US Americans are outraged by Japanese whaling 
practices because the moral boundaries of US Americans include whales to a greater degree 
than the Japanese. However, whaling was a large industry in US in recent history. Moral 
exclusion and differing moral boundaries provides insight to conflicts in other animal rights 
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activism, as well, where animal rights activists are commonly criticized for caring more about 
non-human animals than humans. As Plous (2003) argues, the process of excluding non-human 
animals from moral consideration psychologically parallels the process of excluding other 
humans.  
The concept of moral exclusion and moral boundaries sheds light on the relationship 
between environmental and social degradation, as well. Let’s return to the study where Kahn 
(1999) interviewed Black children in Houston, Texas about their perceptions of nature. In 
response to a question about what the children thought about when they thought of nature, 7% 
mentioned drugs or violence and 17% reported that it was an environmental issue that they 
discussed at home (Peter H. Kahn, 1999). I was struck by one child’s responses to the 
interviewers attempt to understand how they connected with non-human animals. The child 
said that they had a cat and the interviewer asked if the cat was important to them. The child 
responded, “No. I have other things that’s important to me. If I eat or not. Or if anybody in my 
family is gonna die, because I don’t want nobody in my family to die” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, 
p.109). The same child expressed similarly demoralizing concerns to the interviewers other 
questions relating to their connection with and concern for nature. When the interviewer asked 
the child about parks, their response illustrated concern for dangers of broken glass and gun 
violence. It seems evident that such immediate concerns would preclude ecological ones.  
The majority of children in the Houston study did provide moral justification for 
judgments relating to the environment. Most of the justifications were anthropocentric and the 
children expressed very few biocentric justifications. Kahn (1999) stresses that “anthropocentric 
reasoning should not be discounted” (p.113) in either the larger context of environmentalism or 
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in the context of the children in Houston. In fact, Kahn (1999) suggests that “the Houston 
children articulated forms of anthropocentric reasoning that many would argue are not only 
philosophically valid, but practically speaking- in terms of effecting societal change- an 
imperative”(p.113). With the Houston study in mind, I suggest that anthropocentric and 
biocentric perspective taking and motives are equally important in the struggle for restoration 
and position the needs of the planet and the needs of humanity in congruence.  
An alternate conception of moral justifications involves microjustice (focused on the 
individual) and macrojustice (focused on the group) (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). In environmental 
conflicts, macro level judgments favor the needs of the collective (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). 
Depending on the specific situation and who is morally included, neither macro nor micro level 
judgments are strictly anthropocentric or biocentric. Clayton & Optow (2003) found that macro 
level considerations were more common for pro-environmental arguments and micro level 
considerations, such as the rights of landowners, were more common in anti-environmental 
arguments. However, neither micro nor macro level justifications deny consideration of self-
interest because collective welfare is instrumental to individual welfare. Although humans have 
the capacity for altruism, we must also consider our own self-interest to ensure that our basic 
needs are met.  
This calls into question to nature of biocentric reasoning and led some environmental 
philosophers to speculate that all human reasoning is anthropocentric (Peter H. Kahn, 1999). In 
the attempt to understand how people are morally motivated, the micro/macro conception 
provides more insight. However, I have tried to embrace both/and thinking and micro/macro 
considerations easily incorporate biocentric/anthropocentric considerations .This does not 
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diminish the value of biocentric perspective taking (in distinction from strictly biocentric 
reasoning) which has been shown to be a powerful motivator for pro-environmental  moral 
judgments and empathy (Berenguer, 2007, 2010).  Nor, as Kahn (1999) points out, should 
anthropocentric perspectives be undervalued in their power as a prosocial and pro-
environmental motivator.  
Building on Kahn’s (1999) earlier work, Severson & Kahn (2010) tested whether 
children’s perspective anthropocentric or biocentric perspective taking was more dependent on 
the situation that they were considering than their values. Severson & Kahn (2010) posed a 
hypothetical situation where there was no anthropocentric stake in nature. Aliens had come to 
an earth uninhabited by humans and caused harm nature (including pets, wild animals, orchards 
and forests). The children were asked if it would be wrong for the aliens to do such harm and 
the majority answered that it was wrong to do harm to nature even without the presence of 
humans. This suggested that 
If children are asked questions about environmental harms when humans are 
involved, then biocentric reasoning appears seldom, and it appears late in 
development. But if children are asked questions about environmental harms 
without the pull of human consideration, … then biocentric reasoning appears 
often and early. (Severson & Kahn, 2010, p.255) 
 
With these perspectives on biocentric and anthropocentric reasoning and the micro/macro level 
judgments in mind, I will examine an example from Kahn’s (1999) Houston study. When a child 
was asked if it is all right to throw trash in the bayou, they answered  
[It’s not alright] because some people that don’t have homes, they go and drink 
out of the rivers and stuff and they could die because they get all that dirt and 
stuff inside their bodies. (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, p.101) 
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This appears to be obviously anthropocentric but in consideration of the micro/macro model 
of justice, it is not so simple. This child may be demonstrating moral concern for the bayou at 
the macro level where the value of the bayou is for water as a collective resource.  While the 
child’s explanation centers humans, specifically people experiencing homelessness, that doesn’t 
necessarily morally exclude others (other people and the natural environment) from the 
collective. I believe that this illustrates only that the child was immediately concerned about 
homelessness and does not necessarily illustrate an anthropocentric orientation. As evidenced 
by Kahn & Severson (2010), their answerer may have reflected a more significantly biocentric 
orientation if asked in a different way. Especially since the question relates to anthropogenic 
harm, it may warrant a more anthropocentric judgment. 
 A final consideration related to moral exclusion is denial of self-involvement (Opotow & 
Weiss, 2000). One may consider their own actions unrelated to the wellbeing of others, not 
because they do not consider them worthy of moral consideration, but because they deny that 
their actions affect the other. Through denial of self-involvement, one may believe that they do 
not pollute so they are not involved in the ecological crisis (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). “Another 
route to denial of self-involvement recognizes a problem as real but focuses on parts of the 
problem that exonerate oneself and therefore denies one’s contribution to the problem” 
(Opotow & Weiss, 2000, p.486). One such example could be someone’s proud ecological 
commitment to drive a hybrid car… 30,000 miles per year. Self-exclusion also applies to racism. 
Conceptions of self-exclusion may allow folks to believe that racism is a terrible, awful thing that 
thankfully, they are not involved in, or that they have successfully put an end to. An example of 
the latter is efforts by a university to increase racial diversity while ignoring institutional racism.  
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3.7.1.2 Subjugation of animals 
I haven’t focused too intently on the subjugation of animals because I don’t want to 
dismiss or trivialize the subjugation of humans. In consideration of the child in Houston who said 
they didn’t care about their cat because they cared if they would eat or not (Kahn, 1999), I think 
emphasis on animal rights and ecological rights are, for good reason, poorly received in the face 
of such severe violations of human rights. However, there are many parallels between the 
oppression of humans and the oppression of other animals. In this section, I will explore the 
relationship between the mistreatment of non-human animals and the mistreatment of 
humans. 
Even if one does not consider other species worthy of moral consideration, humane 
treatment of non-human animals likely parallels our humane treatment of one another. 
Although Kant did not consider animals to have any intrinsic value, Kant recognized that by 
mistreating animals, humans degraded their own humanity.  
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he 
does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is 
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show 
towards mankind [sic]. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice 
kindness towards animals, for he [sic] who is cruel to animals becomes hard also 
in his [sic] dealings with men [sic]. (Kant, 1963) 
 
Thus, Kant argued that the kindness that humans show to other species is an indicator for 
human morality but not within the domain of morality and felt that humans should treat other 
animals with kindness in order to preserve their own humanity.  
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Similarly, Plous (2003) considered “historic attempts to portray human targets of 
prejudice as animal-like” (p.510) as an attempt to use speciesism (a term for prejudice against 
non-human animals) to justify human oppression. Plous (2003) wrote, 
African Americans have been depicted as apes, Jews as vermin, women as prey, 
homosexuals as beasts, fat people as cows and pigs. Yet the very act of “treating 
people like animals” would lose its meaning if animals were treated well. Just as 
racism, sexism, and other prejudices share a similar mindset, many of the 
psychological factors that underlie speciesism serve to reinforce and promote 
prejudice against humans. These factors include power, privilege, dominance, 
control, entitlement, and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance when 
committing harmful acts. (p.510) 
 
Thus, Plous (2003) not only saw the treatment of non-human animals as an indicator for human 
morality, but saw a complete parallel between the mistreatment of humans and the 
mistreatment of other species. Additionally, Plous (2003) held that animals all have intrinsic 
value and that treating animals better benefits all animals (including humans).  
These considerations of the humane treatment of non-humans are an important 
consideration in social justice work. In societies where the mistreatment of other animals is 
normalized, arguments for human liberation often dismiss or condone the subjugation of non-
human animals. For example, Freire’s (1970/2000) position, which is hugely influential in social 
justice work, was that oppression of humans denies both oppressor and oppressed of their 
humanness and reduces them to the status of animals. However, Freire did not challenge the 
status of animals and instead attempted to distance humans from other animals. Thus, by 
condoning the mistreatment of animals and distancing humans from other animals, the 
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structures of oppression including hierarchy and domination remain unchallenged and 
undermine efforts for human liberation28. As I suggested after reviewing Bookchin’s (1982) 
considerations of the relationship between subjugation of women and subjugation of the earth: 
any expression of oppression will spread like a virus throughout humanity.  
In summary, not only is consideration of animals vital in understanding the structural 
influence of oppression on human moral considerations, but caring for animals contributes to 
the liberation of all animals (humans included). By focusing explicitly on the rights of a narrow 
community, such as humans, we imply that other communities don’t deserve rights and we 
debate over who should be allowed membership in that community. It may serve the welfare of 
human and non-human animals to instead extend moral consideration to other animals and 
establish universally consented upon rights to all animals29. Many of the rights that are 
associated with humanness  should be extended to non-human animals such as the right to live 
freely, the right to basic survival needs, and the right to live at all.  
                                                          
 
28
 In a letter published posthumously, Freire (2004) significantly deviated from his humanist tradition and 
may have been beginning to formulate a more holistic view of oppression. Freire (2004) wrote on the day 
of a brutal murder of Pataxó Indian,  
The fact in itself that this tragic transgression of ethics has taken place warns us how urgent it is 
that we fight for more fundamental ethical principles, such as respect for the life of human 
beings, the life of other animals, of birds, and for the life of rivers and forests. I do not believe in 
love among women and men, among human beings, if we do not become capable of loving the 
world. Ecology has gained tremendous importance at the end of this century. It must be present 
in any educational practice of a radical, critical, and liberating nature. (p.47) 
29
 There are obviously certain differences between humans and other animals that dictate that human 
moral considerations do not apply in precisely the same way to other animals. One significant factor is our 
very limited ability to communicate with other species.  
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A final consideration at the interface of animal rights and conservation is zoos.  Zoos 
are largely justified by their role in promoting “species conservation in natural habitats” (Myers 
et al., 2004, p. 559). Zoos provide opportunity for humans to experience non-human animals in 
simulated natural habitats and such experiences may foster empathy for non-human animals 
and lead to greater concern for animals and the natural world. However, in a study on children’s 
conceptions of the needs of animals, Myers et al. (2004) noted that “few subjects explicitly 
acknowledged freedom to roam as an important need, when it may be a precondition for 
meeting all other needs in an appropriate habitat” (p.560). Myers et al. (2004) concluded that 
while data suggested that such value for freedom is related to the developmental stage of 
participants, the significance of normalization of the captivity of animals in urban environments 
could not be determined. Thus, zoos may have positive and negative influence regarding the 
subjugation of animals (including humans).  
I maintain that the struggle against oppression requires uncompromising opposition of 
all oppression. I oppose the subjugation of all animals and the normalization of animals in 
captivity potentially perpetuated by many zoos. However, this has more to do with the 
treatment and portrayal of animals in captivity than holding animals in captivity. Many beautiful 
animal sanctuaries provide the best possible conditions for animals who due to domestication, 
capture, or abuse cannot be safely reintroduced into the wild. Many of the facilities offer limited 
public access and facilitate educational experiences with constant emphasis on the welfare of 
the residents.  
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3.7.2 Cultural normative limitations 
The Nazi’s had a term, lebensunweten Lebens meaning “life unworthy of life” (Opotow, 
1990) and “Nazi propaganda defined Jews as outside the pale of humanity” (Oliner & Oliner, 
1988, p.6). Such condemnation and exclusion of the Jewish people was systematically 
normalized and enforced by the Nazis. This caused Hoffman (2000) to declare: 
Since the Holocaust, cultural relativism is dead. We no longer have the luxury of 
assuming every culture’s values or guiding principles will pass the moral test and 
that each good is as good as the any other. (p.273) 
 
It seems self-evident in consideration of the Holocaust that certain atrocities are universally and 
unquestionably wrong. However, cultural relativism may not be so easily dismissed. This section 
explores the influence of culture in attempt to understand how moral injustice could occur with 
majority complicity on the scale of a society. The section begins by examining moral relativism 
and ethical objectivism. Next, the influence of cultural norms on individual and group moral 
judgments is examined while entertaining the possibility that such perceived injustice is 
objectively immoral and the possibility that morality is entirely subjective. Finally, I conclude 
with a pragmatic approach to morality in search of a middle ground between relativism and 
universalism.  
Before continuing I want to consider the framing of the Holocaust as the epitome of 
moral failure due to relativism. First, it stretches the concepts of moral and cultural relativism 
because German culture wasn’t the culprit. What the Nazis (not the Germans) attempted was to 
establish a different epistemology- a competing reality where any dissenter was deemed 
unworthy of life. The Nazi party was no more representative of German culture than it was of 
dominant Western culture. If cultural relativism is denounced by citing the Holocaust, then the 
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denouncement is of the moral validity of judgments relative to dominant Western culture.  
However, many of the liberating forces were also part of dominant Western culture. Thus, 
cultural relativism does not account for the Holocaust. 
A second consideration of framing of the Holocaust as the epitome of moral failure is 
that Earth has not witnessed a single Holocaust, but many holocausts occurring before and after 
WWII. Defining the Holocaust as the single most profound atrocity in the history of Western 
culture dismisses a history of atrocity perpetrated and perpetuated by dominant Western 
culture. If we are to suggest that moral relativism be denounced based on extreme cases, why 
not cite colonialism or slavery? I suggest that it is because the moral deficiency is easily 
recognizable in those cases as a deficiency of European and European-American culture and in 
the case of the Holocaust, it is easy to maintain the moral standing of European-American 
liberators. The pursuit of moral universalism must overcome ethnocentrism and egocentrism 
that underlie assertions of objectivity and lead to judgments of superiority.  
Still, Hoffman (2000) raises an important question regarding the possibility of ethical 
objectivism. Regardless of the above considerations, most people, despite the subjectivity of our 
own experiences and differences in culture, maintain similar basic ideals about what is right and 
wrong. Such concepts were considered in the preceding discussion of rights. Despite the 
subjectivity of our individual experiences and the influence of normative forces like culture, 
there is some innate intersubjectivity among all humans. This intersubjectivity allows us to 
cooperate and generally resolve moral conflicts constructively. When significant harm is 
perceived as the result of judgments made by majority consensus of a society, cultural relativism 
and ethical objectivism become important considerations.  
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Cultural or moral relativism suggests that morality is subjective and differs in 
accordance with culture. The presumptions of relativism are: (1) we are not able to know the 
moral truth of our judgments apart from our own culture (2) our moral judgments do not apply 
to those who do not share the same moral truths (Cook, 1999). Thus, moral behavior is dictated 
by cultural norms and judgments are only universally right or wrong in the context of a 
particular culture (e.g., in Hindu culture it is wrong to…). Moral relativism taken to the extreme 
suggests that all moral judgments are arbitrary and no moral claim could be better than any 
other. Ethical objectivism makes the opposite claims suggesting that we can and do know moral 
truth and that it does apply to those who do not share the same convictions. The 
consequentialist position on moral objectivism is that right and wrong are determined by the 
outcomes of moral judgments and relies on a judgment of the desirability of those outcomes. 
The deontological position is that there are universal principles which rationally dictate whether 
or not a judgment is morally right or wrong (as illustrated by Kahn’s (1999) definition of 
obligatory moral judgments).  
Regardless of whether one believes that cultural norms validate moral judgments, there 
is no escaping the fact that culture is influential in individual moral judgments. Certainly the 
influence is not deterministic and individuals have the ability to resist or comply with cultural 
norms. We should never assume cultures are homogenous or static or that all individuals 
approve of all of the practices of their culture.  Martin Luther King Jr. expressed this sentiment 
beautify when addressing the American Psychological Association in 1966. 
There are some things in our society, some things in our world, to which we 
should never be adjusted. There are some things to which we must always be 
maladjusted if we are to be people of good will. (as cited in Turiel, 2005, p.4) 
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King’s statement may represent a consequentialist perspective on the moral truths 
underlying the civil rights movement. In fact, throughout American history, cultural critique 
unapologetically condemning the outcomes of cultural practices has propelled our social 
progress (e.g., civil rights movement). King made it clear that the injustice he spoke of was just 
as wrong elsewhere in the world as in the United States.  
The relativistic rejoinder to such a powerful stance on justice may suggest that the 
identification of injustice was relative to the status quo. 
It is easy for us to feel appalled at the way nobles exploited their serfs, 
plantation owners exploited their slaves and male chauvinists exploited women. 
But were these land-owners, slaveholders, and male chauvinists fundamentally 
different from us, or were they simply responding to different pressures and a 
different status quo? The prevailing power balances, then, seem to affect even 
the most aloof reformers’ conceptions of social justice. (Austin & Hatfield, 1980, 
p.53)  
 
The above passage does not suggest that it is arbitrary to feel appalled by past injustice, but that 
we must understand the context for injustice. We have to be sympathetic but not permissive 
when critically examining the cultural influence of behavior that we consider harmful to 
ourselves or others.  
When behavior is culturally normalized, individuals may not recognize their compliance 
as a moral judgment. The cultural normativity of the behavior may additionally be seen as 
validation of the moral judgment to comply. Therefore we must critically examine our own 
enculturation. If we seek moral objectivity we must consider how Western norms have been 
conducive to Western atrocity. Rather than denouncing the moral judgments of others we must 
accept that Westerners may not be the moral light of the world (we don’t have the greatest 
track record). However, although Western culture dominates Western society, Western society 
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is not culturally homogenous. Thus, we must look inward to critique the normative forces of 
our own cultures and societies and look outward, not in judgment, but in humility. As Grande 
(2004) wrote 
Dominant patterns of belief and practice are … integrally related to the cultural 
and ecological crises. Thus, the need for understanding other cultural patterns 
as legitimate and competing sources of knowledge is critical. (p.65) 
 
However, Grande (2004) did not assert that colonized peoples exist beyond critique and 
referred to the idea as “not only short sighted but also patronizing” (p.84). She clarified that  
voices of Indigenous and other non-Western peoples become increasingly vital, 
not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical 
power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because non-
Western peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture, 
providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms. 
(Grande, 2004, p.65) 
 
Thus, through exploring relativism we may find moral truth. However, there may be multiple 
moral truths and truth may not be static or absolute. We must be firmly rooted in our own 
identities and concepts of morality while simultaneously respecting, honoring, and learning from 
differing practices in other cultures. 
In summary, humans experience life subjectively and our perceptions, experiences and 
identities influence our moral judgments. At issue is whether moral judgments can be right or 
wrong. I suggest that we know certain universal rights and wrongs, but others most certainly will 
continue to emerge and evolve over time. Genocide, slavery, murder, rape, and mutilation are 
examples of things that are unquestionably wrong. In less extreme cases, moral judgments are 
much more subjective and objective rights may be unknown or nonexistent.  
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Pragmatic ethics establish a reasonable middle ground between objective moral 
judgments and subjectivity based on consequentialism.  Sayre’s (1991) environmental ethics fit 
well into my broad conception of the environment as natural and social. Sayre (1991) proposed 
an alternative view according to which the aim of environmental ethics is (1) a 
clear understanding of how moral norms actually come to be instituted in a 
given society, (2) the analysis of the practical effect of such norms from an 
environmental perspective, and (3) an examination of the relative desirability of 
alternative norms in light of their environmental effects. (p.195) 
 
All that remains is to sort out what is desirable. Although it is certainly a point of subjectivity, we 
all have to choose a point where we stand firm in our own moral convictions on what is good 
and what isn’t. For example, I believe that all life is worthy of life. In my own self-conception, 
the value that I place on life transcends concepts of cultural and moral relativism.  
Sayre’s (1991) ethics most importantly call for understanding. In all but the most 
extreme cases, moral judgments can identified as harmful without condemning the moral 
judge(s) as individuals or a cultural group. When behavior that is accepted/normalized is 
harmful, I believe we have a duty as humans to intervene. However, intervention cannot be an 
imperialistic effort at coercion which is both a violation of rights and an ineffective means of 
changing behavior. We have to heed Sayre’s (1991) advice and recognize how and why the 
harmful behavior may be a function of cultural and moral norms. We must meet people where 
they are, help them expand their perspectives, see the consequences of their actions, and 
voluntarily come to new moral positions. However, we must also be prepared to expand our 
own perspectives and recognize the consequences of our own actions. I’m reminded of the 
narrative of a Christian missionary who lived with Pirahã Indians in the Amazon Rainforest with 
the goal of learning their language in order to convert them but wound up not converting 
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anyone (Everett, 2008). Instead, Everett (2008) was personally transformed by the 
experience and gained new respect for the Pirahã way of knowing and being entirely in the 
present moment. The lesson is that we need to know people before we make assumptions 
about their judgments or behavior. 
In conclusion, I do not reject the possibility of moral objectivity, but I make no claims 
that humans know such objectivity in the complexity of human social relations. I am unwilling to 
quickly condemn cultural or individual practices as immoral and I hold that undesirable behavior 
isn’t always immoral because judgments involve subjectivity. Consequences of judgments, 
however, are less subjective, and when one’s moral judgments cause harm, intervention is 
necessary. In the most extreme circumstances, such as violent assault, considering the 
possibility that the transgressor is acting morally, gently intervening, and having a conversation 
about the transgression would be unreasonable. In such cases, only the moral judgment of the 
person or people intervening could possibly dictate the appropriate response.   
3.7.3 Social death 
Lisa Marie Cacho (2012) takes a structural approach to understanding (in)justice through 
the concept of social death. Social death is significantly related to moral exclusion and empathic 
bias. However, Cacho’s (2012) method of exploring social death as a process of exclusion 
provides a more sociological than psychological perspective. Social death is the outcome of a 
process where those deemed “dangerous, undeserving or unintelligible” are stripped of political 
legitimacy and moral credibility and denied the right even to demand rights. The socially dead 
are legally and morally “ineligible for personhood” (Cacho, 2012). 
 
135 
Criminalization is one of the methods of exclusion resulting in social death. 
Criminalization is the variety of “ideological and material processes that turn some people into 
criminals by making it all but impossible for them to be law-abiding” (Cacho, 2012) 
because “certain vulnerable and impoverished populations and places of color” are targeted by 
policies of regulation and containment (p.5). Cacho argued that because legal policy is generally 
accepted as 
both ethical and irreproachable, the act of law-breaking reflects poorly on a 
person’s moral character. If following the law (legitimate or not) determines 
whether a person is moral or immoral, it is all but impossible for people 
assigned to certain status categories to represent themselves as moral and 
deserving. (p.4) 
 
Therefore Cacho (2012) addressed legal, social, and moral exclusion singularly for the targets of 
criminalization and social death.  
The targets of criminalization are inescapably prejudged as immoral and criminal and 
“deemed deserving of discipline and punishment but not worthy of protection. They are not 
merely excluded from legal protection but criminalized as always already the object and target 
of law, never its authors or addressees” (Cacho, 2012, p. 5). The progression in judgment from 
illegal to immoral and therefore undeserving of rights renders the targets ineligible for 
personhood. This “not only forecloses empathy but does so through producing people and 
places always already subject to a form of discrimination believed to be both legitimate and 
deserved” (Cacho, 2012, p. 82).  
Cacho (2012) is suggesting that laws (as practically synonymous with morals) are written 
against specific racialized identities making not only someone’s behavior illegal, but their very 
existence.   
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People subjected to laws based on their (il)legal status – “illegal aliens,” “gang 
members,” “terrorist suspects”- are unable to comply with the “rule of law” 
because US law targets their beings and their bodies, not their behavior. They 
are denied not only the illusion of authorship but even the possibility of 
compliance. (Cacho, 2012, p.6) 
 
Cacho (2012) supported this proposition by analyzing media portrayals and legal proceedings 
related to immigration, terrorism, and gang violence and showed that status and identity dictate 
the way law targets individuals. One example of the way that identity and criminality are deeply 
intertwined was provided by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Cacho (2012) juxtaposed 
images in the media of a Black man wading through floodwaters with food from a grocery store 
with a nearly identical image of white couple who had taken food from a grocery store. The 
Black man was portrayed as a criminal who looted property, while the white couple portrayed as 
victims who found food in a grocery store (Cacho, 2012). Cacho (2012) concluded that only a 
black body makes certain crimes (looting) visible. More precisely, Black is criminalized as a de 
facto status crime. 
De facto status crimes can be defined as specific activities that are not only 
transparently recognized as “criminal” when they are attached to statuses that 
invoke race (gang member), ethnicity (“illegal alien”), and/or national origin 
(suspected terrorist). (p.43) 
 
A compelling case that Cacho (2012) examined was the case of eight high school 
teenagers who planned and executed a targeted attack on Mexican migrant workers in July, 
2000. The teenagers explicitly sought out to attack “illegal immigrants” (incidentally, none of the 
migrant workers were undocumented). They nearly beat a man to death and beat, robbed and 
harassed several other migrant workers for three hours while shouting racial slurs. In the 
ensuing trial the teenagers were portrayed as victims of gang enhancement charges (Proposition 
21) that dictated that they should face enhanced sentencing and be tried as adults, which were 
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clearly not intended for people like them. National media attention and public sympathy 
were invoked for these otherwise ‘good kids’ who just made a ‘mistake’. As Cacho (2012) 
concluded “The primary question regarding the assailants’ case was whether their irrefutable 
guilt tainted their innate innocence” (p.29). Their innate innocence was related to their status as 
affluent white US American citizens. At the same time, many other Youth of Color received 
enhanced sentences under Proposition 21 with very little public media attention. The clear 
subtext is that the status of gang member is inseparable from race, status categories, and 
criminalized identities (Cacho, 2012).  
Another component of social death is that not all identities are unquestionably 
protected and privileged. While some people/s are considered entitled to rights, others must be 
deemed deserving of rights. 
When a group’s rights are presumed to be entitlements, discussions about 
injustice can focus on whether people’s rights have been respected. But when a 
group’s rights are not socially recognized, discussions revolve around whether 
or not the aggrieved group even deserves to speak out against discrimination or 
exploitation, which effectively subverts or forecloses any dialogue about the 
actual injustices. (Cacho, 2012, p.139) 
 
African Americans, in this light, are often portrayed as having “earned” rights (as citizens), while 
Latina/o migrant workers are portrayed as undeserving of rights (as immigrants). This rhetoric is 
used to put civil rights and immigrant rights at odds because civil rights are considered to have 
been earned while immigrant rights are not (Cacho, 2012). Cacho (2012) points out that it is the 
same institutions that render these folks socially dead that must be appealed to in order to 
establish deservingness of rights. An appeal for rights made within a system that functions to 
deny rights may be a case where the master’s tools, indeed, will never dismantle the master’s 
house. Thus deservingness “is an unachievable prerequisite for the conferral of rights and 
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dignity that functions to align paid and unpaid workers with the regulating institutions and 
ideologies that keep them economically exploitable and legally vulnerable” (Cacho, 2012, p.12). 
The rights we need to be talking about are universal human rights. If rights are 
distributed based on deservingness then even those who are morally included, are only 
conditionally included and must continue to prove their deservingness and always unprotected 
from moral exclusion and social death. Cacho (2012) suggested that we must “set aside the 
notion that rights are contingent (with citizenship as the prerequisite) and conditional (with 
deservingness as the provisio)” (p. 141). In summary,  
As criminal by being, unlawful by presence, and illegal by status, [the socially 
dead]do not have the option to be law abiding, which is always the absolute 
prerequisite for political rights legal recognition, and resource redistribution in 
the United States. When the subjugation is engendered, justified, and 
maintained by the law, legal recognition cannot be a permanent or meaningful 
solution to subjugation. Criminalization justifies people’s ineligibility to 
personhood because it takes away the right to have rights. Consequentially, 
criminalization makes sense of the contradictions that ensue when according 
unequal access to legal universality. (Cacho, 2012, p.8) 
 
Finally, Cacho (2012) concluded with the value of hope: 
The space of social death is a desperate space, overwrought with and 
overdetermined by ideological contradictions of ineligible personhood … And 
yet the space of social death is always graced with hope, courage and/or 
youthful idealism, where those who decide to take responsibility for the 
unprotected are always looking for and stepping on the pressure points that can 
barely manage the contradictions that their very being inspires. (Cacho, 2012, 
p.145) 
 
3.8 Hip Hop Interlude 
Reserving the category of “resistance” for activists, organizers, and leaders 
underestimates and depreciates everyday forms of resistance, such as strategies 
to subtly subvert exploitation or artistic approaches to reclaim and “redecorate” 
public space. In fact, we may not only misread resistance as deviance, but in 
doing so we run the risk of patronizing youth, workers, and communities as 
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childishly disobedient rather than consciously and deliberately defiant. (Cacho, 
2012, p. 162) 
 
I can’t possibly recognize and honor the myriad ways of knowing and being of the world 
and by the nature of this project academic theory and research dominate. However, as an active 
participant in dominant culture with the audacity to think I have anything to say about a struggle 
against oppression, it would be an act of oppression to ignore American cultures who stand 
against oppression (not only Hip Hop, but many Indigenous, immigrant, and diasporic artists, 
peoples, and cultures). Potter (1995) wrote that 
it is vital to recognize that there are material inheritances- such as slavery- 
whose reverberations need not be recorded by a seismograph in a sealed 
laboratory, but can be and are felt in the everyday life of black diasporic 
cultures. (p.6) 
 
One such culture is Hip Hop. Those who live and practice Hip Hop are the experts most qualified 
to speak to the urban experience. For that reason, I find it imperative to take a brief intermission 
to consult Hip Hop on the urban30  experience and its influence on morality. 
The products of hiphop (e.g., albums) foster a certain experience to those who consume 
them, but the culture of Hip Hop is lived experience. Folks who do not share the lived 
                                                          
 
30
 ‘Urban’ is a bit of a vague and euphemistic term that is often used to dodge issues of race, poverty, and 
class. Nygreen, Ah Kwon, and Sánchez (2006) challenged this “dominant discourse that frames urban 
youth as disengaged or troubled” and suggested urban is “a euphemism for underserved, poor, 
marginalized, ethnic minority” peoples (p.108). I have avoided using the term as a label of identity (e.g., 
urban youth) in attempt not to be presumptuous about the identities of the referents of the term because 
urban refers to a type of environment. For that reason, I do discuss urban environments and the 
experiences that may be common urban environments (e.g., “the urban experience”). This is still a 
euphemistic term that is loaded with assumptions and generalizations related to race and socio-economic 
status, but I attempt to avoid explicitly making such assumptions and use the term ‘urban’ for lack of a 
good substitute.  
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experience (such as myself) cannot claim to know it through consuming the products. 
However, we can and should interpret the products empathically. The music, visual, and 
performing arts of Hip Hop (and the arts of many cultures) are deeply subversive, defiant, and 
educational while simultaneously emotional, poetic, and beautiful. These artists deliver critique 
in a way that is reaching and moving folks who academics don’t reach and won’t move. 
Three pieces by artists who I believe to be widely influential (and whose work I love) are 
quoted in their entirety. Each piece offers a different perspective on the urban experience. All 
three pieces relate to criminal(ized) behavior and violence in urban environments. The first 
piece, The Message by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five (1982) represents deterministic 
perspective on human behavior where the hardships of urban life lead to criminal(ized) 
behavior, jail, and ultimately death. The second piece, Love’s Gonna Get’cha by KRS-One (1990) 
offers a socially conditioned perspective where the protagonist of the song struggles with their 
agency to reconcile criminal(ized) behavior with survival needs. The third piece, Hell Yeah by 
Dead Prez (2004) provides a perspective more focused on individual agency and portrays 
criminal(ized) behavior as a subversive act against unjust social structure.  
All three artists as well as countless others write and perform about many topics and I 
don’t mean for this to be a representation of Hip Hip or each artist’s collection of work. It would 
be too simple to suggest that each of the three pieces reflect an overarching school of thought 
in Hip Hop that has progressed through the decades. However, I hope to illustrate the richness 
of the discussion taking place in Hip Hop by including three pieces spanning more than 20 years. 
The Message was a foundational piece in Hip Hop and it’s a certainty that each successive piece 
is written at least vaguely in response to it.  
 
141 
As a final note, I have decided to quote each piece in its entirety because I feel that 
it would be an appropriation for me to alter the pieces or quote only segments that portray the 
work in the light that I am interpreting it. 
In hip hop, there are, no doubt, expressions of sexist, racist, homophobic, 
capitalist constructions; however, there is also a disruption of these oppressive 
discourses, often within the same performances. (Baszile, 2009) 
 
Hip Hop is deeply and necessarily contradictory, complex, nuanced, and perfect in its 
imperfection because it is reflective of the contradictions of the society in which it exists. It’s not 
refined and sanitized like academic work that is how it is supposed to be.  
Ultimately, the critical point here is not—I believe—whether hip hop is good or 
bad, but that it in essence represents the struggle for freedom (even when 
acted out in negative ways) on behalf of young people who negotiate and 
perform self-meaning within a largely different sociopolitical context from 
previous generations. (Baszile, 2009) 
 
The pieces use language that I do not use. However, I will not take any part in censoring 
artwork. It must be taken as a whole package.    
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3.8.1 Grandmaster Flash – The Message 
It's like a jungle sometimes 
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under 
It's like a jungle sometimes  
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under  
 
Broken glass everywhere 
People pissin' on the stairs, you know they just don't care  
I can't take the smell, can't take the noise  
Got no money to move out, I guess I got no choice  
Rats in the front room, roaches in the back  
Junkies in the alley with a baseball bat  
I tried to get away but I couldn't get far  
'cuz a man with a tow truck repossessed my car  
 
Chorus: 
Don't push me 'cuz I'm close to the edge  
I'm trying not to lose my head  
Uh huh ha ha ha  
It's like a jungle sometimes  
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under  
 
Standin' on the front stoop hangin' out the window  
Watchin' all the cars go by, roarin' as the breezes blow  
Crazy lady, livin' in a bag  
Eatin' outta garbage pails, used to be a fag had sex and  
danced the tango, skip the life and dango  
A Zircon princess seemed to lost her senses  
Down at the peep show watchin' all the creeps  
So she can tell her stories to the girls back home  
She went to the city and got so social security  
She had to get a pimp, she couldn't make it on her own  
 
[Chorus] 
 
My brother's doin' bad, stole my mother's TV  
Says she watches too much, it's just not healthy  
"All My Children" in the daytime, "Dallas" at night  
Can't even see the game or the Sugar Ray fight  
The bill collectors, they ring my phone  
and scare my wife when I'm not home  
Got a bum education, double-digit inflation  
Can't take the train to the job, there's a strike at the station  
Neon King Kong standin' on my back  
Can't stop to turn around, broke my sacroiliac  
A mid-range migraine, cancered membrane  
Sometimes I think I'm goin' insane  
I swear I might hijack a plane!  
 
[Chorus] 
 
My son said, Daddy, I don't wanna go to school  
'cuz the teacher's a jerk, he must think I'm a fool  
And all the kids smoke reefer, I think it'd be cheaper  
if I just got a job, learned to be a street sweeper  
Or dance to the beat, shuffle my feet  
Wear a shirt and tie and run with the creeps  
'cuz it's all about money, ain't a damn thing funny  
You got to have a con in this land of milk and honey  
They pushed that girl in front of the train  
Took her to the doctor, sewed her arm on again  
Stabbed that man right in his heart  
Gave him a transplant for a brand new start  
I can't walk through the park 'cuz it's crazy after dark  
Keep my hand on my gun 'cuz they got me on the run  
I feel like a outlaw, broke my last glass jaw  
Hear them say "You want some more?"  
Livin' on a see-saw  
 
[Chorus] 
 
A child is born with no state of mind  
Blind to the ways of mankind  
God is smilin' on you but he's frownin' too  
Because only God knows what you'll go through  
You'll grow in the ghetto livin' second-rate  
And your eyes will sing a song of deep hate  
The places you play and where you stay  
Looks like one great big alleyway  
You'll admire all the number-book takers  
Thugs, pimps and pushers and the big money-makers  
Drivin' big cars, spendin' twenties and tens  
And you'll wanna grow up to be just like them, huh  
Smugglers, scramblers, burglars, gamblers  
Pickpockets, peddlers, even panhandlers  
You say I'm cool, huh, I'm no fool  
But then you wind up droppin' outta high school  
Now you're unemployed, all non void  
Walkin' round like you're Pretty Boy Floyd  
Turned stick-up kid, but look what you done did  
Got sent up for a eight-year bid  
Now your manhood is took and you're a Maytag  
Spend the next two years as a undercover fag  
Bein' used and abused to serve like hell  
'til one day, you was found hung dead in the cell  
It was plain to see that your life was lost  
You was cold and your body swung back and forth  
But now your eyes sing the sad, sad song  
Of how you lived so fast and died so young so...  
(Grandmaster Flash & Furious Five, 1982) 
  
3.8.2 Boogie Down Productions – Loves Gonna Get’Cha (Material Love) on Edutainment 
Ya know that's why man I be telling you all the time man, you 
know love, that word 'love,' is a very serious thing, and if you 
don't watch out I tell ya, that (Love's gonna get you) because a 
lot of people out here say "I love my car" or "I love my chain" or, 
or "I-I-I'm just in love with that girl over there" so, for all the 
people out there that fall in love with material items, we gonna 
bump the beat a little something like this 
 
I'm in junior high with a B-plus grade 
At the end of the day I don't hit the arcade 
I walk from school to my mom's apartment 
I got to tell the suckas everyday "Don't start it," 
Cause where I'm at, if you're soft, you're lost 
To stay on course means to roll with force 
My boy named Rob is chillin' in a Benz 
In front of my building with the rest of his friends 
I give him a pound, oh I mean I shake his hand 
He's the neighborhood drug dealer, my man 
I go upstairs and hug my mother 
Kiss my sister, and punch my brother 
I sit down on my bed to watch some tv 
(machine gun fire) Do my ears deceive me? 
Nope, that's the fourth time this week 
Another fast brother shot dead in the street 
The very next day while I'm off to class 
My moms goes to work cold busting her ass 
My sister's cute but she got no gear 
I got three pairs of pants that with my brother I share 
See there in school see I'm made a fool 
With one and a half pair of pants you ain't cool 
But there's no dollars for nothing else 
I got beans, rice, and bread on my shelf 
Every day I see my mother struggling 
Now it’s time I've got to do something 
I look for work I get dissed like a jerk 
I do odd jobs and come home like a slob 
So here comes Rob his gold is shimmery 
He gives me two hundred for a quick delivery 
I do it once. I do it twice 
Now there's steak with the beans and rice 
My mother's nervous but she knows the deal 
My sister's gear now has sex appeal 
My brothers my partner and we're getting paper 
Three months later we run our own caper 
My family's happy everything is new 
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do? 
 
Chorus: 
 
That's why, (loves gonna get you) 
(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you) 
You fall in love with your chain 
You fall in love with your car 
Love's gonna sneak right up and snuff you from behind 
So I want you to check the story out as we go down the line 
(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you) 
 
Money's flowing, everything is fine 
Got myself an Uzi and my brother a nine 
Business is boomin' everything is cool 
I pull about a g a week--fuck school 
A year goes by and I begin to grow 
Not in height but juice and cash flow 
I pick up my feet and begin to watch tv 
Cause now I got other people working for me 
I got a 55-inch television you know 
And every once in a while I hear 'Just Say No,' 
Or the other commercial I love 
Is when they say 'this is your brain on drugs,' 
I pick up my remote control and just turn 
Cause with that bullshit I'm not concerned 
See me and my brother jump in the BM 
Driving around our territory again 
I stop at the light like a superstar 
And automatic weapons cold sprayed my car 
I hit the accelerator scared as shit 
And drove one block to find my brother was hit 
He wasn't dead but the blood was pouring 
And all I could think about was warring 
Later I found that it was Rob and his crew 
Now tell me, what the fuck am I supposed to do? 
 
[Chorus] 
 
My brothers out of it, but I'm still in it 
On top of that I’m in it to win it 
I can't believe that Rob would dis me 
That faggot, that punk, he's soft--a sissy! 
I'm driving around now with three of my guys 
The war is on, and I'm on the rise 
We rolled right up to his favorite hangout 
Said 'hello' and then the bullets rang out 
Some fired back so we took cover 
And all I could think about was my brother 
Rob jumped up and began to run 
Busting shots hoping to hit someone 
So I just stopped, and let off three shots 
Two hit him and one hit a cop 
I threw the gun down and began to shout 
'Come on, I got him, it's time to break out!' 
But as we ran, there were the boys in blue 
Pointing their guns at my four man crew 
They shot down one, they shot down two 
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do? 
 
Ya know a lot of people believe that that word 'love' is real soft, 
but when you use it in your vocabulary like you're addicted to it, 
it sneaks right up and takes you right out. So, for future 
reference remember: it's alright to like or want a material item, 
but when you fall in love with it and you start scheming and 
carrying on for it, just remember, it's gonna get'cha 
(Boogie Down Productions & KRS-One, 1990) 
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3.8.3 Dead Prez - Hell Yeah on RBG (Revolutionary but Gangsta) 
Holton Street 
Dean Street, click clack 
President, uh huh 
Nostrand Ave, DPz 
Orange Ave, RBGs 
Tee Town, who wanna ride 
Brooklyn, come on, come on 
 
Sitting in the living room on the floor 
Hunger pang got me on some migraine shit 
But I'm gonna maintain 
Nigga got two or three dollars to my name 
And my homies in the same boat going through the same thing 
Ready for a caper, better plot for the paper 
We been living in the dark since April 
On the candle, gotta get a handle 
My homie got a twenty-five automatic added to the camper 
Nigga get the phone book look up in the yellow page 
Lemme tell you how we gonna get paid 
We gonna order take-out and when they send the driver 
We gonna stick the twenty-five up in his face 
Let's ride, stepping outside like warriors 
Head to the notorious Southside 
One weapon to the four of us 
Hiding in the corridor until we see the beams from the car 
headlights 
White boy in the wrong place at the right time 
Soon as the car door open up he mine 
We roll up quick and put the pistol to his nose 
By the look on his face he probably shitted in his clothes 
You know what this is 
It's a stick up 
Gimme the do' from your pickups 
You ran into the wrong niggas 
We running down the block hot with these stacks of boxes 
So we split up and met back at the apartment 
 
Chorus: 
Hell yeah! - Yo ain't you hungry my nigga? 
Hell yeah! - You wanna get paid my nigga? 
Hell yeah! - Ain't you tired of starving my nigga? 
Hell yeah! - Well lets ride then! 
Hell yeah! 
Hell yeah! 
 
I know a way we can get paid you can get down but you can't be 
afraid 
Let's go to the DMV and get an ID 
The name says you but the face is me 
Now it's your turn take my paper work 
Like 1, 2, 3 let’s make it work 
Then, fill out the credit card application 
And it’s gonna be ‘bout 3 weeks a waiting 
For American Express 
Discover Card 
Platinum Visa, Mastercard 
Cause when we was boosting shit we was targets 
Now we just walk right up and say charge it 
To the game we rocking brand names 
Well known at the department store chains 
We even got the boys in the crew a few things 
Po Po never know who to true blame 
Sto' after Sto' you know we kept rolling 
Wait two weeks report the car stolen 
Repeat the cycle like a laundry mat 
Like a glitch in the system it's hard to catch 
Coming out the mall with the shopping bags 
We can take it right back then get the cash 
Yea, get a friend and then do it again 
Damn right that's how we paid the rent 
 
[Chorus] 
 
I know a caper 
We can get some government paper 
You know food stamps can we really do that 
Hell yea, right there for the taking 
Fuck welfare we say reparations 
And, you know the grind 
Get up early get in the line and just wait 
Everybody on break that's part of the game 
And when they call your name 
Ms. Case Worker let my state my claim 
I'm homeless, jobless, times is hard 
I'm bout hopeless 
But I gotta eat regardless 
No family to run to I'm twenty two 
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do 
My sad story made her feel close to me 
I made her feel like it was an emergency 
When I came to the crib niggas couldn't believe 
I came back with a big bag of groceries, hell yeah 
 
Every job I ever had I had to get on the first day 
I find out how to pimp on the system 
Two steps ahead of the manager 
Getting over on the regular tax free money out of the register 
And when I'm working late nights stocking boxes 
I'm creeping their merchandise 
And don't put me on dishes I'm dropping them bitches 
And taking all day long to mop the kitchen shit 
We ain't getting paid commission, minimum wage, modern day 
slave conditions 
Got me flippin' burgers with no power 
Can't even buy one off what I make in an hour 
I'm not the one to kiss ass for the top position 
I take mine off the top like a politician 
Where I'm from doing dirt is a part of living 
I got mouths to feed I gots to get it 
 
If you claiming gangsta, then bang on the system 
And show that you ready to ride 
Till we get our freedom 
We got to get over 
We steady on the grind 
(Dead Prez, 2004)
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3.8.4 Concluding notes on Hip Hop 
The preceding lyrics are simply intended to illustrate the attention to urban social 
conditions and diversity of thought on the significance of the influence of those conditions 
among Hip Hop artists. I’m certain that all of the theory discussed in this paper is addressed in 
outside of academia and significantly in the art of Hip Hop. I return to Hip Hop as pedagogy in 
section 4.4.3 on page 232.  
This section on Hip Hop precedes the following section explores outlying behavior, in part, 
to provide perspectives on how and why some folks may act in such a manner, specifically 
considering environmental influences. Additionally, the lyrics illustrate how conflicting needs 
and interests in the context of a fundamentally unjust social structure may render simple 
categorization of behavior as prosocial or antisocial inadequate.  Certain antisocial behavior may 
be an attempt to reconcile injustice; this may be what Dead Prez (2004) referred to as 
“revolutionary but gangsta.” I would not categorize their music as ‘gangster rap,’ on the above 
track they are deliberately examining the subversive nature of criminal(ized) behavior from the 
perspective of those targeted by oppression in urban environments. I hope the reader will keep 
these perspectives and lived experiences in mind in the following exploration of outlying 
behavior. 
3.9 Outlying Behavior 
Empathy potentially exists in everyone, it may be reduced by irritability, 
fearfulness, and other temperamental factors, and by depressive and autistic 
tendencies that interfere with mimicry, role-taking, and other empathy arousing 
processes. Combining these temperamental factors with nonnurturant, 
excessively  power-assertive life experiences may well produce individuals who 
cannot empathize (psychopaths?) (Hoffman, 2000, p.282). 
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 To be frank, I do not have the background or expertise to adequately explore 
differences in the moral development of individuals who are outliers in the process of empathy 
and moral development as I have described it. However, as an educator and an outlier, I hope to 
offer a sympathetic perspective and a passionate refusal to believe that anyone is 
fundamentally incapable of prosocial behavior.  
3.9.1 Autism Spectrum Dis/Order  
 
The concept of ‘Autistic Psychopathy’ was introduced by Hans Asperger in 1944 (Jones 
et al., 2010). People diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder may experience empathy 
differently, but there is no reason to suggest that autistic people lack the ability to care for 
others or to develop moral principles.  
The essential features of autism spectrum disorder are persistent impairment in 
reciprocal social communication and social interaction (Criterion A), and 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (Criterion B). 
These symptoms are present from early childhood and limit or impair everyday 
functioning (Criteria C and D). (American Psychological Association, 2013) 
 
Criterion A raises questions about how autism spectrum disorder (ASD) relates to the empathy 
and moral development process. The DSM-5 (2013) elaborated on Criterion A: 
A. Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple 
contexts, as manifested by the following, currently or by history (examples are 
illustrative, not exhaustive; see text): 
1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from abnormal 
social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation; to reduced 
sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to failure to initiate or respond to social 
interactions. 
2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction, 
ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal 
communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or deficits in 
understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack of facial expressions and 
nonverbal communication. 
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3. Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships, 
ranging, for example, from difficulties adjusting behavior to suit various social 
contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends; to 
absence of interest in peers. (American Psychological Association, 2013) 
However, behavior by individuals with ASD that may be interpreted by neurotypical (NT) 
individuals as antisocial may not be done with malicious intent (Jones et al., 2010). Rather, such 
antisocial behavior could be explained as well-intentioned faux pas by “individuals who find the 
social world difficult to interpret” (Jones et al., 2010). Obviously, individuals with ASD, like all 
other individuals, may occasionally act with malice.  
Individuals with ASD experience empathy in the affective sense similarly NTs but have 
difficulty with more cognitive forms of empathy like perspective taking (Jones et al., 2010). 
Individuals with ASD have difficulty in understanding the perspective of others 
and consequently may react in a seemingly cold and uncaring manner in real-life 
situations. However, if information is presented in a way that enables 
individuals with ASD to identify others’ point of view, they appear to show as 
much concern and compassion as typically developing individuals. (Jones et al., 
2010) 
 
Co-occurrence of ASD and lack of affective empathy (commonly associated with psychopathy) is 
possible. Both conditions are believed to be highly heritable, but they are genetically 
independent. Thus, although both are sometimes considered empathy disorders, autism and 
psychopathy are significantly distinct from one another (Jones et al., 2010).  
Although many folks on the Autism Spectrum are highly communicative, either verbally 
or non-verbally, ASD is primarily researched and described by neurotypical people. In The 
Positive Psychology of Personal Transformation: Leveraging Resilience for Life Change, Garbarino 
(2011),  who has authored more than twenty books related to childhood violence and trauma, 
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boldly discusses his own autistic tendencies (it is not explicitly clear whether or not 
Garbarino has been diagnosed): 
They say that because of having trouble understanding the emotions of others a 
person with Asperger’s31 may be seen as egotistical, selfish, and uncaring. This is 
mostly not true of most of “us.” I know it is not true of me. Let me make it clear 
that my intentions are good: I believe I am “a good person.” At heart I am a 
person of light and spirit. I am kind, generous, compassionate, caring, and giving 
to the degree that I can “figure out” what the kind, generous, compassionate, 
caring, and giving thing to do would be. (p.34) 
 
Additionally, the book Asperger Syndrome & Social Relationships: Adults Speak Out about 
Asperger Syndrome provides a collection of essays about social relationships written by adults 
with Asperger Syndrome. The personal narratives reflect a diversity of unique people who 
connect with others in a variety of ways. Several of the contributors work in social professions 
such as healthcare, teaching, and social work and actively engage in helping others. Many of the 
submissions certainly reflect difficulty with perspective taking, but many express the active use 
of induction (attempts to make generalizations about the effect of their actions on others). 
What I was struck by, was how actively attentive the authors were to their own difficulty 
regarding things like perspective taking and theory of mind for the express purpose of helping 
other autistic people achieve greater success in social relations. With the attention, deliberation, 
                                                          
 
31
 DSM-5 no longer diagnoses Asperger’s disorder and those previously diagnosed with Asperger’s 
disorder are now diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (American Psychological Association, 2013). 
Autism spectrum disorder may be specified with or without accompanying intellectual impairment and 
with or without accompanying language impairment. Severity is further specified in relation to the level of 
support that the individual needs. (2013)  
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and detail of any social scientist these folks deconstruct everyday social interactions in order 
to understand social convention that many NTs don’t have to pay specific attention to.  
The following quote is meant as a joke and lacks empirical support, but it offers a shift in 
perspective regarding conceptions of what a disorder is: 
Neurotypical syndrome is a neurobiological disorder characterized by 
preoccupation with social concerns, delusions of superiority, and obsession with 
conformity. Neurotypical individuals often assume that their experience of the 
world is either the only one, or the only correct one. NTs find it difficult to be 
alone. NTs are often intolerant of seemingly minor differences in others. When 
in groups NTs are socially and behaviorally rigid, and frequently insist upon the 
performance of dysfunctional, destructive, and even impossible rituals as a way 
of maintaining group identity. NTs find it difficult to communicate directly, and 
have a much higher incidence of lying as compared to persons on the autistic 
spectrum. (Institute of the Study of the Neurologically Typical, 
http://inst.autistics.org, accessed 11 February, 2008) (as cited in Beardon & 
Edmonds, 2008, p.11) 
 
I intentionally challenge the term disorder. However it is important to recognize that there are 
mental and physical disabilities as well as mental and physical different-abilities. By so 
frequently pathologizing children as disabled, we form our expectations for them based on 
perceived deficits rather than potential (Damon, 2009). Since “children are acutely aware of 
how they are being appraised, and they base their own self-conceptions largely on how others 
see them,” (Damon, 2009, p.169) we limit our children’s capacities when we view them as 
disabled. Damon (2009) argued that “no child who retains a living brain is ever wholly or 
permanently disabled … there are always useful and self-fulfilling things that a child can learn to 
do” (p.171).  
All people deserve an active role in the way that they self-identify and we all need a 
little extra help sometimes. Difference is not necessarily disability. However, those who need 
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assistance in order to be healthy and successful in daily life should not confuse politics of 
(dis)ability with their practical needs. Labeling a human being as high or low functioning based 
on their need for help is dehumanizing. But it is not dehumanizing to recognize and understand 
someone’s need for help on an individual basis without presuming that their value is based on 
their independence. 
3.9.2 Psychopaths, sociopaths & antisocial behavior 
 
“The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of 
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence 
and continues into adulthood” (American Psychological Association, 2013). Those diagnosed 
with antisocial personality disorder frequently lack empathy, however a lack of empathy is not 
required for diagnosis (American Psychological Association, 2013). This definition neatly applies 
to the majority of repeat offenders in prisons. In fact, the prevalence of the disorder is above 
70% in prisons and substance clinics (American Psychological Association, 2013). Antisocial 
personality disorder is also associated with low socioeconomic status and more frequent in 
urban areas (American Psychological Association, 2013).  
In everyday use psychopath and sociopath are used interchangeably and evoke images 
of a merciless criminal or murder. The DSM-5 does not use the terms psychopath and sociopath, 
and such conditions would be diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder (American 
Psychological Association, 2013). Pemment (2013) overviewed evidence for the biological nature 
of psychopathy and relation to early childhood development and advocated for specific use of 
the terms psychopath and sociopath. Pemment (2013) suggested that the psychopath does not 
feel empathy and thus has no sense of morality or simply no regard for moral convention due to 
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their neurological differences. Sociopaths are defined to have a sense of morality that does 
not match their cultural context. The sociopaths belief that their actions are just modulate their 
feelings of empathy for a potential victim (Pemment, 2013). Although not caring about others is 
a possible outcome of the lack of empathy, a lack of empathy doesn’t doom someone to 
antisocial behavior.  
Furthermore, the terms psychopath and sociopath and associated empathic “deficiency” 
are generally only ascribed post-hoc to those who engage in antisocial behavior. However Haidt 
(2006) pointed out that folks who “lose most of their emotional lives” due to damage to the 
orbitofrontal cortex (the lower third of the frontal cortex) “perform normally on tests of 
intelligence and knowledge of social rules and moral principles” (p. 12). Thus, diminished 
emotional capacity is not intrinsically associated with antisocial behavior. The deficit that these 
folks most significantly suffer is indecision because without the immediate emotional response 
to a situation, the individual must logically examine all of the pros and cons of each possible 
choice and may find little reason to pick one or the other (Haidt, 2006). However, damage to the 
entire frontal cortex has caused people to become sexually aggressive and uninhibited (Haidt, 
2006). Certainly differences in the brain affect our behavior, but rarely do they dictate our 
behavior. Cultural influence is too complex and profound a factor for any behavior to be 
biologically determined. The general consensus is that some people are born with neurological 
deficits that are conducive to psychopathy but that environmental factors more significantly 
influence the manifestation of psychopathic behavior (Garbarino, Bradshaw, & Vorrasi, 2002).  
 If someone is already condemned, criminalized and diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder or as a psychopath or sociopath even their innocence is presumed to be 
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evidence of guilt. They are presumed fully and entirely anti-social. Thus, what for a non-
criminalized individual would be normal behavior is perceived as a cover for evildoings. Anyone 
considered a psychopath is easily rendered socially dead and morally excluded. In fact, the Bush 
Administration employed a similar rhetoric to the descriptions of psychopaths in moral research 
in order to justify the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The Bush administration constructed the Middle East as an area where “the 
condition” of “evildoing” was hidden and latent, posing permanent and 
unpredictable threats to civilization. Afghanistan and Iraq were constructed as 
terrorist “hideouts” or places with “hidden” weapons of mass destruction, and 
this presumption of guilt assumed the existence of unseen evidence that may 
not, in fact, have existed. In other words, Iraq and Afghanistan would be 
presumed guilty even if proven innocent because the requirements for 
exoneration were also the terms of indictment. (Cacho, 2012, p.100) 
 
Psychopathy, sociopathy, and antisocial personality disorder are easy answers for antisocial 
behavior (cf. Haidt, 2006 on the myth of pure evil) because they simply condemn the evil other 
as incapable of goodness.  Evil may exist, and I won’t discount the possibility that some 
contingent of human population is simply ‘bad’. However, it is too simple to suggest that 
someone who engages in antisocial behavior feels no empathy is simply compelled by their evil 
nature to commit crimes. We need to consider the possibility that something is very wrong in 
environments where antisocial behavior is prevalent.  
 Childhood bullying may be a warning sign for psychopathy in adulthood (Gini, Pozzoli, & 
Hauser, 2011). Gini et al. (2011) found that children who bully their peers often make sound 
moral judgments but lack in moral compassion (i.e., psychopathy: they know right from wrong 
but don’t care about the moral distinction). The study stressed the necessity of intervention in 
bullying behavior. However, a strictly behaviorist approach to antisocial behavior is not 
sufficient because “antisocial behavior in children appears to be correlated with physical abuse, 
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parental conflict, and antisocial parents (among a number of other factors)” (Pemment, 
2013, p.2). Interventions must address the child’s social environment and the process of moral 
development in addition to behavioral interventions.  
Garbarino (1996) suggested that factors such as violence and economic poverty, 
especially urban environments, are significant causes of antisocial behavior. Garbarino (1996) 
used the term socially toxic environments to how such circumstances are conducive to antisocial 
behavior.  
Social toxicity refers to the extent to which the social environment is 
psychologically poisonous, in the sense that it contains serious threats to the 
development of identity, competence, moral reasoning, trust, hope, and the 
other features of personality and ideology that make for success in school, 
family, work, and the community…  Like physical toxicity, social toxicity can be 
fatal in the form of suicide, homicide, drug-related and other life style-related 
preventable deaths. But mostly, it results in diminished “humanity” in the lives 
of children and youth by virtue of leading them to live in a state of degradation, 
whether they know it or not. (Garbarino, 2011, p.30) 
 
This is clearly the position taken by all three Hip Hop artists discussed previously (Boogie Down 
Productions & KRS-One, 1990; Dead Prez, 2004; Grandmaster Flash & Furious Five, 1982). In fact 
the DSM-5 stated that “Concerns have been raised that the diagnosis may at times be 
misapplied to individuals in settings in which seemingly antisocial behavior may be part of a 
protective survival strategy” (American Psychological Association, 2013). It should be considered 
that if such a survival strategy was persistently necessary throughout a child’s development 
“survival strategy” in a toxic environment could be incorporated into one’s moral framework 
and become disorder. The motivation for antisocial behavior and associated “lack of remorse” 
characterizing psychopaths may be reflective of moral and empathic limitations that all humans 
are subject to such as habituation. 
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There may be two unique process at work: (1) Antisocial behavior is a product of 
toxic environments and diminished or altered empathy and morality allow one to cope with 
having acted in such a way; (2) Antisocial behavior is a result of diminished or altered empathy 
and morality and the prevalence of such behavior produces toxic environments. To ask which is 
more prevalent is the wrong question. Both are at work and together the two processes make 
up a positive feedback cycle that creates and reproduces toxic environments (social 
degradation) and perpetuates antisocial behavior. 
Hunger and malnutrition also contribute to antisocial behavior. Many vitamins, 
minerals, and amino acids are vital to cognitive functioning and effect production of chemicals in 
the brain, such as serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine (Massachusets General Hospital, 
2006) . Studies have shown that dietary correction or supplementation can reduce antisocial 
behavior and violent tendencies in incarcerated adults (Gesch, Hammond, Hampson, Eves, & 
Crowder, 2002) and adolescents (Schoenthaler et al., 1997), and improve cognitive functioning 
(Rogers, 2001) and academic performance (Florence, 2007). In the Schoenthaler et al. (1997) 
study the researchers in this study collected and analyzed blood samples prior to, and in course 
of the intervention study. The subjects who had deficiencies (most common deficiencies were 
B1, B3, B6, B9, all associated with mood disorders) prior to the study displayed the most 
significant decrease in violent behavior. Rogers  (2001) concluded that, “dietary risk factors for 
physical (ill)health are also often risk factors for mental (ill)health” (2001). Ultimately, a healthy 
diet and healthy brain improve cognitive functioning and may help people resolve conflicts non-
violently. 
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When survival is at stake, in cases such as hunger, the pursuit of nourishment is 
one’s most primary motivator. Their considerations will likely become egoistic as a matter of 
survival and they may find behavior that they might otherwise consider immoral justifiable or 
act without moral consideration. Additionally, as discussed in the Hip Hop Interlude, antisocial 
behavior, in the face of injustice, may be an act of symbolic defiance. Maybe we shouldn’t 
simply consider the ‘rightness’ of the struggling individual’s behavior. Indeed, maybe we should 
consider that if someone has to resort to criminal(ized) behavior to acquire food, regardless of 
their personal merit, there may be a significant moral shortcoming on the part of all of those 
complicit with a system allowing anyone to go hungry.  
Just as unmet physiological needs may encourage a tendency towards antisocial 
behavior, so do unmet psychological needs. Antisocial behavior that individuals may justify 
based on their personal needs is not always morally excusable even in the context of unmet 
needs, environmental stressors, and pathology. I draw the line not at the loss of property but at 
the infliction of physical harm: it is excusable to steal food if one is starving, but it is not 
excusable to shoot a convenience store clerk to acquire food. In these extremely antisocial 
cases, individuals often make little distinction between survival needs and desires (Gibbs, 2014). 
One such case of atrocity resulting from unmet psychological needs for love and acceptance is 
the recent murders committed by 22 year old Elliot Rodger. In videos posted on YouTube titled, 
Life is so unfair because girls don’t like me (Rodger, 2014), Elliot blamed women for his 
unfulfilled need for love and acceptance.  He later murdered six students who attended his 
university (Pengelly, 2014). Elliot was obviously mentally ill and took deeply misogynistic 
elements of society to an atrocious extreme. However, despite all pathology, and how ‘sick’ 
Elliot might have been, there is no possibility to suggest that Eliot’s unmet needs excuse his 
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actions. Pathologizing behavior does not justify it nor relieve those who have done such 
severe harm of responsibility. However, we need to be looking more carefully at social structural 
influences on antisocial behavior.  
In summary, we can’t immediately dismiss people who do bad things as bad people. 
Reductionist theories are always appealing, but human behavior is not that simple. To dismiss 
antisocial behavior lets those of us who have self-conceptions as good people off the hook too 
easily. The idea that we are only responsible for our own actions is nonsense, we co-construct 
our environment together and we (all people) co-construct environments that are conducive to 
antisocial behavior. We must work to change the environments conducive to the behavior and 
to rehabilitate the individuals who have acted antisocially (cf. Chapter 8 in Gibbs, 2014 Treating 
Antisocial Behavior). Hope mandates that even in the most deterministic cases (e.g., 
psychopaths), we critically consider how, when, and where we can make the most effective 
interventions in any process that produces undesirable outcomes. This means that regardless of 
biological influence (which educators have little ability to intervene in, but psychiatrists may) we 
must make social and environmental interventions. We need to create environments and foster 
experiences that are more conducive to prosocial behavior than antisocial behavior.  
3.9.3 Trauma & chronic stress 
Severe trauma can stimulate psychopathy  (Garbarino, 2011). Traumatic events are 
typically defined as confrontations involving the actuality or threat of death or serious injury 
(Alisic et al., 2011). “Traumatic events may disrupt a youth’s brain development, developmental 
skills, talents, personality development, and functioning” (Nader, 2011). Nader (2011) suggested 
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that less violent events such as prolonged separation for young children or shame and 
humiliation for older children can also be traumatic.  
Psychological distress following exposure to a traumatic or stressful event is 
quite variable. In some cases, symptoms can be well understood within an 
anxiety- or fear-based context. It is clear, however, that many individuals who 
have been exposed to a traumatic or stressful event exhibit a phenotype in 
which, rather than anxiety- or fear-based symptoms, the most prominent 
clinical characteristics are anhedonic [inability to experience pleasure in 
normally pleasurable acts] and dysphoric symptoms, externalizing angry and 
aggressive symptoms, or dissociative symptoms.  (American Psychological 
Association, 2013) 
 
Garbarino (2011) described trauma as simultaneous affective and cognitive over-arousal. The 
overwhelming negative feelings are coupled with thoughts “beyond normal ideas of human 
reality” (Garbarino, 2011, p.49). 
3.9.3.1 Posttraumatic growth, resilience, and coping 
“The experience of a single incident of acute trauma in an otherwise good life is likely to 
yield to short-term rest and therapy … that brings a traumatized persons feelings and thoughts 
back into normal focus” (Garbarino, 2011, p.50). Human response to trauma is complex and 
may, but usually doesn’t, result in posttraumatic stress disorder (Alisic et al., 2011). It may have 
transitory or lasting ill-effects but it can also promote emotional growth. Children can recover 
and even grow from traumatic one-time-events when their environment is otherwise positive, 
but a single event, and especially chronic stress or trauma can negatively affect the 
development of a child’s brain (Haidt, 2006). The role of a trusted adult (e.g., parent/guardian or 
teacher) is significant in providing assurance and providing a safe and consistent environment 
(e.g., home, school). Children need to know that “their world” is ok (physical and emotional 
safety and stability) even if the outside world is not (Garbarino, 2011).  
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Posttraumatic growth suggests that 
making sense of the bad things can lead to some good things – if you are 
fortunate in who your friends are, what resources you have, how your 
temperament equips you to deal with stress and threat, and how you come out 
on the other side with a new appreciation for the meaning of life (Garbarino, 
2011, p.47). 
 
Haidt (2006) identified three types of posttraumatic growth. The first suggests that by getting 
through a traumatic experience and the resulting feelings, one can discover a sense of inner 
strength and emerge with a new understanding of their own abilities that positively changes 
their self-concept. This knowledge of their ability to cope with hard situations can be a source of 
strength in future traumatic experiences. Haidt (2006) refers to this newfound ability to cope as 
something akin to inoculation against future trauma. The second type of posttraumatic growth 
that Haidt (2006) discussed was that it can have a filtering effect on personal relationships. In 
the aftermath of trauma one’s most important relationships sometimes become more apparent. 
Ones’ friends either step up and are there for them or step back and the emotional vulnerability 
and dependence on friends and loved ones in recovery from trauma can strengthen those 
relationships. Ultimately, people who go through profound challenges together may emerge 
closer to one another than ever before or pushed apart. Third, trauma shakes the foundation of 
our reality and may thus provide a stimulus for someone to reassess their philosophy and 
priorities in life. I think we all anecdotally know examples of all three types of posttraumatic 
growth such as a close friendship developing through a shared hardship or someone recovered 
from cancer and resolved to quit their office job and pursue their dream to be an artist.  
People’s ability to consistently maintain hope in the face of trauma and achieve growth 
is referred to as resilience. Resilience can be considered as functional and existential (Garbarino, 
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2011). Functional resilience may allow someone to continue their normal business in the 
face of trauma, but they could still be suffering inside and trauma symptoms could surface years 
later (Garbarino, 2011). The aim of positive psychology is not just surviving, but thriving 
(functional and existential resilience). Garbarino (2011) described a human quality called 
hardiness that protects against traumatization. Hardiness is composed of a positive outlook on 
life, a sense of control, and a disposition to see challenges rather than threats.  
Finally, Garbarino (2011) most significantly discussed the importance of forgiveness and 
compassion. Violence is cyclical and the victim of one trauma may become the perpetrator of 
future trauma. For inner peace and peace in the social environment, forgiveness is vital and “we 
must not allow our hurt egos and our dark sides to use the opportunity presented by traumatic 
events to liberate and validate our rage” (Garbarino, 2011, p.60). We must also be 
compassionate, in that regard, to the possibility that those who have caused our own trauma 
have done so as a result of their own trauma. This is about healing breaking the cycle of trauma, 
not about excusing or validating the transgression. Through compassion and forgiveness some 
violent youth that Garbarino (2011) worked with 
have undergone a profound spiritual transformation as part and parcel of fully 
owning their crimes and simultaneously seeing the roots of that crime in the 
way they themselves were victimized and traumatized by others, earlier in their 
lives. (Garbarino, 2011, p.60) 
 
Thus, injustice and trauma offer opportunity for spiritual growth but not without love, hope, and 
support.  
Just because positive psychology helps us to see positive outcomes of trauma, that 
doesn’t make trauma good. As Haidt (2006) stated:  
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I don’t want to celebrate suffering, prescribe trauma to everyone, or minimize 
the moral imperative to reduce it where we can … I want only to make the point 
that suffering is not always all bad for all people. There is usually some good 
mixed in with the bad, and those who find it have found something precious: a 
key to moral and spiritual development. (p.141) 
 
The potential for growth doesn’t justify one’s suffering. We need to work to reduce trauma but 
focus on positive outcomes when trauma does occur. In our pursuit to stop the degradation of 
ourselves and of the world we will never eliminate all opportunities for suffering. Adversity is a 
natural part of life, and certain potentially traumatic events such as death can never be 
prevented.  
3.9.3.2 Chronic trauma 
The negative psychological effects of trauma are not always transient. Adequate support 
and physical and emotional safety necessary to recuperate may not be attainable or an 
individual may be differently equipped to cope. It may also be possible that some traumatic 
experiences may simply be too much for anyone to cope with. Acceptance of such reality is 
challenging, and positive psychology is important for both reading about trauma32 and treating 
it. As Garbarino (2011) said, making sense of bad things can lead to good things. Thus, the 
harmful outcomes of trauma must also be addressed with the hope that they can be shifted into 
more positive outcomes.   
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  
                                                          
 
32
 I found the investigation of trauma to be the most difficult portion of this project. The research was 
heartbreaking and it was difficult to maintain hope. In that sense, I mean that practicing positive 
psychology is as important in studying trauma as it is in treating trauma.  
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is characterized by overwhelming feelings of reexperiencing the traumatic event 
(e.g., nightmares and intrusive thoughts), by the avoidance of stimuli and 
emotional numbing (e.g., avoiding places related to the event and feeling 
detached from others), and by symptoms of hyperarousal (e.g., concentration 
difficulties and hypervigilance) (Alisic et al., 2011).  
 
Nietlisbach et al. (2010) found that affective empathy was diminished by PTSD but cognitive 
empathy was not. The participants did not have difficulty understanding the emotional states of 
others, but were not emotionally affected and this was explained by dissociation. The 
dissociation and diminished feelings of affect were speculated to be a coping strategy to prevent 
being overwhelmed by others emotions (Nietlisbach et al., 2010). Certainly this coping strategy 
associated with traumatization is consistent with Hoffman’s (2000) discussion of empathic over 
arousal. Such dissociation is also consistent with psychopathy and antisocial personality 
disorder.  The environmental correlates with PTSD are also similar to those of APD, including: 
lower socioeconomic status, lower education, childhood adversity, and minority racial/ethnic 
status (American Psychological Association, 2013). Indeed, Martens (2005) suggested that 
childhood trauma promotes the development of antisocial personality disorder and in turn,  
antisocial personality disorder places an individual at greater risk for “violent assaultive 
traumatization as a consequence of reckless, impulsive, self-destructive, and violent attitudes 
and social-emotional and moral incapacities, and retraumatization” (Martens, 2005).  
Violence is prevalent in US American culture and communities and so are symptoms of 
trauma. It is not uncommon for students to arrive at school on a Monday morning having lost a 
peer, friend, or family member to violence over the weekend. Violence is perpetrated 
horizontally (within our social groups e.g., gang violence), and vertically (by those with greater 
agency/power e.g., police involved shootings), and on ourselves (e.g., drugs & suicide). Such is 
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the reality that many youth face and this violence and trauma may be significantly 
influencing their development (Cloitre et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, youth living in violent communities may experience ‘pathological 
adaptations’ such as hopelessness, fatalistic thoughts, desensitization to 
violence, and truncated moral development. These youth often participate in 
high risk behaviors such as alcohol or drug abuse, promiscuous sex, or 
association with dangerous people. (Garbarino et al., 2002)  
 
Violence spreads through communities like a virus. High-violence, high-economic-poverty urban 
environments (but rural environments are not immune) suffer a vicious cycle where the victims 
of violence become perpetrators of further violence33. Such environments, as Garbarino (1996) 
said, are toxic and they are traumatizing our youth. However, psychopaths and sociopaths thrive 
in socially toxic environments (Garbarino, 2011).  
When trauma is a pervasive occurrence the lives of children and adolescents the 
psychological effects may differ significantly. Chronic trauma occurs 
                                                          
 
33
 Poverty is distributive injustice justified in the minds of the privileged through defensive thinking, 
denial, and other moral and empathic bias. However, areas where economic poverty is prevalent are not 
necessarily populated by impoverished people. Those who are economically poor may be especially 
vulnerable to the atrocities of capitalism and lack economic, social and political agency. In the worst cases 
the most destitute are not able or barely able to meet their basic survival needs. However, the targets of 
such oppression are resilient and may be extremely wealthy by noneconomic measures. Furthermore, 
while I have tried to illuminate problems associated with economic poverty, it is vital to consider these 
problems as more significantly structural than individual issues. People who are vulnerable to or targeted 
by oppression are not necessarily living a life of perpetual unhappiness and suffering. Certainly some folks 
face major hardships that may, in extreme cases be all encompassing, but others live happy and fulfilling 
lives in material poverty. In fact, external conditions beyond survival needs play a minimal role in 
happiness (Haidt, 2006). But happiness despite material poverty doesn’t provide justification for the 
injustice resulting in poverty. What is necessary is a nuanced conception of poverty where we neither 
conceptualize people as victims nor justify their oppression, but recognize injustice and make reparations.  
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when “normal” is the problem, not the solution. Chronic traumatic danger 
imposes a requirement for what we might call “developmental adjustment,” in 
the sense that it demands a reorganizing of one’s very understanding of life over 
time and not just a relatively short period of recalibration. (Garbarino, 2011, 
p.50) 
 
Chronic trauma has also been described as complex or persistent PTSD. 
Exposure to sustained, repeated or multiple traumas, particularly in the 
childhood years, has been proposed to result in a complex symptom 
presentation that includes not only posttraumatic stress symptoms, but also 
other symptoms reflecting disturbances predominantly in affective and 
interpersonal self-regulatory capacities such as difficulties with anxious arousal, 
anger management, dissociative symptoms, and aggressive or socially avoidant 
behaviors. (Cloitre et al., 2009) 
 
Gabarino (2011) suggested that individuals (and groups) faced with chronic trauma 
developmentally adjust to accommodate a reality that threatens one’s sense of reality. When 
someone persistently faces atrocity in their life their brain adjusts in order to accommodate that 
reality (Garbarino, 2011). This can potentially result in the compromise of an individual’s basic 
instinct for survival because the reality of danger is normalized.  
However, it’s not quite that simple. Aside from those who may be somehow 
predisposed to a lack of empathy which may be exacerbated by chronic trauma, hypersensitivity 
to future trauma is a more common outcome (Garbarino, 2011). Garbarino (2011) suggested 
that although it may seem like one’s affect has completely disappeared, seeming lack of 
emotion may be symptomatic of chronic trauma that has “not yet reached the point of collapse” 
(Garbarino, 2011). This distinction is particularly relevant to criminal (in)justice because many 
youths who had committed murder or other violent crimes that Garbarino (2011) interviewed 
were believed to be suffering from chronic trauma. Garbarino (2011) suggested that the “most 
violent youths construct elaborate defense mechanisms against anxiety, fear, and 
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abandonment; these defense mechanisms culminate in the persona of the cold-blooded 
‘gangster’” (Garbarino, 2011, p.56). Thus, an apparent lack of remorse for a violent crime may 
not be an actual lack of remorse.  
Cacho (2012) problematized how “criminalized poor of color are characterized as either 
products of violent environments that should be heavily policed or as irrational people incapable 
of moral agency who need to be under police surveillance” (p.83). Overemphasis on structure 
and overemphasis on one’s own agency both condemn victims of trauma and targets of 
oppression. Overemphasis on structure makes situations seem entirely determined and 
overemphasis on agency leads to victim blaming. Those affected by trauma are not doomed. 
They are not on a one way road to further violence, psychopathic behavior, prison, drugs and 
death. Garbarino (2011) refers to this as terminal thinking. It is hope’s kryptonite.  
3.9.3.3 Stress 
It is not only when the emotional injury that we inflict on our youth results in trauma 
that concern is warranted. Institutional racism and other forms of oppression such as economic 
poverty are detrimental to psychological and physical health.  
Poorer communities are less likely to have adequate health and social services, 
creating a problem of access and timely use. Also, the physical environments are 
more likely to expose the residents to health hazards (e.g., air pollution, lead, 
dust, dirt, smog, and other hazardous conditions). Finally, the concentration of 
poverty and its related characteristics (e.g., exposure to drugs, crime, gangs, and 
violence; unemployment, stress, and anxiety; substandard housing and schools; 
and lack of green space or fresh fruits and vegetables) often creates social 
environments that lessen social connectedness and provide fewer social 
benefits for residents. (Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007) 
 
“In racially segregated, poor neighborhoods, both chronic and acute daily stressors (e.g., 
violence, unemployment, personal safety concerns) repeatedly invoke a biological challenge 
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similar to the flight/fight response” (Mays et al., 2007). The accumulation chronic stress 
results in “premature wearing down of the body” referred to as allostatic load and it is 
associated with heart disease, chronic inflammation, and cognitive impairment (Mays et al., 
2007). We all know through our own experience that stress also affects our self-care. Rogers 
(2001) speculated that since carbohydrate rich junk foods can increase serotonin in the brain, 
carb cravings may be our body’s way of self-medicating for depression. However in cases where 
the stressors are persistent such self-medication can cause diet related health problems such as 
obesity and diabetes may be (exacerbated by education and access for healthy foods, diet and 
lifestyle).  
The ill-effects of chronic stress are not exclusively correlated with economic poverty, nor 
economic poverty as a result racial discrimination. Chronic stress is associated with racial 
discrimination independent of socioeconomic status. People experiencing race-based 
discrimination have physiological responses including “elevated blood pressure and heart rate, 
production of biochemical reactions and hypervigilance” that eventually result in disease and 
mortality (Mays et al., 2007). African Americans are disproportionately affected by diabetes, 
cardiovascular heart disease, hypertension and obesity and the disparity is not attributable to 
genetics or socioeconomic status (Mays et al., 2007). African American women, regardless of 
socioeconomic status, suffer the highest rates of preterm birth and their babies weigh the least 
(on average).The health disparities affecting African Americans are posited to relate to: “cultural 
differences in lifestyle patterns, inherited risks, and social inequalities that are reflected in 
discrepancies in access to health care, variations in health providers’ behaviors, differences in 
socioeconomic position, and residential segregation” (Mays et al., 2007). Although there is no 
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biological validity to the concept of race (Laland & Brown, 2011), the biological results of the 
social construct of race are real (Mays et al., 2007).  
This paradoxically calls into question notions of race based medicine which essentially 
reduces to racial profiling. It is dangerous to make medical assumptions based on perceptions of 
racial experience. It’s especially scary when drugs are prescribed exclusively to African 
Americans (e.g., BiDil). However, we do see that the social construct of race has real 
consequences for health. I propose that the only just race-based medicine is social justice. 
However, self-medication in the form of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug use is also correlated 
with stress associated with racial discrimination and internalized racism- likely as a coping 
strategy  (Mays et al., 2007). However, such drug use often exacerbates stress and increases 
health problems. Additionally, illicit drugs are often associated with violence, increasing the 
likelihood that one will experience trauma. 
Similarly to trauma, chronic stress causes youth’s response to stress to become erratic 
resulting in more frequent involvement in violent situations as victim or perpetrator (Duncan-
Andrade, 2010). Again, it is important to note that neither trauma nor chronic stress dictate that 
any individual will behave antisocially. We (all people) need to take responsibility individually 
and collectively for the structural influences on stress and trauma and there are many levels of 
collective membership that must be considered. Family groups, blocks, neighborhoods, schools, 
workplaces, communities, cities, states, nations, humans, and members of the community of life 
all have important roles to play in reducing human violence. 
I refuse to be the devil’s advocate by entertaining the possibility that anyone is suffering 
and dying because they are bad, unworthy of rights, and ultimately deserving of pain, suffering, 
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and death. I maintain that such violence is not inherent it is inflicted. We inflict trauma on 
ourselves, we inflict it horizontally to family and peers in similar status groups and we inflict it 
vertically to those less protected and less privileged than us. The underlying moral shortcoming 
is not just on the part of the repeat offenders, the gangs, or drug dealers (as criminal or 
criminalized people). We are all co-responsible. We need to work to reduce violence, trauma, 
and chronic stress by addressing the injustices that cause them. We also need to help those 
experiencing trauma cope. Education can have a fundamental role in raising consciousness to 
help students work for social change and reduced violence. However, there are two practical 
actions that schools need to be taking: (1) provide basic mental health training to all teachers in 
order to recognize trauma (2) providing mental health services. 
3.10 Catalyzing Action 
From the most significant actions, such as risking one’s own life to save the life of a 
stranger, to the mundane acts of kindness and generosity that humans perform on a daily basis 
and go largely unnoticed, humans act altruistically. Oliner & Oliner (1988) suggest that at the 
point where a person decides whether or not to act, the decision is already largely made 
because that person has already internalized the systems for response. Intuitive or 
instantaneous decisions likely result from previous experience and previous contemplation. 
Haidt (2006) suggested that  
moral judgment is like aesthetic judgment. When you see a painting, you usually 
know instantly and automatically whether you like it. If someone asks you to 
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explain your judgment you confabulate. You don’t really know why you think 
something is beautiful, but your interpreter module (the rider) is skilled at 
making up reasons34.” (p.21) 
 
Haidt (2006) didn’t argue that we never know our motivations, but that we do not always 
explicitly understand our motivations. Sometimes we contemplate, make inductions and come 
to new conclusions and sometimes we act upon the inductions and principles we’ve already 
constructed and internalized.  
Intuitive moral and esthetic judgments may be associated with natural tendencies, but 
are certainly related to previous experiences. The more I study, the more I see a deep 
relationship between esthetics and morality. I think that the path to beauty is the path to justice 
and vice versa. The gut feelings we so often (at least I so often) act upon are exactly this 
combination of esthetic and internalization. As in the famous poem The Road Not Taken by 
Robert Frost,  
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth;  
 
Then took the other, as just as fair 
                                                          
 
34
 Haidt’s (2006) uses the metaphor of a “ider on an elephant for the human behavior. The rider is our 
conscious brain and the elephant is the rest of our self. The rider isn’t in complete control of the 
elephant’s actions, only parts and only sometimes and ultimately must defer to the much more powerful 
elephant. The elephant is composed of autonomous systems like breathing and our beating heart as well 
as emotions. Confabulation is when our conscious mind explains the elephant’s actions without actually 
understanding the elephant. Our brain is so good at this that we don’t necessarily know that we’ve fibbed 
to ourselves. We ultimately accept the first plausible explanation that our mind offers. 
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And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same 
 
Frost ultimately made a gut decision and tentatively tried to explain why, but admits that the 
reason doesn’t really hold up- confabulation. In the process of this research there has been 
much that I have laid awake at night contemplating, trying to understand, and trying to 
understand how what I’ve learned fits within my existing moral framework. I’ve most 
significantly wondered how I act upon my new understandings. However, in my moral 
judgments, despite all my contemplation, I’ve ultimately followed my gut. A more substantial 
amount of what I’ve learned and written were things I either already knew tacitly without 
knowing explicitly or deeply and tacitly realized that I knew as I read. Much of this work consists 
of truisms explored empirically, and clichés elaborated and contemplated upon.  
 The above considerations are central to understanding how and why we take action 
when we are confronted with a moral dilemma, especially, when action is not explicitly 
demanded of us. Before considering more explicitly how people are morally motivated, I want to 
consider an example from my own experience researching morality. Throughout the course of 
working on this thesis, I’ve wondered if my own behavior has been affected by the knowledge I 
have attained. Has researching morality made me more sensitive to moral conflicts or better 
equipped to help others recognize and resolve moral conflicts positively? I’ve often answered 
no. Because when I am with young people I am entirely in the moment and I am not thinking 
about theory. Although I occasionally do step back from the experience and attempt to consider 
how the topics of this thesis apply, I have never found myself considering theory when 
attempting to help kids resolve a conflict.  
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Oliner & Oliner (1988) are right to suggest that the experiences culminating in a 
triggering or catalyzing event are more significantly indicate how someone will respond than the 
event. However, they nature of the event is also significant and will be considered further in the 
context of a profoundly salient catalyzing event- the Holocaust. At the end of this section I 
explore how such triggering may apply in situations where the moral conflict is less monumental 
(e.g., climate change). Triggering or catalyzing events challenge the morals that one has already 
committed to (Hoffman, 2000). For some Holocaust rescuers, inaction threatened their self-
conception to a point where they didn’t consider their behavior to be a choice (Oliner & Oliner, 
1988). They felt they had to act because they felt that they could not have lived with themselves 
if they hadn’t. Some felt others’ suffering as if it were their own. Others felt that they had simply 
reacted to the circumstances that they encountered without significant reflection. A common 
sentiment among rescuers was, “I did nothing unusual; anyone would have done the same thing 
in my place,” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.113) a remarkably humble, but inaccurate sentiment.  
Oliner & Oliner (1988) identify four circumstances that facilitated action: Information 
and comprehension of the need, risk, resources, and a precipitating occasion. The information 
available to rescuers and their comprehension of the events were not significantly different 
from non-rescuers. Information alone was necessary, but not sufficient for action. Similarly, the 
perceived risks for rescuers and non-rescuers were not significantly different. The only 
difference was that rescuers acted despite that risk. In terms of material resources, rich and 
poor alike rose to the occasion, but the resource that did significantly differ between rescuers 
and non-rescuers was community. Rescuers more frequently belonged to organizations or had 
personal relations that they believed would support their efforts. Still this was not exclusively a 
characteristic of rescuers:  some acted alone, keeping their activities secret from friends, family, 
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and neighbors even beyond the end of the war. Many of those rescuers stated that their 
interview was the first time that they had discussed their activities. Finally, the precipitating 
occasion was the most significant indicator for rescue. More rescuers were asked for help than 
non-rescuers. This could be due, in part, to the rescuers, through past actions, relationships, and 
character traits, seeming more likely to help. This relates to the concept of extensive persons. 
Still, others acted without being asked. These circumstances all facilitated rescue in certain 
ways, but it is clear that altruistic behavior is not dictated by circumstance alone. 
Researchers found that the actions of the individuals they interviewed were 
based only partially on their hope that they could create change. Often these 
individuals acted in spite of not knowing whether they would actually make a 
difference. These activists, at times, “decide that success is not important- that 
something must be done even though there is no assurance that it will change 
anything.” For them, the essential “rightness” of the action makes the issue of 
success irrelevant. (S. Berman, 1997, pp.46-47) 
 
 
 The nature of the precipitating occasion that catalyzes action varies. However, it seems 
universal that some event, perceived or experienced, triggers altruistic behavior. Oliner & Oliner 
(1988) describe three types of catalysts: those that aroused or heightened the observer’s 
empathy, those that challenged a normative demand, and those that violated the observer’s 
principles (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). While Oliner & Oliner (1988) recognize that some rescuers 
deliberately sought out ways to help, most did so in response to a specific event that they 
witnessed. Even those who sought out opportunities to help without having directly witnessed 
any of the atrocities of the Holocaust were certainly acting in response to the immediacy and 
severity of the situation. Still, it was more than simply the situation that dictated responses from 
the rescuers, their actions reflected their individual character. Such a quality of their character is 
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illustrated by the fact that majority of the interviewed rescuers continued to be actively 
engaged in helping behavior beyond the war (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). 
 When faced with such a precipitous occasion the moral limitations and empathic bias 
that have been described all influence whether or not someone will act. Additionally, the ways 
that individuals process information and cope psychologically are influential.  Oliner and Oliner 
(1988) wrote that “interpretations of events are human inventions, and that what and how we 
choose to see shape our responses – and thus the future” (p.260). Humans have an emotional 
preference for knowledge that we want to be true and avoid thinking about things we don’t 
want to be true (Clayton & Myers, 2009). This bias may be especially pronounced when it comes 
to beliefs about our own identities. “Defensive thinking results when our basic wants, such as 
the desire for comfort and pleasure, are incompatible with our rational or moral judgment” 
(Clayton & Myers, 2009, p.26). Such denial may be a very significant barrier to catalyzing action 
in conflicts from the most salient (such as the Holocaust) to the least visible (such as climate 
change). In fact, some non-rescuers, interviewed by Oliner & Oliner (1988), reported that they 
simply couldn’t believe that something so unthinkable was happening.  
Learned hopelessness may result from exposure to events that seem uncontrollable and 
as a potential outcome of inaction in the face of precipitous occasions (Christens et al., 2013). 
Learned hopelessness may further diminish moral action in future conflicts. Some rescuers, 
however, acted despite very low feelings of self-efficacy (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Some rescuers 
even continued their efforts despite witnessing the murders of those they had risked their lives 
to help (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, many would be unlikely to take action, especially at 
such great personal risk, if they felt that their efforts would be unsuccessful. Furthermore, a 
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sense of self-efficacy, despite not necessarily precluding moral action in conflicts that we 
perceive (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) may affect the way we perceive of those conflicts (Clayton & 
Myers, 2009).  
In the spaces of privilege the effects of the socio-ecological crisis are not always obvious. 
Faced with a conflict between a desire for self-gratification through 
unsustainable behavior and the knowledge that the environment is threatened 
by such behavior, we repress our awareness of the conflict, deny the threats 
that face us, displace them onto other communities, and rationalize our 
continued unsustainable behavior as having no alternative. (Clayton & Myers, 
2009, p.26) 
 
Clayton & Myers (2009) explicitly refer to ecological threats, however the same process certainly 
applies to humanitarian and social justice concerns which are inseparable from ecological issues. 
Such defensive thinking is more prevalent when one does not feel able resolve conflicts 
between their personal needs and moral principles (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Johns (2013) 
wrote that “conservationists … resist taking on structural change because it seems to require 
that people make material sacrifices, and this is unrealistic. But is giving up mindlessly complex 
social hierarchies that infantilize people a sacrifice” (p.238)?  Thus, Johns (2013) resists framing 
environmentalism as conflict between consumerism and sustainability and frames the conflict as 
one between consumerism (and more generally capitalism) and human welfare (and more 
generally planetary welfare). In Johns (2012) framing pro-environmental behavior is also 
prosocial and the struggle is against unjust social structure that affects consumerism. However, 
Clayton & Myers (2009) frame the conflict in such a way where our own agency in sustainable 
behavior is primary. How we perceive conflicts certainly influences the ways we are motivated 
to action it may be that in some cases or for some individuals framing a conflict in a certain way 
may be more effective than framing it in some other way.  
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All humans develop moral principles that guide our determinations of what is fair 
and acceptable behavior. We are often unknowingly complicit in injustice and maintain a self-
conception that mandates justice. In such cases, triggering events do not necessarily need to be 
external. If through conscientization one begins to understand the ways in which their own 
actions contribute to injustice, continuation of such behavior would be a violation of their 
established moral principles. It would be collusion rather than unintentional complicity. bell 
hooks (2003), an artist, teacher, and notable feminist35,  suggested that people choose to 
collude or oppose racism, but I think that people need experience, opportunity, and agency to 
recognize it as a decision to oppose or collude. 
Collusion with injustice, would threaten the self-conception of anyone who maintains 
justice as a moral mandate.  
People affirm their sense of self by endorsing moral mandates consistent with 
their personal values. Moral mandates are the selective expression of moral 
values that are central to people’s sense of identity. (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, 
p.310) 
 
This violation of an individual’s moral mandate threatens one’s sense of identity. The cognitive 
dissonance that such a violation incites can be resolved with a change in behavior or through 
justification and restructuring of moral principles as a defense. Despite the fact that humans 
have a natural tendency or motivation to cooperate and help one another, we do not always 
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 bell hooks (2003) wrote: 
Coming to academia thinking of myself first and foremost as an artist (a poet, a painter, a writer), 
I pursued a teaching career as an avocation. My desire was to create art. (p.185) 
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help. When relations of power are involved, moral mandates could conflict with the status 
quo and a behavior change could seem difficult or impossible. In such a situation one could 
succumb to learned hopelessness (Christens et al., 2013). However, hopefulness- beneficial 
effects of perceived or actual control of one’s circumstance- can also be learned (Christens et al., 
2013) and must be addressed through pedagogy. 
The value of risk as a catalyst honors “the fact that we may learn and grow in 
circumstances where we do not feel safe” (hooks, p.64). Thus, hooks (2003) concluded that “the 
presence of conflict is not necessarily negative but rather its meaning is determined by how we 
cope with that conflict” (p.64). Conflict should be considered as a process and an outcome. 
Conflict processes can be positive (such as cooperation) or negative (such as disrespect) and 
lead to constructive and destructive conflict outcomes (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). In cases related 
to social and ecological degradation, where the issues may not always be salient, a conflict may 
be necessary in order to catalyze moral action.   
In more recent years, the targets of degradation and economic exploitation and 
globalization by policies and trade agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA have been catalyzed to 
action around the world by a perceived threat not only to their traditions and sovereignty but 
their very existence.  Some refer to this as the fourth world war (where WWIII is defined as the 
Cold War). The Zapatistas, for example, felt that NAFTA and the dissolution of communally held 
property eliminated their means for subsistence. Proclaiming that NAFTA was a death sentence, 
the Zapatistas essentially seceded from Mexico (Hayden, 2002). External threats can increase 
solidarity and catalyze collective action. When folks have little left to lose and everything to gain 
and perceive inaction as a death-sentence, fighting injustice isn’t an altruistic motivation but 
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survival instinct. In some parts of the world, and almost certainly increasingly in more 
“developed” nations, the ecological crisis is becoming such a catalyst. However, a significant 
motivation for this work is my hope that some of us will be catalyzed to action before we are 
confronted with death36.  
In summary, a precipitous occasion so pronounced as the Holocaust is not necessary for 
action. The three types of catalysts (those that aroused or heightened the observer’s empathy, 
those that challenged a normative demand, and those that violated the observer’s principles) 
also provide insight for motivation to action for social and ecological justice. In the case of 
environmental action, the same considerations of information and comprehension of need, risk, 
resources, and a precipitating occasion apply. The need for environmental action is not always 
so apparent. For example, the effects of climate change are not necessarily apparent in all parts 
of the world to the untrained eye. Education is vital, then, to make the issues salient and 
catalyze action.  
3.11 Section Conclusion: It Takes All Types 
Oliner and Oliner (1988) identified four characteristic types of rescuers based on their 
personalities and motivations. Although the rescuers could not all be neatly categorized into a 
single type, these idealized types illuminate certain characteristics that may promote altruistic 
behavior. The types illustrate that all sorts of people rise to challenging occasions and that there 
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 The necessity for social change as a survival need is further discussed in section 4.3.5 Meeting basic 
needs mandates social change on page 232. 
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is no universal set of circumstances, experiences, or characteristics, that cause a person to 
be a hero or to simply act in accordance with principles that are considered to be prosocial. As 
educators, I believe it is our role to recognize and support the development of moral principles 
of all people, and never to devalue the different ways in which others are prosocially motivated.  
The four types represent rescuers who were primarily empathically motivated, 
normatively motivated, motivated by a principle of justice, and motivated by a principle of care. 
In each case, rescuers were rarely exclusively driven by one of the four archetypes, but some 
combination. It was also recognized that the rescuer’s motives changed over time. Still, by 
understanding the four motives as archetypes, the differences among rescuers are illuminated.  
Thirty seven percent of rescuers were initially empathically motivated and acted 
primarily in response to the empathy they felt for the individuals that they helped. Their efforts 
and attention were primarily focused on the individuals that they aided and they more 
commonly felt close personal attachment to those whom they helped. Oliner & Oliner (1988) 
discuss one rescuer, called Stanislaus, in detail. As a prototypically empathically motivated 
rescuer, “understanding others, taking their perspective, and anticipating their futures may have 
left Stanislaus little psychological room to consider his own needs” (p.197). Interestingly, 
Stanislaus was reported to strongly feel an external locus of control and lower than average self-
esteem. Oliner & Oliner (1988) describe Stanislaus having a “fatalistic orientation towards life.” 
Interestingly, Stanislaus doesn’t fit neatly into the category of extensive or constricted 
 
178 
persons37. Stanislaus’ accounts seldom focus on himself and describe the victims and their 
situations in detail. A sense of connection to others and empathy guided Stanislaus’s actions. 
Fifty two percent of rescuers were initially primarily normatively motivated. They were 
not typically motivated by their connection to the victim. They were motivated by a sense that 
implicit or explicit societal rules that dictate normal activity and behavior were being broken. 
These norms sometimes related to a church, national identity, or other social institution where a 
rescuer was directly influenced by the inspiration of a leader, or action based on internalized 
norms. Normatively motivated rescuers often felt a sense of obligation or duty to help and 
anticipated feelings of guilt over inaction. They often viewed themselves as part of a larger 
cause. For example, rescue was a matter of national pride for many Danish people. The sense of 
normlessness and loss of order that the war provoked, threatened the reality that these people 
lived in, and promoted behavior that accorded with the rules of decency that they ascribed to 
before the war and fostered a return to normalcy. 
Principle based motivation accounted for 11% of rescuers initial action. This includes 
those motivated by principles of justice and care. These people were inspired to act because 
what was happening violated their moral principles and threatened their sense of self. These 
rescuers were often motivated to act despite any perceived futility of their actions because their 
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 Oliner and Oliner (1988) posited that extensivity was more conducive to prosocial behavior than 
constriction (see 3.5.1 Influence of parenting p.94). Einolf (2010) tested the hypothesis for prosocial 
behavior such as donating to charity and volunteering and supported the Oliners’ (1988) claim. Both 
researchers explicitly state that constricted persons can or do behave prosocially and altruistically. 
 
179 
actions were in line with their principles. Those motivated by justice tended to have more 
impersonal relationships with those that they rescued but expressed feelings of anger or hatred 
towards the perpetrators of injustice. These people more frequently acted independently. A 
rescuer called Suzanne, who was highly motivated by principle expresses her actions as simply 
cognitively logical. However, as Hoffman (2000) suggests, this sort of principled response is 
often “hot cognition.” Suzanne states that 
It was evident that a dictatorship had begun. I knew that one of the first 
measures would be an indictment against the Jews. I did not react to the first 
indictment, but then the second statute was published, I decided to get 
involved. I wrote a letter to the three rabbis in my region, and as I remember 
what I wrote, it said: 
 
Sirs: 
I am very upset that in my country, in the twentieth century, some citizens are 
persecuted for their religious or racial conditions. My ancestors, Protestants of 
Cevennes, have fought for their freedom of belief. I cannot but follow their 
example and at this time, I will be at your side. Can you put me in touch with 
some needy French families belonging to your faith so that I may be of some 
help. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, pp.210-211) 
 
From this point forward, Suzanne actively sought out ways to help and acted primarily 
independently. Her descriptions provide accounts of the sequence of events with few to no 
descriptions of individuals or discussion of feelings. Suzanne is reported to have helped several 
hundred people all of whom were strangers to her and who had not asked her for help. 
Suzanne’s behavior may relate to the empathic limitations discussed earlier. Suzanne was 
considered to be much less empathic than average (two standards of deviation below) and was 
so she less disposed to empathic over arousal. 
Rescuers motivated primarily by the principle of care felt “a dominating sense of 
obligation to help all people out of a spirit of generosity and concern for their welfare” (Oliner & 
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Oliner, 1988, p.217). A rescuer called Louisa, expresses concern for all people to a point 
where she put herself, her husband, and her son in positions of significantly increased risk for 
the benefit of the larger group. In her accounts, she sometimes does not distinguish between 
her own family and those that she worked to rescue. Louisa stated in her interview, 
My mother said, “I don’t think you have the right to do this. Your responsibility 
is for the safety of your own children.” I said to her that it was more important 
for our children to have parents who have done what they felt they had to do, 
even if it costs us our lives38. It will be better for them- even if we don’t make it. 
They will know we did what we felt we had to do. This is better than if we think 
first of our safety. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.217) 
 
Although these are all accounts of Holocaust rescuers, Hoffman (2000) and Berman (1997) use 
these and other accounts to generalize to situations of similar gravity and to the everyday 
activities in our personal lives.  
In summary, human behavior is the result of complex interactions between internal and 
external processes throughout one’s development.  This chapter barely scrapes the surface of 
human motivation and morality. However, the lesson is that we would all do well to actively 
practice empathy and sympathy in our behavior and in our judgment of others’ behavior. 
Pedagogy must always leave space for all people and all voices to develop in their own unique 
ways. This is not to say that it is not the job of educators to create space and foster experience 
                                                          
 
38
 Note that this sentiment aligns with the concept of elevation as discussed (3.2.1 Prosocial motivation p. 
62).  Elevation was not a theme explored in Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) work. This speaks to the 
relationship between theory and research (Greenwald et al., 1986) because Oliner and Oliner (1988) 
aligned their findings with the prevalent theory of their time. I hypothesize that reanalysis of the Oliners’ 
(1988) data may reveal elevation among rescuers as a significant factor in rescue.   
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that is conducive to moral development or specific principles.  A lesson from Friere (1994) 
concludes this chapter on moral development and transitions to the final chapter on pedagogy. 
What kind of educator would I be if I did not feel moved by a powerful impulse 
to seek, without lying, convincing arguments in defense of the dreams for which 
I struggle, in defense of the ‘why’ of the hope with which I act as an educator? 
(p.83) 
 
Friere (1994) expresses this question rhetorically, but continued to state that: 
 
What is not permissible to be doing is to conceal truths, deny information, 
impose principles, eviscerate the educands for their freedom, or punish them, 
no matter by what method, if, for various reasons, they fail to accept my 
discourse- reject my utopia. (p.83) 
 
Freire (1994) is beautifully arguing that education is not value neutral and this chapter reflects 
that sentiment. I maintain, as a matter of faith, that every living human from the deviant to the 
exemplar has a greater potential for ‘goodness’ than they have realized. My entire exploration 
of morality is guided by my faith in humanity, in all of life, and in Earth. An important illustration 
of this point is my investigation into outlying behavior. To my knowledge no portion of that 
exploration is inaccurate, but it is certainly not complete. I refuse to take myself or the reader 
down a path of hopelessness .   
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Chapter 4: Pedagogy for Restoration 
Dear Teacher: 
 I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man [sic] 
should witness: Gas chambers built by learned engineers. Infants killed by 
trained nurses. Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college 
graduates.  
 So, I am suspicious of education. My request is: Help your students 
become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled 
psychopaths, educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are 
important only if they serve to make our children more human. 
--Author unknown (as cited in Ginott, 1972, p.87) 
 
What follows is my attempt to conceptualize pedagogy for restoration. This final chapter 
significantly departs from the preceding attempts to understand the nature of oppression and 
human morality. Pedagogy for restoration is not pedagogy in reaction to oppression. No set of 
instructions for liberation or restoration could ever be prescribed. Thus, pedagogy for 
restoration maintains focus on youth-potential rather than ideology. The goal is to conceptualize 
an approach that would help young people reach a physical, emotional and intellectual place 
where they feel able to follow their own passions, their own sense of right and wrong, and their 
own vision for a better world. Pedagogy for restoration is a process of healing on the individual 
level, collectively, and for the planet. I believe such healing or self-restoration could spread 
through social systems just as I have suggested that oppression does. Such efforts by educators 
in all walks of life promote the global project of restoration. 
Restoration must be a process of healing personal, ecological, and social degradation. 
The degradation of the natural world caused by humans and the degradation of humans caused 
by humans is not inevitably a unidirectional process. As I have argued the planet can and will 
heal, I see restoration as a process allowing humans to heal with the planet. Our presence on 
this earth has not been a single consistent expression of degradation. 
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4.1 Introduction to Pedagogy 
Being a responsible member of the global community demands… action to 
promote a more just, peaceful, and ecologically sound world through the 
appreciation of diversity, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution 
of conflict. (S. Berman, 1997, p.190) 
 
 
I see pedagogy as something beyond the science, art, and theory of teaching. My own 
pedagogy is deeply concerned with the philosophy of education, how we relate with our 
students, why we teach, and the goals of education beyond curricular objectives - to create a 
better society. I have studied, combined, and attempted to reimagine the work of many 
teachers and intellectuals rather than extensively reviewing their works. Notably among the 
works that I have studied are those of Paulo Freire. Freire’s vision for critical consciousness, of 
reading the word and reading the world, of the necessity of hope and the pursuit of utopia are 
also my vision. Although it is not my intention to essentialize Freire or to suggest that his works 
are beyond critique, much of what he wrote applies just as much today, if not more, than when 
his works were published. However, Freire (1992/1994) held that the meaning of his books (or 
any book) was not found through passively reading the words, but through critically engaging 
with the ideas and making one’s own meanings. Freire’s intention was for his work to be 
critiqued and reimagined for application in different contexts rather than wholly adopted. I hold 
the same intentions for my work. I do hope that my pedagogy (or any portion of this project) 
could be of utility to others, but just as I will be adapting and reimagining this work for the rest 
of my life, anyone who finds value in these pages must do the same.  
4.1.1 Critical pedagogy 
Critical pedagogy brings a socially conscious lens to education that aims to reflexively 
critique all of educational and social practice. Critical pedagogy must fundamentally be an action 
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oriented anti-oppression approach to education. There is enough in the world that needs 
critique that we don’t need to critique what we may omit without damage. Critique solely as an 
exercise in deconstructionism is of no utility to critical pedagogy or an anti-oppression effort. My 
primary critique of the body of work of critical pedagogy in the decades following Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed (Freire, 1970/2000), is the overemphasis on critique over creativity.  
Weiner (2007) suggested that critical pedagogy suffers a lack of clear definition as well 
as an overemphasis on disciplining itself within particular ideologies (e.g., Marxism). Weiner 
(2007) further suggested that critical pedagogy is amidst a crisis of imagination and suggested 
that we “put the goal of free and imaginative thinking above the goal of ideological persuasion” 
(p.68) to “create context for rejuvenated imagination and its development” (p.67). Debates over 
the necessity of Marxist language, an explicitly socialist agenda, and of the centrality of class 
struggle become detrimental to the struggle against oppression and the project of restoration 
when they overshadow the real work of making change. As the Zapatistas say, we need to be 
working for a world where many worlds fit. I’m not interested in a debate over specific ideology. 
Rather than a coercive approach that aims to liberate students from capitalism only to 
indoctrinate them in Marxism39 (or any ideology), we need to aim only to facilitate experiences 
that broaden perspectives, encourage critical thinking and create a space that promote self-
liberation. I firmly believe that it is not our business, as educators, to enforce any particular way 
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 This is not intended to be a condemnation of Marxism, but of essentializing/fetishizing Marxism to the 
point that we enforce it on students. Marxism is a fine ideology with broad interpretation in many 
contexts, many of which could certainly enrich education.   
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of thinking.  To deny my own political agenda would be disingenuous, but to assert that 
there is only room for my own ideology in a project of restoration would be disparaging to the 
project of restoration40.   
The stakes are too high to quibble over Marxism. Some critical authors and educators 
take such a hardline on particular theories that creative thinking is overwhelmed by a demand 
for ideological consistency. Karl Marx famously addressed such ideological stubbornness by 
proclaiming: “what is certain is that I myself am not a Marxist” (marxists.org). Marx made this 
statement during a disagreement over the Programme of the (French) Workers Party (1880). 
Marx believed that Jules Guesde (the leader of the Workers Party) was too dismissive of the 
value of reformist workers’ struggles and too strictly insisted on radical-revolutionary 
interpretation of Marxism (marxists.org). Thus, Marx made it absolutely clear that he would not 
allow his thinking to be marooned in his own ideology by denouncing Marxism. This was 
certainly a little hyperbolic, but made the point quite well. Critical pedagogy may be suffering a 
crisis of the critical imaginary, as Weiner (2007) suggested, due to strict adherence to ideology 
outlined by folks (e.g., Marx and Freire) who never intended such a strict and narrow 
interpretation of their own works. Wiener (2007) suggested that “even if it is true that everyday 
life is shaped by ideologies, it is less clear that solutions to troubles caused by ideology will be 
discovered in ideology” (p.63). 
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 One could suggest that I am simply arguing for my own pluralistic ideology of restoration. They would 
probably be right. Just as I prescribe to others, I struggle to broaden my perspectives and think beyond my 
own ideology.  
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However, Wiener (2007) critique of critical pedagogy was not purely deconstructive. 
Weiner (2007) proposed four guiding principles for critical pedagogy to resolve the crisis:  1) The 
primary concern must be ending oppression in all forms. Weiner (2007) explicitly identified the 
difference between “a more complex understanding of how oppression works in all its forms” 
and “transforming conditions and relations of oppression” (p. 61). Weiner (2007) did not dismiss 
the former but emphasized the latter.  2) This work needs to center those who it hopes to help. 
This refers to both the language that we use and the locations (primarily in the academy) where 
these conversations take place. Both language and location often exclude those who should be 
centered. Weiner (2007) wrote that the primary audience for critical pedagogy are privileged 
individuals who are not the targets of systematic oppression and reminded us ” it does not 
matter if what you say or write is brilliant if no one who you want to communicate with can 
understand a thing you say” (p.60). 3) The work must reach beyond its own ideology. This 
refers to the importance of the critical imaginary and of not marooning ourselves or our 
educational practice in Marxist territory (or any ideology). 4) There is a need for public 
intellectuals. This refers to the necessity of prioritizing bringing theory into the real world rather 
than advancing complex theoretical research. People like Noam Chomsky, bell hooks, 
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Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Paulo Freire, and Chuck D41 are public intellectuals who 
have worked in various ways to bring critical consciousness to the public. Pedagogy for 
restoration rests on these theoretical foundations.  
4.2 Moral Education 
What is required is nothing less than institutionalized structures that promote 
supportive relationships with the same seriousness as is currently devoted to 
academic achievement. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p. 259)  
 
Most of education, at least the curricular objectives, and the focus of standardized tests 
is explicit knowledge – facts and formulas – but the more important goal of understanding and 
meaning making is more difficult to define, discipline, and assess.  
If moral instruction imparts only explicit knowledge (facts that the rider can 
state), it will have no effect on the elephant, and therefore little effect on 
behavior. Moral education must also impart tacit knowledge- skills of social 
perception and social emotion so finely tuned that one automatically feels the 
right thing in each situation, knows the right thing to do, and then wants to do 
it. Morality, for the ancients, was a kind of practical wisdom. (Haidt, 2006, 
p.160) 
 
Tacit knowledge can be constructed through induction based on explicit knowledge and 
through experience. In education, the experience encompasses everything that happens in the 
                                                          
 
41
 Fight the Power: Rap, Race, and Reality (Chuck D & Jah, 1997) was one of the most influential books I 
have ever read. In plain language and rooted in the culture of Hip Hop, Chuck D of Public Enemy explained 
race in America in a way that is approachable for folks who don’t use terms like microagressions and 
structural oppression. In fact, when I read Chuck D’s book almost a decade ago, I would have never sought 
out or understood the work of most of the authors I have cited here. In fact, I didn’t read Chuck D’s book 
to learn about racism, I read it because it had a catchy title and because of Chuck D’s status and visibility 
in pop culture. I was resistant to some of the ideas in the book, but by the time I had finished it, my entire 
worldview was beginning to shift. I think this exactly illustrates the role of public intellectuals- to make 
knowledge accessible to a broader community than the one already holding that knowledge. 
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classroom (or any educational space) from the most subtle to the most overt. The 
environment that we construct in education and the relationship between teacher and student 
are hugely influential. Students are always learning, but much of what they learn in school is not 
what is written into the curriculum. The Moral Life of Schools (Jackson, 1993) explored the ways 
in which the subtle or even mundane routines of classroom life may have profound moral 
implications. This encompasses everything from the cleanliness and organization of the 
classroom, to the decorations on the walls, to the tone of the teacher’s voice. 
As educators, we must be sure our students know three things: I hear you, I accept you, 
and I am with you no matter what. As the exploration of empathy has shown, we may never 
achieve a perfect match between our empathic feelings and our students experience. We may 
never completely hear anyone (in the sense that we perceive their inner states). However, it is a 
powerful aspiration to seek to fully hear, accept, and support students. I believe this is the true 
work of education and if we do this work, the simple vocation of teaching, of sharing 
information on a path to understanding, critical consciousness and enlightenment requires very 
little theory42. 
Humans are moral by nature so moral education only needs to provide opportunity for 
children to develop and commit to their own moral principles. This most significantly happens 
through action and reflection (e.g., transgression and induction). Moral development research 
                                                          
 
42
 This is not to suggest that curriculum theory, learning theory, and pedagogy are not important. Theory 
certainly informs instructional methods that may optimize student learning.  
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shows that children need to make their own inductions (often with the guidance of an adult) 
rather than be told explicitly what is right and wrong (Hoffman, 2000). Therefore moral 
education must be conceptualized as a path of moral growth and development with an 
emphasis on the walking (experience and moral action) rather than didactic instruction in 
morality43. This means that moral education must be about the real-world and lived experience 
rather than academic artifacts of the real-world. Education must be about creating and 
protecting space for development, for free thinking, and for imagination. However, it can’t be an 
entirely hands off approach. The approach must be flexible and adaptive, but it cannot be 
entirely without structure or direction. “Maintaining intentionality and trajectory in the midst of 
real-world messiness is demanding, far more demanding than standing at the edge of the 
wilderness and giving the expeditionary team a lecture about what they might find there” 
(Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 40). It’s a journey we take together. 
Pedagogy for restoration does not heavily focus on specific moral principles or an 
attempt to design moral curriculum but on walking with students and assisting them along the 
path. Rather than charting the course, educators help students learn to read the map, chart 
their own course and take the lead. We provide experience, knowledge, and logistical support, 
but our greatest success is marked by our students’ knowledge that their accomplishments are 
their own (Simpson & Hsih, 2003). However in all things, harmony is found in the balance 
                                                          
 
43
 However, exploration of near-universal rights that have been established by consensus, such as The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Assembly, 1948) and other international agreements on human 
rights, the treatment of animals, and environmental protection would likely be excellent resources to 
complement more inductive and experientially focused curriculum.  
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between extremes. Students should recognize that their achievements are their own, but 
with the humility to recognize that others have helped. This calls for balance between populism 
and elitistism (and similarly authoritative and authoritarian approaches) (Freire, 1994). A fully 
populist (entirely submissive to public opinion) approach would not provide the direction or 
perspective necessary to raise consciousness, but  an elitist approach where the educator 
presumes to know precisely what the students need to know would be little more than pedantic 
and didactic attempt at indoctrination.  
There can’t be a scripted how for restorative education. The how has to come out of the 
student-teacher-community relationship. I have tried to focus on the what and the why with the 
presumption that a framework is tentatively established where each educator’s own how would 
emerge. However, the fact that the approach cannot be canned and standardized does not 
imply that every educator needs to start entirely from scratch. Leading critical educators need to 
produce “concrete, hands-on examples44 to provide educators with both inspiration and ideas 
for developing a parallel unit on a similar or different theme or to spin off an activity and add 
their own creative questions in a range of content areas” (Bode, 2012, p. 343). In the following 
discussions of pedagogy, I have tried to provide examples showing how such ideas are being put 
into practice in ways that are both academically rigorous and socially/ecologically important. 
                                                          
 
44
 Bode (2012) provided three wonderful examples of critical multicultural curriculum including Cambodia 
and the Cambodian American experience, expanding definitions of family, and gay and lesbian literature. 
Each unit incorporates multiple content areas such as math, science, English, and history. 
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Pedagogy for restoration is composed of three elements: Pedagogy of basic needs, 
Pedagogy of Identity, and Pedagogy of purpose. By addressing students’ basic survival needs 
(see 4.3 Pedagogy of Basic Needs p.191) we make the journey possible. By helping them to 
know themselves and in the process coming to deeply know them (see 4.4 Pedagogy of Identity 
p.220) we begin to make the path as we walk it. And by searching for and constructing meaning 
and purpose (see 4.5 Pedagogy of Purpose p.242) we help students connect their sense of self 
with their community and the planet in such a way that they commit to the path.  
4.3 Pedagogy of Basic Needs 
[When someone is] chronically and extremely hungry… Utopia can be defined 
very simply as a place where there is plenty of food... Life itself tends to be 
defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. 
Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside 
as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach. (Maslow, 1943) 
 
Making sure that students have their basic needs met, including emotional needs, must 
precede any educational effort. Not only do I know this tacitly, with my gut, to be morally 
imperative, it is explicitly and empirically true (as I will show). Therefore, education must 
become a healing process before it can become a learning process (cf. Duncan-Andrade, 2010 
on education as a healing process). All educators need to think more deeply about our role as 
healers: to serve our students and to promote their well-being in any way we can. We must 
assist our students in reaching a place where they are physically and emotionally prepared to 
learn.  
Educator-healers should look to the healers of their own cultures and world-cultures for 
guidance. In environmental education it is common for instructors to have wilderness medicine 
training because we often take students into the back country and need to be prepared to 
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respond to a medical emergency. This training is not periphery to education, but can, should, 
and does inform pedagogy. In wilderness medicine (and all emergency medicine), the same 
initial assessment is performed on every patient whether they have a minor scrape or a sucking 
chest wound in order to avoid overlooking symptoms of potentially life-threatening injuries. We 
assess symptoms in the order that are likely to most quickly kill our patient and we stop and fix 
any condition that we discover in the order that it is identified during the assessment (Tilton, 
2010). There are countless examples of patients dying because the first responder was 
distracted by an obvious symptom while the patient died of a less obvious injury. The stop-and-
fix assessment is designed to prevent such potentially deadly oversights.  
Educators as healers need to be performing stop-and-fix educational assessments based 
on Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs45. Maslow (1943) suggested that humans are motivated 
by the desire to satisfy certain universal human needs. Starting with the most basic needs one 
will generally only be motivated to satisfy each “higher” need once the lower needs are met 
(usually depicted as a pyramid or tipi). The most basic or ‘lowest’ needs are physiological (e.g., 
food, water, shelter) and safety. Maslow (1943) suggested that these needs may entirely 
                                                          
 
45
 Throughout this paper I have tried to emphasize non-academic ways of knowing. Abraham Maslow’s 
theory of motivation is an important and valuable academic contribution, but I want to recognize that his 
work was inspired and heavily influenced by Indigenous knowledge. Although it is sparsely mentioned in 
Maslow’s work Narcisse Blood and Ryan Heavy Head (2007) have spoken about it at length. Maslow spent 
six weeks at Siksika in 1938 at with Blackfoot people. His observations of their way of life informed his 
hierarchy of needs and concept of self-actualization. In fact, the hierarchy of needs is thought to have 
been inspired by Siksika tipi designs (Heavy Head & Blood, 2007). However, one of the fundamental needs 
that the Blackfeet recognized that Maslow did not was a sense of place. In fact, Heavy Head and Blood 
(2007) joked that Maslow’s tipi was floating in space. 
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dominate one’s consciousness if unmet and that the ‘higher’ needs can only be fulfilled once 
the basic needs are sufficiently met. There are, however, notable and profound exceptions 
where humans forego their basic needs (e.g., Gandhi’s hunger strikes). Psychological needs of 
belonging (e.g., love and acceptance) and esteem are next on the tipi. Maslow (1943) recognized 
that these needs may not be equally prevalent for all people (e.g., for some self-esteem is may 
be of higher importance than love) and when unfulfilled, the ‘higher’ are not as all-consuming as 
the basic needs. Finally, when one has satisfied their basic and psychological needs, they can 
seek self-fulfillment or self-actualization. 
 Unfulfilled physiological and safety needs are educationally (as well as morally) stop-
and-fix situations. Hunger is a stop-and-fix. Trauma is a stop-and-fix. The stakes are not always 
as high in education as in first aid, but still we must consider how overlooking the physical and 
emotional wellbeing of our students can be catastrophic (academic failure and social or even 
physical death). Kids are arriving to school (or any formal or informal educational space) in 
conditions not conducive to their education or not arriving at all. Instructional methods and 
learning theory don’t make any difference if students are hungry. Thus, pedagogy of basic needs 
is focused on meeting children’s physiological and safety needs is the first step in pedagogy for 
restoration. 
 Hunger may represent the most prevalent unmet and inadequately met physiological 
need that US students face. “Food is essential to academic performance because it provides the 
energy necessary for cognition” (Woodhouse & Mark, 2012). For the purposes of this discussion, 
I intend a broad interpretation of hunger. Hunger does not refer strictly to starvation, it includes 
students who may have missed breakfast and/or lunch and their attention suffers, but may 
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generally be well nourished. We all know what it’s like to skip lunch and have trouble 
focusing on school or work later in the afternoon. However, fewer know what it’s like to miss a 
meal every day, or several times per week and be unsure if there will be enough to eat for the 
next meal and when that will be. This is what so many of our students experience: not 
starvation, but food-insecurity. Food insecurity is much more prevalent in United States than 
starvation. 
Children who are not physically experiencing hunger pangs (contractions of the stomach 
due to severe hunger) may be deficient in any number of micronutrients necessary to keep their 
body functioning and developing optimally and brain healthy and ready to learn. In United 
States children who are suffering health effects of malnutrition may, in fact, be obese. 
Childhood obesity is often associated with micronutrient deficiencies resulting from limited 
access to healthy foods (Drewnowski & Specter, 2004). Calorie dense, nutrient poor foods are 
cheaper, more convenient, and more easily available to folks living in economic poverty 
(Drewnowski & Specter, 2004). Overconsumption of macronutrients and under consumption of 
micronutrients can lead to obesity and deficiencies (Drewnowski & Specter, 2004).  
Malnourishment is not a simple issue of teaching folks to eat better. It is a moral issue. 
For example, by suggesting that obesity is always signs of excess and poor education, we ignore 
structural and economic injustices and justify oppression by judging individuals as ignorant and 
gluttonous based on the appearance of their bodies. Few would be so callous as to suggest that 
someone displaying more recognizable signs of malnutrition (e.g., emaciation and bloating) was 
simply lazy or ignorant of the necessity of a healthy diet. However, we constantly blame others 
for their ill-health which is commonly (at least partially) associated with structural oppression. 
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Although food and health education are vitally important and overconsumption can be 
harmful to individual health and the health of the planet, we need to be considering how stress, 
limited time, resources, and access, as structural injustices, contribute to obesity and myriad 
diet related health problems (e.g., heart disease and diabetes) and developmental disabilities 
prevalent in United States .  
Many parents of malnourished children are not ignorant about how they should feed 
their kids, and I maintain that all parents want the best for their children. However due to the 
injustice of poverty and corrupt economic systems, many do not have time, access, and ability to 
feed their children healthier foods. The documentary A Place at the Table provides a look into 
the reality of hunger in United States including several interviews with parents struggling to 
provide their children with both enough food and healthy food (Jacobson & Silverbush, 2012). 
Such narratives become experiential (even through film) and offer greater potential for 
empathic arousal than intellectual accounts of hunger. These narratives make issues real in a 
way that empiricism and statistics cannot. Seeing the pain in one mother’s eyes as she discusses 
her children’s malnourishment, the stress associated with struggling to get food on the table for 
dinner every night, and the agony of sending her children to bed hungry may be more moving 
than the knowledge that 17 million families in United States (Weaver-Hightower, 2011)  face 
food insecurity. Together, in dialectical solidarity, facts and the feeling, the reading of the word 
and the reading of the world make this a moral issue and demand action.  
Malnourished children have frequently been shown to have decreased attendance, 
attention, and academic performance along with various other health issues (Florence, 2007; 
Rogers, 2001; Woodhouse & Mark, 2012).  
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The human brain needs sufficient energy – specifically glucose – and a variety of 
micronutrients to perform cognitive functions. A long-term deficiency of any or 
numerous macro- or micro-nutrients causes malnutrition and consequential 
cognitive impairment, the extent of which depends on the duration and degree 
of the malnourishment and the timing of its occurrence in development. In the 
United States, macronutrient malnutrition (i.e., starvation) is rare, but the diets 
of America’s schoolchildren lack quality as measured by adequate and varied 
consumption of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains, and moderation of 
saturated fats and extra-calorie foods. Therefore, it can be inferred that US 
students’ brains are often malnourished, as they are undersupplied of the 
micronutrients needed for effective cognition. 
(Woodhouse & Mark, 2012) 
 
Numerous studies have found significant correlation between decreased overall diet quality and 
poor performance on an academic assessments (Florence, 2007). However, as Florence (2007) 
discussed, income is a significant indicator for both malnourishment and academic success so it 
is often difficult to attribute causality to diet apart from income (and other socio-economic 
factors). Children are likely eating an inadequate diet, in part, because of their socio-economic 
status. The ill-effects on their overall health and cognition influence their academic and 
economic attainment and contribute to generational poverty. However such chicken-and-the-
egg questions are less important for educator-healers than scientists. We know that the brain 
needs both sufficient macronutrients (calories) and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) to 
healthily function and develop. We also know that economic poverty presents myriad barriers to 
educational opportunity and attainment. We cannot focus on either/or solutions (poverty or 
hunger), we must address both explicitly and simultaneously in whatever ways we can.  
Feeding children breakfast has a significant impact on cognition, behavior, and 
performance (Florence, 2007). Simply stated, hungry students don’t learn optimally. More 
precisely these students don’t optimally learn the lessons on the curriculum. As Maslow (1943) 
suggested unmet basic needs, especially physiological and safety needs become all consuming, 
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and one can only be motivated to achieve ‘higher’ needs when the ‘lower’ needs are met. As 
Maslow (1943) wrote, when the need for food is unsatisfied, 
All capacities are put into the service of hunger-satisfaction, and the 
organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one 
purpose of satisfying hunger. The receptors and effectors, the intelligence, 
memory, habits, all may now be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools. 
Capacities that are not useful for this purpose lie dormant, or are pushed into 
the background. The urge to write poetry, the desire to acquire an automobile, 
the interest in American history, the desire for a new pair of shoes are, in the 
extreme case, forgotten or become of secondary importance. For the man [sic] 
who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food. He 
dreams food, he remembers food, he [sic] thinks about food, he emotes only 
about food, he [sic] perceives only food and he [sic] wants only food. 
  
If even one of our students is hungry the first lesson of the day needs to be breakfast. No other 
lesson would matter. If educators serve only to ensure that school (or any space) is a safe place 
where kids are served a healthy breakfast and lunch every day and sent home with a healthy 
snack it would revolutionize education, even if kids spent the rest of the day on the playground. 
I hypothesize that happy healthy kids would learn more on the playground than hungry kids in 
the classroom. However, there is tremendous educational opportunity in meeting the basic 
needs of students. 
Maybe it’s unfair to suggest that the role of education is to ensure and that all students’ 
basic needs are met inside and outside of school. However, education is part of a public 
institution whose concern is exactly that: the welfare of the public. If the larger institution 
doesn’t meet its mandate, then education is undermined from the start. This leaves educators 
three options. (1) We can keep doing more of the same. We can keep teaching the standards 
and attempting to prepare kids for standardized tests knowingly leaving many behind. (2) We 
can defer education and focus entirely on meeting basic needs (3) We take up the slack of failing 
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and floundering institutions as an educational effort. Such an education in the real world, 
addressing hunger or other community needs prepares students to be actively engaged citizens 
and provides context and meaning for traditional learning objectives.  
It may go without saying that I demand option three. Food is not only prerequisite to 
learning; meals are opportunities to learn. Priority number one must be to get food into the 
mouths of hungry students. Second must be for the food to be healthy. Third is to sustain 
healthy eating. The remainder of this section is focused on attaining and sustaining food security 
through education. I explore how helping students and communities meet their basic needs can 
meet moral and traditional education goals. However, constant attention to the physical reality 
and immediacy of hunger must be maintained. It would be extremely distasteful to ignore the 
immediate reality of a student’s physical hunger while working with the class to address access 
and food-security in their community.  
4.3.1 Shifting the discourse 
Learning is often conceptualized as occurring in a social vacuum—the black box 
of research—denuded of concerns of the body, its needs, its pleasures, and its 
politics. Food, as highly body-centric, thus might seem unrelated to schooling’s 
purest mission, the acquisition of skills and knowledge. (Weaver-Hightower, 
2011) 
 
Pedagogy of basic needs frames the fulfillment of physiological and safety needs as a 
matter of justice which demands action. In such a framing the discourse on need is shifted: the 
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shame and stigma associated with need (e.g., homelessness) is replaced with guilt46 
associated with privilege. However, it is not the right of an educator to design the discourse, but 
to join with the students and community to seek an understanding of the issue beyond cursory 
explanations that are so frequently accepted (e.g., justifications based on considerations of 
merit which lead to victim blaming). With understanding and contemplation the moral conflicts 
of the issue becomes more salient and inaction due to ignorance and lack of contemplation 
becomes informed collusion (e.g., realizing that one’s advantage is unfair or comes at the 
expense of others). Although we have many psychological defenses, this conflict threatens our 
self-conception and demands resolution either by cognitively restructuring (e.g., defensive 
thinking) or taking action (see 3.10 Catalyzing Action p.167).  
Positive psychology provides some tools to prevent defensive thinking from interfering 
with positive resolution of moral conflicts (i.e., action). We need to know and to help our 
communities know that we can make things better because that knowledge affects our 
perception of the conflict. We are more likely to think defensively when we see a conflict as an 
unsolvable problem. However, when an issue is collectively viewed by a community as a moral 
injustice that can and should be resolved, action is almost inevitable. The project of restoration 
rests on the assumption that people are generally motivated to act morally but face moral road 
blocks related to moral development, bias, feelings of hopelessness, defensive thinking, and 
                                                          
 
46
 Guilt, as that Hoffman (2000) defined it, is a prosocial motive encouraging a sense of responsibility or 
duty. Guilt is not necessarily a ‘bad,’ painful, or negative feeling unless one feels that they have failed to 
reconcile the situation.  
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ability to perceive a moral conflict. What educators must facilitate is a shift from emphasis 
on the deficits in communities to assets and potentials, from shame and blame to solidarity, and 
from determinism to hope.  
As the discourse shifts, those whose needs are not met are not depicted as lesser or 
undeserving people, they are recognized as the targets of injustice. Stigma is replaced with 
moral indignation. Students should be outraged that anyone is being cheated out of their health 
and education and guided to positive solutions. The classroom must become a community 
development organization. All that stands in our way is our imagination and our perception of 
what is possible. Part of what is so wonderful about young people, is that they have strong 
imaginations and haven’t learned yet to believe that they can’t make a difference. Youth are 
well positioned to be the leaders and free thinkers who will solve problems in their communities 
(e.g, hunger) where grown-ups have failed. I genuinely believe that a few committed educators 
and inspired elementary school students, with the support of their community, can end hunger 
in their neighborhoods.  
Depending on the age of the students shifting the discourse may not require a shift at 
all, but armoring against the change from a moral emphasis on care to one based on merit. As 
Hoffman (2000) discussed, such a change in emphasis happens around fifth grade. Children are 
often raised to value sharing, equality, and self-improvement until upper elementary where 
considerations of merit, competition, and social comparison take over. This is marked by a 
broader shift in world-view, where children would be more likely to view economic poverty as 
someone’s fault than naively (and nobly) questioning how the world could let people go hungry. 
One might suggest that it is an important process for children to become adjusted to the ‘real 
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world’ which parents often shelter young children from. However, our concept of the real 
world, in this case, is socially inflicted and perpetuated by accepting the norm of social 
comparison and competition and ultimately our own degradation. We need to support the 
values that children naturally develop and prepare them to face the ‘reality’ with the courage 
not to submit to a voice of morality hijacked by economic interest that serves the market rather 
than the people and planet. Since schools play a primary role in the shift in emphasis of moral 
principles, educators are well positioned to arm and armor students against the socially inflicted 
shift in moral emphasis and equip them with critical perspectives to encourage autonomous 
deliberation and choice rather than indoctrination. Additionally, engaging students in real world 
problem-solving would provide them experience to reflexively adapt and internalize their own 
principles. 
For upper elementary and high school students the shift in discourse would require 
conversation and experience. Students will be more motivated by affect and positive solutions 
than explicit knowledge. However, shifting the discourse can use explicit knowledge to launch 
conversation and facilitate experience. Just as the emphasis on social comparison begins to 
become prominent in late elementary, students are nearing adolescence, certainly a time of 
social comparison, but also a time when youth begin to test and develop their own moral 
principles, ethics, and political stances, often very idealistically. Such youthful idealism and 
adolescent rebellion is a powerful force and many of the most passionate environmental and 
social justice advocates that I have met have been high school students. Thus, as problematic as 
I consider the socially inflicted shift from an ethic of care to principles of justice based on merit 
and social comparison to be, it’s something that many youth should be well prepared to 
interrogate by late middle school or high school. 
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4.3.1.1 Discussion 
We … seek forms of knowing, teaching, and learning that offer more 
nourishment than the thin soup served up when data and logic are the only 
ingredients. In our complex and demanding worlds – inner and outer worlds – 
the human species cannot survive, let alone thrive, on a diet like that. (Palmer & 
Zajonc, 2010, p. 21) 
 
The facilitation of discussion, as an academic exercise aimed at shifting the discourse 
must attempt to broaden experience and understanding, The topic of discussion is no more 
significant than the way the topic is discussed. For example, lecture is a common method of 
discussion in classrooms. In most lectures, the teacher stands at the front and claim most of the 
air time, encouraging students to occasionally participate but remain largely passive. Certainly 
lecture plays an important role in education, and is not inherently a passive or pacifying 
experience- a good lecture can be “a well-staged theatrical drama” (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 
29). However, a professor’s “rigorous solo act … can feel more like rigor mortis from where the 
student sits” (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 29). I explore the value of a more open and active 
conversation among students. The teacher’s role is to facilitate a conversation that is safe and 
academically productive and to provide clarification and direction to the conversation. In such 
conversations the balance of power between teacher and student is shifted. Thus both the 
content of the discussion and the way in which it is facilitated are beneficial learning 
experiences. The content of the discussion involves viewing a topic from multiple perspectives 
and expanding their understanding of an issue, and the way the conversation is facilitated 
empowers students to make their own meanings and connections.   
What is not permissible is for the teacher to not actively engage with the students in the 
conversation or to rely entirely on student directed conversation. The teacher should maintain 
authority without becoming authoritarian. All active participants should be recognized as co-
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teachers and co-learners. The teacher should be well positioned to help students build on 
their existing knowledge and connect their lived experience, their affect, and their tacit 
understanding, with explicit knowledge and curricular goals. It is necessary to incorporate a 
scaffolding approach where conversation is a central element allowing students to reflect 
together. This must be accompanied with curriculum emphasizing individual reflection and 
lessons or experiences for the students to reflect upon. If for example, hunger is being 
discussed, students should initially be encouraged to voice their own knowledge, feelings, and 
experience associated with hunger but the educator must scaffold upon this knowledge of lived 
experience with experiences in the community, films, readings, etc., to guide students to deeper 
understandings.  
It is important to emphasize the difference between conversation and debate. Debate is 
intentionally persuasive and competitive and explicitly a controlled form of conflict. Learning to 
form and articulate persuasive arguments and face social conflict in a formal setting is an 
important skill. However, facilitating debates is not a task that I have expertise or skill in, and in 
my own experience, I’ve always feared that conflict and competition overshadow learning 
objectives related to the content informing the debate. Especially regarding moral conflicts, 
debate is unlikely to change anyone’s original position. When someone argues their moral 
position and feels 
strongly about an issue, their feelings come first, and their reasons are invented 
on the fly, to throw at each other. When you refute a person’s argument, does 
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she47 [sic] generally change her [sic] mind and agree with you? Of course not, 
because the argument you defeated was not the cause of her [sic] position; it 
was made up after the judgment was already made. (Haidt, 2006, p.21) 
 
There are certainly reasons for our moral judgments and Haidt (2006) is not suggesting 
otherwise in the above quote. Haidt (2006) is suggesting that we may not be able to identify or 
access those reasons and that our brain automatically attempts to make sense of our judgments 
anyway. Conflict can become so emotionally charged that our arguments reduce to little more 
than confabulation (Haidt, 2006).  
I don’t want to suggest that debate, when not reduced to argument, is entirely 
ineffective. Debate is a particular skill and presents its own unique educational opportunity. 
However I focus on the benefit of shifting the nature of the discussion from debate to open 
dialogue. In open dialogue, students should be encouraged to share thoughts, opinions, and 
feelings, but not in competition with one another or with the sole aim of advancing their opinion 
(or better yet, advancing the depth of their understanding by formulating sound arguments).The 
goal in open dialogue is to reflect and to learn from each other and to share an experience. 
Loeber et al. (2007) suggested that “an atmosphere of trust and commitment to reciprocity is 
                                                          
 
47
 Throughout the paper I have used [sic] when a quote uses male pronouns to refer to humans generally. 
However, some authors alternate between he/him/his pronouns and she/her/hers. In each case, I wonder 
how and why they chose. Most likely, in the above quote and most instances it was not something 
significantly contemplated. One might even suggest that the choice was random. But unless the author 
literally flipped a coin, humans are not capable of thinking randomly. Although, not deeply explored here, 
I have frequently noticed that by alternating pronouns in attempt to be inclusive, gendered traits and 
values subtly reinforced. Additionally, use of binary pronouns remains uninclusive to non-binary and trans 
gender identities. In the quote the use of she/her pronouns subtly derogates women by suggesting that 
although all humans confabulate, emotional is feminine and irrational (therefore devalued).  
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essential” (p.89) in such dialog. The sentiment was “I’ll let you in on my private 
considerations if you’ll let me in on yours” (Loeber et al., 2007, p.89). However, I favor a less 
strict demand for reciprocity (i.e., mature reciprocity) where everyone should have the 
opportunity to make a contribution as a valuable member of the group and be encouraged to do 
so by sharing their thoughts and opinions, but it should to be ok not to speak, too. 
In such a dialogue, the why (factual support) of a statement isn’t always as important as 
the what. Asking “what makes you feel that way?” is significantly different than “why is your 
statement true?” or even “why do you feel that way?” Children and adults alike, may not know, 
or may not be able to clearly articulate why, and they may either confabulate or respond that 
they do not know. As Loeber et al. (2007) suggested  “If there is no clear need to reflect on the 
tacit assumptions that underlie common patterns of behavior, they are often factored out of the 
discussion” (p.88).  However, if we ask what makes us/them say that, we may reduce 
confabulation and focus more on the conditions and emotions that lead to the judgment which 
we can investigate further towards discovering a more explicit why. It is important to be clear, 
however, about the differences between what and why in this context.  
Everyone is entitled to their feelings and feelings are never wrong. However our tacit 
assumptions and intuitions should not be interrogated. By attempting to bring such assumptions 
to the surface by both questioning and encouraging questioning we 
can reveal how social structures create stereotypes and lack of information that 
may lead to tension, alienation and conflict. Attentive teachers can invite those 
questions and affirm a classroom culture that creates trustful, respectful 
dialogue. (Bode, 2012, p. 344) 
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For example, in a discussion aimed at shifting the discourse on hunger, students may make 
certain tacit assumptions about the merit of those facing hunger. Through dialogue, “students 
who examine their stereotypes about why people need to make repeated visits to the 
emergency food pantry may begin to ask larger questions about why members of the 
community are consistently unable to provide for their families” (Eyler, 2002). We need to teach 
kids to value different ways of knowing, but to understand the different roles and function of 
those different ways of knowing. By exploring what, why, and how we know and feel through 
conversation and being clear about the distinctions, we facilitate growth, broaden our 
perspectives, and allow the group to delve deeper into issues.  
Conflicts and disagreements may arise and can be resolved constructively as long as 
respect and equitable power are maintained. Through conversation power is equalized. Berman 
(1997) suggested that the shift in power in open and democratic classrooms parallels civic life 
and encourages kids to become more involved the democratic process.  
Educators should promote the belief that political and social change is necessary 
and good, that American society has problems (a ‘reality’ students are well 
aware of); that there are means by which citizens can work to resolve those 
problems; and that when the channels of political change within the system are 
closed to certain groups, conflict (not necessarily violent) may emerge. Conflict 
should be treated as creative rather than necessarily destructive, because 
eventually it may open up awareness of participation to those who have been 
excluded. Conflict is thus a vital and constructive aspect of the American 
political system. (S. Berman, 1997, p. 115)  
 
Although discussion is important, students need action to discuss and reflect on. Once a 
community need is identified and briefly introduced and explored, action is imperative. From 
that point forward action and reflection must be regular and continuous. The discourse will shift 
as much with experience as with conversation. For example, a student questioning the merit of 
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people continually needing emergency assistance from a food pantry “at the food pantry 
giving out emergency food boxes” eventually “arrived at the point where she is ready for critical 
reflection on fundamental principles about how society is organized to provide for its members” 
only after spending time volunteering at a local food pantry (Eyler, 2002). 
4.3.2 Educational action 
What students learn about poverty from texts is almost always less compelling 
than what they would have learned by doing the reading while volunteering in a 
community where the sights, sounds, and smells of poverty are inescapable 
elements of the educational experience. (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 31) 
 
Shifting conversation about a community need into action is an educational process. I 
loosely follow the Action Research and Community Problem-Solving (ARCPS) model48 (Wals et 
al., 1990) to imagine what such a process may look like. The ARCPS model is fundamentally 
about empowering students as researchers and activists rather than subjects of action research.  
Students are often unmotivated and dissatisfied in the classroom because they 
feel that what they are taught there is removed from, and not useful or valid in, 
the “real world.” ARCPS attempts to address their concerns by challenging 
students with “real-world” problems. (Wals et al., 1990) 
 
                                                          
 
48
 There are many named approaches to participatory research and community action (e.g., Community 
Based Participatory Research (Anguiano, Milstein, De Larkin, Chen, & Sandoval, 2012), Action Research, 
Youth-led Participatory Action Research (YPAR),  etc.) and the methodological differences are sometimes 
quite subtle and nuanced. I take a broad approach to the concept of action research most closely 
following ARCPS model because ARCPS explicitly focuses on student involvement in community problem 
solving as an educational process. However, other models that more broadly focus community 
involvement in research and evaluation provide additional insight into the process. Many papers, 
including Wals, Beringer, and Stapp (1990) provide specific methods and adaptations particular to the 
intended setting (including Environmental Education). 
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Additionally, students should benefit both internally (e.g., empowerment and motivation) 
and externally by addressing a community problem that affect them. Since ARCPS focuses on 
problem solving in the students’ communities (or even schools), students may uniquely be 
subject, researcher, and beneficiary of action research.  For example, action research conducted 
by students may focus on “misinformed decisions and policies intended to help them, but 
designed without their input”. Youth can change this dynamic through action research and 
influence “the development of programs and policies designed to affect their lives” (Powers & 
Tiffany, 2006, p. S80). 
The action research process begins with identifying of a community need. The ARCPS 
model suggests that the issue should be of the students choosing (Wals et al., 1990). This is 
certainly ideal and I think that teacher, students, and community must identify and define the 
issues together, but an educator can chum the waters to engage stakeholders. In such cases the 
educator must be fully prepared to defer to emergent themes or concerns of students and 
community. An initial conversation should focus on the lived experience of the students (see 
4.3.1.1 Discussion p. 202). Are they familiar with this issue? Do they think it is prevalent? Do 
they think it is fair? What feelings do they associate with it? This could be facilitated in a variety 
of ways and should be more informed by the teacher’s relationship with the students than my 
hypothetical treatment. Centering student and community needs and emergent themes doesn’t 
mean that the teacher doesn’t come prepared for class, instead the teacher must prepare for 
multiple possibilities and be ready walk with the students in new directions or take authority 
and redirect students as necessary. All the while, the teacher must cunningly seek opportunities 
to make grade-level learning requirements relevant and applicable to the goals of the action 
research.  
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Once an issue has been identified students should engage in research activities with 
emphasis on critical thinking and reflection. Fundamental to action research is reliance and 
emphasis on the involvement of community experts who “live the research issue” (Powers & 
Tiffany, 2006). Thus, students need to conduct their research in the community both acting as 
local experts and consulting community experts. Such research can and should be paired with 
readings, films, etc. in the classroom. 
By promoting critical thinking and the exploration of the social circumstances 
related to research questions, participatory research goes beyond mere fact-
gathering and report-writing and uses the knowledge gained to guide and 
energize collective change in communities, organizations, programs, and the 
research participants themselves. (Powers & Tiffany, 2006, p. S79) 
 
The focus should rapidly shift from an emphasis on understanding the problem to focusing on 
possible solutions and opportunities to take action. It is important that initial action takes place 
as soon as possible even before full commitment or deep understanding.  
This approach differs from the standard way of solving a problem, which is to 
first thoroughly understand the problem then to consider what actions, if any, 
to take. Evaluation is normally carried out only after a plan is implemented. The 
drawback of this method is that it tends to delay action while endless study is 
done, and it fails to recognize that one often comes to really understand a 
situation only through taking action and evaluating the consequences of that 
action. (Wals et al., 1990) 
 
Action cements an issue in the here-and-now, which we have empathic bias towards. However, 
before becoming too involved in initiating a community project, it is important to get to know 
the community and the issue, especially the current stakeholders and what is already being 
done. The process can be summarized as: plan, implement, evaluate, repeat, but rather than 
that particular order, beyond an initial cycle action and reflection must be simultaneous and 
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constant. Students need to reflect and evaluate individually and collectively, and should 
have opportunity to act individually as well as collectively. 
 Finally, as Anguiano et al. (2012) pointed out, there is no cookbook approach. The 
nature of the methodology is that it grows and adapts itself to the participants and to the issue 
being addressed. Action research and community problem solving are more about an approach 
to the process than specific methods. This is an approach to education that centers community 
and empowers students and community members by building relationships and balancing 
power among stakeholders in the process of understanding and solving problems. It is also 
about building relationships in order to address a specific community need. “It is intended to be 
a social process that is participatory, practical, collaborative, emancipatory, critical, and 
reflective” (Anguiano et al., 2012). Although there are some subtleties in the specifics, action 
research, critical pedagogy, popular education, integrative education, and multicultural 
education are among a number of other named approaches aiming at a more holistic, 
empowering, and consciousness raising education that demands action.  
4.3.3 Application of pedagogy of basic needs 
Although intrinsically an important and worthy topic by itself, school food can 
also be an entrée (so to speak) into many other topics of interest to education 
researchers. It can be the highlight or simply a small piece of context. It can be a 
central focus or simply one among many facets to explore as a possible 
confounding influence. Whatever the relative weight of food in a study, it is 
time to take school food seriously, to consider how much depends on this most 
human, embodied part of the school day. (Weaver-Hightower, 2011) 
 
I’ve very generally outlined a theoretical approach to problem solving education, with 
specific consideration of hunger and emphasized that by changing the way we discuss problems, 
we see solutions differently. Although the actions and solutions should be co-constructed with 
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students, I provide a vision of what implementation of the process might look like with 
specific examples from real community projects that address community needs, support moral 
growth, and meet learning objectives. The premise for this example is that several kids in a class 
(or other setting such as an afterschool program) experience food insecurity and students have 
come to realize that hunger is prevalent in their community and want to do something.  
4.3.3.1 A case against charity 
Before continuing to explore the wonderful things that folks are doing to address food 
insecurity in their communities, I want to consider a common way that it is addressed in schools: 
canned food drives. Food drives do nothing to destigmatize hunger, and often imply that hunger 
is an external (in the community) while ignoring or overlooking internal (in the classroom) need. 
In my elementary school the class that donated the most cans got to have a party. For several 
weeks a tally on the board kept track of how many cans had been donated and everyone knew 
who the big can donors were. The number of cans a student had donated became a measure for 
social comparison. Although having enough to eat was never a concern in my family and parents 
sent me to school with several cans of food, I distinctly remember sneaking additional cans out 
of the pantry to bring to school. To be clear, I didn’t sneak more cans because I was engaged in 
contributing to a humanitarian effort, I snuck them because I wanted to have a party and 
because I wanted to be recognized as a contributor.  
I wonder how kids who couldn’t bring any cans felt. I wonder how many kids donated 
food knowing that it would mean they wouldn’t get enough to eat in order to avoid being 
shamed because their family was unable to donate. This is a process that adds shame to poverty 
when the goal should be exactly the opposite. It is demeaning to students facing food insecurity 
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to conceptualize food drives as charity rather than justice. We tend to celebrate charity, as if 
social change is something the privileged do for the ‘underprivileged’ who are unable to help 
themselves or each other. This type of charity little more than self-congratulatory social 
posturing for privileged elites and it doesn’t have any place in action research. However, neither 
canned food drives, nor the often genuinely humanitarian goals of charity are innately harmful. 
It is simply a matter of how we approach helping one another. 
We shouldn’t do charity for other communities. There paternalistic way of helping often 
associated with charity that encourages downward social comparison and stigmatizes need, but 
it is not the only way to conceptualize charity. We need to work with/in our communities49 in 
solidarity for justice. The point I am trying to make is that good intentions alone are not enough. 
We have to focus on how and why we help just as much as what we intend to do and we must 
always work with rather than for those we help. Thus, the approach requires humility, respect, 
and attention always focused on the outcomes of the work on both participants50 and 
beneficiaries (who should be one in the same).  
4.3.3.2 A case for educational action 
                                                          
 
49
 I don’t mean to suggest that we only work in our own neighborhoods. I mean to suggest that rather 
than viewing places and peoples as ‘others’ we recognize that we are part of one large community of life 
composed of many overlapping communities. In this way our work is always with and never strictly for. 
50
 Even those acting purely altruistically without any expectation of external reward benefit internally 
through such experiences. It is not selfish or counter to the ideals of altruism to recognize that helping 
others benefits one’s self.  
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What if children come to see food insecurity as injustice? Need would begin to be 
destigmatized and no one would be made to feel ashamed of being hungry. Students could work 
together to make sure that they and their community had enough to eat, not as charity, but 
solidarity and community.  Students could work together to do something as simple as 
implement a “share bowl” where students could leave extra food from their lunches. Anyone 
would be free to leave or take something whenever they wanted. It’s absolutely atrocious to see 
how much is wasted in a single lunch service in most school cafeterias. This is something very 
simple that I have seen implemented in school cafeterias to reduce waste and hunger in schools. 
Other schools and communities have implemented their own pantry programs and started 
sending kids home on weekends with a backpack full of food (cf. Rodgers & Milewska, 2007). 
The internal need in schools must be addressed before attention is shifted to external needs. 
Once the immediacy of the problem is sufficiently addressed that the class is able to 
consider the issue more structurally, they could begin planning, implementing, and evaluating 
solutions in and with their community. One solution could be to implement or expand the 
school garden either for the purposes of donating to the food bank, supplementing school 
nutrition, establishing their own school food bank, or even preparing and serving free meals. 
They could potentially partner with churches, community service organizations, or police & fire 
departments. One thing that is great about kids is that they are adorable and communities are 
often both incredibly inspired by the efforts of their young people and eager to support them.  
Action research towards food justice as part of a curriculum with a food education 
theme could easily meet learning goals while providing a meaningful experience and solving a 
real problem. An educational project with the goal of eradicating hunger in its community could 
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also inspire a sense of meaning and purpose, build community, and encourage civic 
engagement and moral growth reaching far beyond the classroom. Students cool learn about 
healthy diets and lifestyles, food systems and botany by learning to cook and garden. These 
skills could be applied to their project addressing community hunger and they could work to 
establish community gardens, plant gardens at home, or expand their school gardens and in the 
process begin establishing decentralized food systems in their communities. They could donate 
excess produce to a community pantry or open their own. They could additionally prepare and 
serve meals in their school or community. In the course of such efforts, students could explore 
the diets and agricultural systems of other cultures and their own in social studies classes. In 
science classes they could study the biology of plant, the water cycle, photosynthesis, and 
nutrition – all knowledge relevant to their project. Through spending time in the garden 
students could learn natural history and ethnobotany and more generally connect with nature. 
Math classes could directly  apply to nutrition, cooking, and gardening. 
Not only a classroom, but an entire school could engage in a student led action research 
project. Every class and every subject could be related to the single goal of eradicating hunger 
and students at all grade levels could engage in the process. Not only would it be possible to 
meet all of the standards in this process, the students would be eager to learn skills that apply to 
solving an important problem. 
4.3.3.3  Examples of action research 
Students have accomplished amazing things through participatory action research. One 
action research project focused on youth homelessness in upstate New York recruited youth 
researchers from a community program serving runaway youth (Powers & Tiffany, 2006). The 
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youth were involved in the design of the project, data collection, interpretation and the 
presentation of findings and recommendations. One difficulty with studying homelessness 
among youth is that they tend not to utilize support services as frequently as adults and 
researchers often have trouble estimating the population of youth experiencing homelessness, 
much less engaging with them (Powers & Tiffany, 2006). By involving youth familiar with this 
population through their own lived experience, the research team was able to conduct 165 
interviews with youth experiencing homelessness. They presented their reports and 
recommendations to community stakeholders including legislators, funders, human services 
staff, university researchers, and policy makers. Thus, the youth researchers became powerful 
advocates for their peers experiencing homelessness in a way that the detached researcher 
likely could not.  
Nygreen et al. (2006) described several fully youth led projects that developed 
organically out of existing relationships between the authors and youth. Nygreen et al. (2006) 
considered themselves adult allies, outlining a strictly supportive role. In one project current 
students and recent graduates of a public alternative high school predominantly serving low-
income Students of Color considered as ‘at-risk.’ The groups purpose was to make change in 
their school. The group held weekly meetings for a year discussing social issues and personal 
experiences and conducted services and interviews with students, teachers, and staff in attempt 
to understand how social issues affected their lives and educations. The following year the 
students and their ‘adult ally’ developed and instructed weekly 80-minute lessons in the school’s 
US Government class designed to encourage “students to think critically about social justice 
issues and engage in action for social change” using “dialogue-based pedagogy to address topics 
like police brutality, prisons, and environmental racism” (p.111). 
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Another group of four Latina transnational second-generation immigrants including 
one graduate student and three high school students who all regularly spent time with family in 
Mexico spent a year sharing their pictures and experiences (Nygreen et al., 2006). A frequent 
discussion topic was how their experience, language, and culture were ignored in school. This 
inspired the group to write a children’s book on what life is like having homes on either side of 
the border. Beyond their own experience, the group conducted research through dialogue, 
interviews and a collection of pictures, home-videos, and other documents from transnational 
families. Using this information they wrote and illustrated their book, they initially printed 80 
copies through a local small grant and distributed the book to their families, at conferences, 
local libraries and day care centers. At the time of publication of the description of the project 
(2006) the group was working with a children’s book publisher for national distribution. 
I hope to have illustrated through these examples that education focusing on the most 
immediate community need can meet learning goals, solve problems, build community, and 
facilitate moral growth. This may seem too idealistic, but I argue that restoration must be 
idealistic. We can’t replace idealism with practicality, instead we have to remain idealistic in 
order to guide or practical efforts. If our ideal and our practice match we have little direction for 
progress. Thus, the central theme of this section is rethinking education to start from the 
bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy and work our way up. I’ve argued for a radical approach, our duty 
as moral humans and as educators is to do what we can in the spaces where we work. Different 
institutions and different organizations have different capacities. It’s often slow and difficult 
work, but if we’re not in this to serve kids, then we’re not in it at all. I realize this is easy to write 
and difficult to do, but I want to conclude by sharing some my own recent experiences 
observing lunches school cafeterias before and after salad bars were installed. The principle 
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dressed in a banana costume and danced around the cafeteria to encourage kids to eat 
healthy. The food service manager quietly paid out of her own pocket for lunches for kids who 
were behind on payment51. Food that had been grown in the school garden served in the 
cafeteria. I saw everyone from parents, to teachers, to administrators wanting to do better for 
kids and working to accomplish it. I saw kids genuinely excited to eat their vegetables!  I saw 
hope. The point is that we need to be doing big things and making radical changes, but all of the 
small things we do on the way matter.  
4.3.4 Extending to ecological issues 
Action research applies needs beyond the immediate physiological and safety needs. It 
is a model for education as social change. This could mean establishing more green space, 
reducing litter, recycling programs, etc. The sentiment of a pedagogy of basic needs is that the 
most immediate physiological and safety needs need to come first, or at least simultaneous with 
addressing less immediate issues. We need to help everyone meet their basic needs in order for 
them to rightfully claim their place at the table in discussing the large-scale structural changes 
necessary in the face of issues like climate change.  
Ecological degradation is readily identifiable as a significant impairment to survival 
needs in some parts of the world. As such degradation continues (e.g., climate change), the 
                                                          
 
51
 In some schools kids have their lunches taken away at checkout if they are behind on payments surely 
inflicting both shame and hunger. For this manager to refuse to do this to kids at her own personal 
expense goes to show how important everyone’s role is in the project of restoration. It’s not the work of 
academics and educators; it’s all of our work.  
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conflict between human and nature will escalate and social reform, as it has in many parts of 
the world, will not be a utopian dream, but a matter of survival. Conflicts between meeting our 
basic needs and preserving the environment are created through economic exploitation that 
reduces all of life (human and planet) to the status of resource. This is killing us. In a struggle 
that frames human verses nature and human verses human, we divide and conquer ourselves in 
the face of our adversaries (nature and each other). This may be harsh verdict of nature that 
Bookchin (1982) described. When we come to see the struggle as human with nature and 
human with human there is no adversary at all. We need to meet the immediate needs of 
people and planet, but we can simultaneously circumvent the processes that are leading to folks 
having their needs unfulfilled. 
4.3.5 Meeting basic needs mandates social change 
Social change can be a survival need when social structures impede one’s ability to meet 
their physiological and safety needs. I imagine such social structure as a completion to see who 
can tread water the longest where some people have water wings (privilege) and some have an 
anchor chained around their waist (oppression). It could be suggested that everyone has a fair 
chance to win based on their skill and endurance (equal opportunity). This might be easily 
accepted by those with water wings, and reluctantly accepted by those with anchors 
(internalized oppression).  But what we don’t realize is that we’ll all get exhausted and drown 
eventually if we keep playing zero sum games where our success is inevitably at someone else’s 
expense. We need to all help each other out of the anchors and share the water wings (meeting 
basic needs) with the goal of getting everyone out of the water (radical social change).  
As Maslow (1943) wrote: 
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There are certain conditions which are immediate prerequisites for the basic 
need satisfactions… Such conditions as freedom to speak, freedom to do what 
one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, … justice, fairness, honesty, 
orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for basic need 
satisfactions. Thwarting in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or 
emergency response…These conditions are defended because without them the 
basic satisfactions are quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered. 
 
The Zapatista uprising exemplifies the necessity of social change in order to satisfy basic needs. 
The Zapatistas identified economic policy (NAFTA) and the dissolution of communally held land, 
as not only destructive to their way of life, but an attack on their means for survival. For the 
Zapatistas, NAFTA was perceived to be a death sentence. The Zapatistas realized that meeting 
their basic physiological and safety needs was impeded by larger structural issues.  
The Zapatistas have consistently worked for structural change and inspired an 
international Zapatismo movement with constant emphasis on the wellbeing of the people over 
armed revolutionary conflict. The Zapatistas have worked to autonomously meet the needs of 
their own communities by communally operating farms, schools and clinics (Hayden, 2002). 
Many other revolutionary struggles have failed to place the highest value on life and have 
considered the ends to justify the means. When this happens even a win is a loss and one brutal 
dictatorship replaces another. The only revolutionary struggle is one of and for those who love 
and honor life more than power. 
Pedagogy for restoration is divided into three components strictly for conceptual clarity. 
The ultimate goal is planetary restoration and pedagogy of identity and pedagogy of purpose 
circle back to the problem solving process and constant attention to meeting everyone’s basic 
needs and the necessity of large scale social change. Certainly groups and individuals whose 
basic needs are better met can engage further with meeting the basic needs of larger human 
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and non-human communities and work towards ecosystem scale restoration. Through the 
pedagogy of basic needs identity and purpose already begin to be addressed and pedagogy of 
identity seeks to illuminate purpose. In turn, pedagogy of purpose refers back to pedagogy of 
basic needs, because when one finds purpose and self-actualization, they have a duty to act. 
4.4 Pedagogy of Identity 
Native students confined to learn only in Eurocentric systems have poor success 
rates. The experience can be described as “looking into a mirror and having the 
mirror look away.” (von Thater-Braan & Nelson, 2012) 
 
Once we’ve fed our students we need to know them (to the extent that it is possible to 
know someone else and their experience) and help them to know themselves and each other. 
Because to know oneself, is to know how one fits into the world, and to become critically 
conscious of the world. After this, attainment far beyond academic and economic success is 
inevitable and the practice of teaching is inconsequential because students will be mentally and 
physically prepared to learn and become open to education from all facets of life.  
The epigraph to this section refers to the Native students experience in contemporary 
public education. Before continuing with this discussion of the importance of honoring identity 
in education, I want to share the narrative of Sun Elk from Taos Pueblo who attended Carlisle 
Indian Industrial School for seven years beginning in 1883: 
They told us that Indian ways were bad. They said we must get civilized. I 
remember that word too. It means “to be like the white man.” I am willing to be 
like the white man, but I did not believe Indians’ ways were wrong. But they 
kept teaching us for seven years. And the books told how bad the Indians had 
been to the white men—burning their towns and killing their women and 
children. But I had seen white men do that to Indians. We all wore white man’s 
clothes and ate white man’s food and went to white man’s churches and spoke 
white man’s talk. And so after a while we also began to say Indians were bad. 
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We laughed at our own people and their blankets and cooking pots and sacred 
societies and dances. (as cited in Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014, p. 212) 
 
Sun Elk and countless others eventually returned to their native way of life, but reintegrated 
with much difficulty (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). This devaluation of non-dominant culture and 
coerced assimilation covertly continues in schools today and is a source of internalized 
oppression.  
This section focuses on Maslow’s psychological needs of love, belonging and esteem. It 
encompasses helping students explore their own identity (broadly cultural and ethnic identity, 
but also specific identities e.g., environmentalist). It is also about ensuring that students find 
themselves in the curriculum and that it speaks to their own experience (e.g., culturally relevant 
history). Pedagogy of identity is not only a process of self-discovery, but group exploration. 
Students should learn about one another’s identities and experiences and build relationships 
recognizing that while they are each uniquely different, they are similar in many important 
ways. Most importantly, they should learn that we are all connected and come to respect and 
appreciate US American cultures and world cultures. It is critically important that the educator 
engages in the process, letting students know them, as they work to know their students.  
I broadly consider identity to be the culmination of experiences, statuses, traits, and 
beliefs that make up who one is, including both their our own self-conceptions and the way 
others perceive them. “Identity is linked with self-concept and self-reflection, and includes 
beliefs about who we are as we are as well as who we hope to be. It is, in part, a way of locating 
oneself in the world” (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p. 299). Thus, identity must be “understood as a 
complex and multidimensional construct with motivational and behavioral implications” 
(Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.300). Individuals are composed of multiple identities, sometimes 
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conflicting and sometimes confusing. Some elements of identity are biologically determined 
and some socially determined, some claimed by ourselves and some imposed by others (i.e., 
attained and ascribed identity). However our identity is more than the sum of its parts and while 
culturally-constructed markers of identity such as gender, race, and class, may impose meaning 
about who one is (i.e., ascribed), they are only one dimension of identity and do not define 
anyone entirely52 (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). 
Identity is often comparative: by claiming an identity, or having one imposed, an 
implication is made that this label significantly differentiates the person claiming the identity (or 
having it imposed) from others. The implication is that if someone significantly is something 
then someone else significantly isn’t. This establishes affinity among the group of individuals 
that the label applies to and distance from those who it does not. It is a natural human tendency 
to attempt to understand, categorize, and even stereotype. This behavior is not inherently 
harmful. However, the politics of identity are quite complicated and value laden and identity can 
be used to establish hierarchy, to divide, and to oppress (see 3.7.3 Social death p. 134). It can 
also be dismissed entirely in a way that effectively erases people, their experiences, and voices 
(e.g., colorblindness and forced assimilation).  
                                                          
 
52
 Certainly in some circumstances the relative significance of particular biologically dictated and socially 
constructed identities change. For example, although I have only recently considered my Jewish identity 
as it intersects with my other identities and influences how I experience the world, when Neo-Nazis enter 
the equation, I am acutely aware of the significance of this particular facet of my identity. 
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What is necessary is for all educators to help folks celebrate their similarities and 
their differences. Taking the importance of similarity or difference to the extreme is almost 
always detrimental. However, the relative importance of similarities and differences depends on 
context. In certain contexts it may be important to focus more on the ways in which we are 
similar and to stand together in solidarity (but never in a way that attempts to completely 
homogenize). In other cases, it may be important to focus more on the ways that we are each 
unique individuals with different experiences. For example, in the struggle against oppression, 
we must center the identities and statuses most frequently targeted by oppression and how and 
why they are targeted. 
As we explore identity (especially cultural identity) we must carefully avoid over-
generalization. One’s identity reflects some shared experience among that particular identity 
but common experience does not dictate shared values or beliefs. However, cultural identity 
may influence dominant themes in beliefs and values (Moya, 2003). Epistemology can be 
culturally constructed, thus not only the experience but the theory through which we interpret 
experience is influenced by cultural identity (Moya, 2003). The task is to avoid making 
assumptions about any individual’s values or beliefs based on their cultural identity, but to also 
recognize that cultural identity can influence values and beliefs. Our self conception is relative to 
culture but it is not entirely culture defined. This is why, in education, the students own 
exploration of identity and the relationship between teachers and students is so important. We 
need to know (to the extent that we can know, but never become entirely familiar or entitled 
to) our students unique identities and cultural experiences and the intersection between their 
own cultural identity and dominant culture. Furthermore, neither identity nor experience is 
static and their associated meanings are subject to change at individual and collective levels.  
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4.4.1 Role models 
Chuck D (1997) discussed the important role of popular culture, especially of Black53 
musicians, in fighting racism. Chuck D (1997) argued that all Black public figures have a duty to 
strive to be positive role models. 
The athletics and entertainment industries have both had a tremendous impact 
on the mind-set of today’s youth to the point where many young people grow 
up idolizing athletes and entertainers, yet the only time these “idols” are seen is 
if they’re playing ball, singing, rapping or dancing... Black youth, especially 
young Black men, gravitated to Rap when it first came out, because it’s a vocal 
expression, whereas in athletics you’d see somebody do incredible athletic 
things on the court or field, but you’d never hear anything from their mind. The 
travesty is that both athletes and entertainers could be and should be, more 
visual and vocal sources of hope for young children in the ghetto and 
throughout the world. (Chuck D & Jah, 1997, pp.95-96) 
 
Chuck D (1997) further argued that Black people, especially Black public figures both model 
behavior for Black youth and broader public perceptions and stereotypes54. Thus, he suggested 
that when public figures glamorize violence and material wealth they normalize such goals for 
youth and furthermore contribute to racist stereotypes. Regardless of whether this is right or 
wrong, it is real. 
                                                          
 
53
 Although I think that much of what Chuck D (1997) wrote applies more generally, I have tried to be true 
to his words in an effort to honor the voices of the authors that I have cited rather than appropriate their 
ideas for my own agenda.  
54
 Kaplan and Berman (2010) suggested that coping with negative stereotypes and devoting attention to 
avoid confirming them may deplete one’s resources for self-regulation executive-functioning. This 
pressure may be exacerbated for celebrities of color who are constantly in the spotlight. Thus, while Black 
public figures certainly serve as role models they cannot be expected to be perfect and we should be 
sympathetic to the stressors they face. 
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It’s more than just saying, “I’m not a criminal or contributing to a criminal 
element that should be good enough.” It’s not enough. It’s not an issue of 
donating money to Black causes. What makes me pissed off is that they [Black 
athletes] are not saying much of anything. Their words and their time could 
steer a lot of young people out of the traps that are set for them. (Chuck D & 
Jah, 1997, p.100) 
 
All public figures have an obligation to pay careful attention to their public perception and 
persona55.  
No one should be so presumptuous as to believe that their behavior reflects on only 
themselves. This presumption is a significant function of privilege because whites are rarely 
burdened with an awareness that our actions could be taken as a reflection whites that we don’t 
consider ourselves associated with. However, we are all co-responsible for bringing social 
change. We must all be aware of both how we see ourselves and how others see us. We are all 
role models and ambassadors (at least sometimes) for the identities we are socially assigned 
and the collective identities we claim membership in.  
 People of Color alone should not be burdened with the task of breaking down racial 
stereotypes and the work of anti-racism. I insist that we challenge the expectation that People 
of Color should be accountable for their entire (socially constructed) race and constantly 
expected to prove that they are ‘good’ (see 2.1.2 Entitlement and deservingness p.37). 
However, as long as such an unjust expectation remains prominent, whites must hold 
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 It is important to distinguish the public persona of artists and performers from the works that they 
produce. Although, it is important to pay attention to the way People of Color are portrayed in film, 
television, and music, the consumers of the products need to be accountable for the meaning of it.  
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themselves to the same (unjust) level of accountability. An example of this unjust disparity 
relates to the election of Barak Obama, our first African American president. Obama had to 
prove that he was a US citizen, not a terrorist, and not Muslim- all three criminalized statuses 
rather than inherently criminal identities. Such scrutiny has never been so publicly prominent 
for any other president of US. Someone with the status of United States Senator and then 
President of United States of America faced pressure to establish value not only as a politician, 
but as a human being. The underlying injustice is that privileged identities and statuses are 
presumed to be good and entitled to rights while dismissed, marginalized and criminalized 
peoples are required to prove that they are good and deserving of rights (Cacho, 2012).  
As much as I do not like to claim identities such as white, man, and environmentalist or 
statuses such as citizen, because of the privilege (and certain behaviors) associated with those 
identities and statuses56, I recognize that I have significant power in challenging the associated 
meanings. Rather than renounce my own privileged identities, I claim them and challenge their 
definitions by the simple fact that I refuse (or aspire to refuse) to resign to privilege and 
stereotypes and I interrogate the ways in which I am conditioned by those identities. It would 
only be from a position of significant privilege that one could declare themselves not 
accountable to a socially imposed identity (e.g., white or Black). As long as such an unjust 
disparity exists, I will (aspire to) hold myself similarly accountable. Furthermore, when it comes 
to more radical stances relating to race and racism, as a white man, and a unique individual, I 
                                                          
 
56
 This is not to suggest that one (myself included) cannot or should not maintain positive associations 
with their status and identity. However, there the privilege associated with dominant identities is unjust.  
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say things differently and I am heard differently. Equality is a utopian idea, but on the path 
to utopia we need to focus on equity. Given that we do not have equal agency and privilege, we 
need to think about what is fair and how we can each contribute to a better world uniquely, 
individually, and collectively.  
Oppression is violent and acts of oppression may be traumatic to both those who enact 
oppression and the targets of oppression. The colonization of America was and continues to be 
traumatic for colonized and colonizer alike and it’s not too late for us to collectively experience 
posttraumatic growth.  Those at each level of collective and individual identity and in the 
intersections of multiple identities have a duty to work in any way they can to reduce violence in 
service of meeting the ultimate goal of ecological and social restoration. I don’t believe that 
People of Color and whites exist as a binary framework of race and relation (us or them) where 
whites committed to anti-racist can be considered allies at best and saviors57 at worst.  This also 
applies to other dichotomously situated identities and statuses related to sex, gender, sexual 
orientation, citizenship status, and educational attainment. I believe there is a time and place 
for allies and saviors, however I want to stand in solidarity as a co-conspirator in an insurgency 
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 By saviors I mean whites who believe that they know best and are doing anti-racist work for People of 
Color, rather than with People of Color. However, this mentality may well apply to folks who rescued my 
family from the Nazi death camps and I don’t think such a mentality should be entirely dismissed or 
criticized. On the opposite end of the spectrum are allies. Ally is a loaded term, and I don’t intend to delve 
deeply into different perceptions of what ally-ship means. Here, I am challenging the perception that 
whites can only act with or under the direction of People of Color. I cherish opportunities to act as an ally, 
but I think that we all need to be sufficiently informed and empowered to take immediate and 
independent action when it is necessary and to lead when appropriate. White co-conspirators must 
challenge the role of their own privilege in such behaviors without renouncing their agency entirely. I 
conceptualize the co-conspirator as the midpoint in a spectrum with ally and savior on either end.  
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against all oppression and a struggle to bring another reality to fruition. I want to be clear 
that I am not suggesting that as a white male I feel entitled to be present, influential or even 
welcome in every space. Furthermore we all need to hold each other and ourselves accountable 
while simultaneously practicing acceptance. What we must not do is reduce all identities and 
experiences in life to a single human experience.  
4.4.2 Hispanic environmental identities 
Anguiano et al. (2012) studied the intersection of environmental values and beliefs 
regarding the natural environment with those of dominant culture in New Mexico. The 
dominant ideology of environmentalism is so prevalent that Anguiano et al. (2012) found a 
“deep disconnect between the word ‘‘environmentalist’’ and Hispanic communities unwilling to 
ascribe to such a label despite practicing sustainable ethics” because 
Hispanic community member participants may already practice social and 
environmental sustainability, but … their strategies are tied to culturally specific 
values and meanings and thus differ from those advanced and advocated by the 
dominant environmental movement… despite the fact that their articulated 
behavior was largely analogous with the environmental justice movement’s 
aims. (Anguiano et al., 2012) 
 
Anguiano et al. (2012) significantly raised the point that It is not fair to assume that ecological or 
social sustainability are not priorities for those whose practice may not align with the dominant 
environmental movement.  
Educators and mainstream environmentalists must acknowledge different cultural 
conceptions of the environment. 
Anglo-American environmental discourses that assume nature is an untouched 
space, that ‘‘wilderness is pristine,’’ and that ‘‘protecting nature means 
protecting it from predation by humans’’ do not resonate with Latino 
communities. (Anguiano et al., 2012) 
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Many of the Hispanic community member participants of Anguiano et al.’s (2012) study lived 
and worked closely with the land including many ranchers with long-standing generational ties 
to the land.  
In contrast with the individualistic and culture-nature binary view of dominant 
Western environmental discourse, for our Hispanic New Mexican participants, 
their environmental concerns stemmed from close ties to their community, 
neighborhoods, and place. (Anguiano et al., 2012) 
 
This sense of place is quite complex in consideration of the 
deep history of colonization 58  implicates New Mexican Hispanics as both 
colonizers and colonized, yielding a complex mixed race identity (e.g., indo-
Hispanic, mestizos, and anglo-Hispanic) that results in interesting paradoxes and 
views about land ownership. These paradoxes partly can be attributed to more 
recent patterns of exploitation exercised since the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo ended the USMexican War and ceded almost one half of Mexico to the 
US, with the Southwest Hispanic colonizers essentially repositioned as the 
colonized. 
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 Northeastern New Mexico was colonized by the French and purchased by US in 1803 while the rest of 
New Mexico was occupied following the US Mexican War. The Spanish occupation of New Mexico swept 
north of the Rio Grande beginning in 1598 decimating approximately 75% of the Pueblos of New Mexico 
over two decades (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). However, in 1680 the New Mexico Pueblos organized a revolution 
with the help of unconquered Navajos, Apaches and Utes, Hopis from the West, and subjugated 
Indigenous and Mestizos in the Spanish capital in Santa Fe. The revolution was successful and they drove 
the Spanish out of New Mexico for 12 years. The Spanish did eventually occupy the land for another 130 
years until Mexico’s independence in 1821. Following independence many Indigenous peoples found 
refuge from United States genocide and relocation in the Republic of Mexico. However, Mexico allowed 
slave owning Anglo-American immigrants to establish plantations which led to conflict when slavery was 
abolished in 1829 ultimately resulting in the secession of the Texas Republic and set forth the US Mexican 
War. By 1848 a large portion of Mexico, including New Mexico, was under US American rule and 
relocation and genocide of Indigenous people increased up to and following the civil war. By the 1890s 
most surviving Indigenous refugees were confined to federal reservations and their children sent to 
boarding schools. However the struggle for Indigenous rights and sovereignty continues in New Mexico 
and in all of America to this day (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). 
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New Mexico is also home to many Latinas/os who (or whose families) immigrated after 1948 
and the influence of both Spanish and US American colonization are prevalent throughout the 
state. Additionally, since 1948 the government has seized community held land from Latina/o 
communities and dispossessed Latino/as of lands along the US-Mexico border (Chen, Milstein, 
Anguiano, Sandoval, & Knudsen, 2012). One begins to see that broad generalizations about the 
values and beliefs of Hispanic peoples even in the specific context of New Mexico are 
impractical. However, attention to the collection of experiences of these peoples is important in 
understanding the formations of individual values and beliefs. 
An example of how “environmental justice59” organizing may look for Hispanic peoples 
in New Mexico illustrates the intersections between individual and collective identities and hints 
at the construction of new collective identities. 
At her first meeting she volunteered and became very involved for many years 
after: 
 
L: So within like 15 minutes I was the vice president and I was like, what is going 
on here? ‘‘And by the way, we are going to have enchiladas you need to go 
home and get all this food.’’ and I was like, whoa! . . . One thing we understood 
is that every time we had an event, there was some kind of celebration; we had 
music; we had food. We understand the way our people think: food and music. 
There was a lot of posole60 that we made. 
 
This participant attributed community activist success to understanding that 
involving people meant having posole, music and community engagement so 
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 Not a label the folks in this study identified with. 
60
 Posole is a traditional Mexican soup made from hominy that is very popular in New Mexico. It is a dish 
that was eaten in pre-colonial Mexico but there is a distinctly New Mexican recipe for posole influenced 
by Spanish and American colonization. 
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that the fight against environmental injustices had a comfortable and familiar 
feeling. The notion of understanding ‘‘our people’’ speaks to an activism that 
recognizes, caters to, and grounds neighborhood organizing in its cultural 
traditions rather than imposing a foreign framework that would not resonate 
with the participants. (Anguiano et al., 2012) 
 
Thus, Anguiano et al. (2012) discussed the importance of not only literally speaking the language 
(e.g., Spanish) but speaking the language of first-hand knowledge of culture and tradition. “The 
larger environmental movement must honor the voices of local communities and acknowledge 
the importance of linking cultural orientations within the larger environmental agenda” 
(Anguiano et al., 2012). Although an educator can never be completely familiar with any culture 
but their own, we must be genuinely interested in and respectful of the people we work with 
and in their language, culture, traditions, and experience, and in working together in solidarity, 
for a better world. 
Additionally, new collective identities can be joined, expanded or formed without 
threatening our existing individual identities. An exemplary case of collective identity is the 
Zapatistas. The iconic image of the Zapatista with black ski mask, Cuban military cap, and red 
bandana is widely recognized around the world. By hiding their personal identities they portray 
themselves as one. As a mestizo, Subcomondante Insurgente Marcos’ lived experience is not 
that of the Indigenous Mayans. As the story goes, Marcos traveled the Chiapas encouraging and 
organizing an uprising informed by Western political theory but was initially unsuccessful 
because he lacked a deep understanding of Indigenous culture (Hayden, 2002). There are many 
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rumors of his identity, education, and background are rampant, but one thing is for sure, 
when he puts on the mask and adornments of the EZLN, he is absorbed into the collective 
identity of the Zapatistas and is neither Indigenous, nor mestizo. Furthermore, Marcos has 
proclaimed that anyone who stands against injustice is a Zapatista61.  In this way, the collective 
identity is not exclusive to Mayan people. While the EZLN retains primarily Mayan leadership 
and attention to Mayan interests in Mexico, it is done in recognition that their local struggle is 
part of a world-wide struggle against oppression.  
Thus, the Zapatistas balance the need for a single collective identity and voice individual 
identities. One can dedicate themselves to a collective identity associated with a social cause 
without sacrificing the individuality. Participants maintain their individual identities and gain a 
collective sense of identity. We need that sense of collective purpose, identity, belonging and 
acceptance, and we need our sense of individuality. We need to reinforce both, through 
education, and emphasize how connected we all are in the collective identities of humanity and 
of life on Earth. 
4.4.3 Hip Hop 
They tell lies in the books 
That you’re readin’ 
It’s knowledge of yourself 
That you’re needin’ 
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 The EZLN remains an organization for and by Indigenous peoples collectively led by the Clandestine 
Revolutionary Indigenous Committee and Marcos was a spokesperson since stepped down so that an in 
order for an Indigenous person to fill that role. However, Marcos remains an active member of the 
collective and has taken the name Galeano in honor of the murdered Zapatista educator. 
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-“Prophets of Rage” (Chuck D & Jah, 1997) 
 
Hip Hop is a prominent American (but not exclusive to America) culture and thus Hip Hip 
must be part of American education. In addition, this approach to Hip Hop (and Hip Hop itself) 
can be applied to the exploration of other cultures and facets of identity. Thus the exploration of 
Hip Hop is intended to illustrate an application of pedagogy of identity.  
Rather than suggesting that educators bring Hip Hop and non-dominant popular and 
traditional cultures into the classroom to engage students and meet learning goals, I suggest 
that culture (i.e., Hip Hop) is already in the classroom and doesn’t need to be assimilated into 
the critical educator’s pedagogy. To say that hip Hop is critical pedagogy or to say that Hip Hop is 
postmodern (cf. Potter, 1995) or for that matter to make such statements about any culture is 
to suggest that they be valued in their relation to the value of dominant academic theories. 
Black history carries the subversive truth that contemporary rationales for 
poverty, ghettoization, and trickle-down economic policy that justify the 
increasing wealth of a few on the backs of a growing black underclass are part 
and parcel of this ongoing capitalistic hegemony, and black arts are the signal 
site for the return of these repressed realities. (Potter, 1995, p.7) 
 
Thus, Hip Hop is already its own critical pedagogy, discourse, and epistemology.  
Coming of age outside of the schoolhouse and as an expression of lived 
curriculum, hip hop resists the images of American national identity presented 
as official school curricula. As lived curriculum, hip hop signifies a site of cultural 
struggle where the politics of race, class, sexuality, gender, place, and 
generation (among other subjectivities) are played out through the discourse of 
power, privilege, and oppression. (Baszile, 2009) 
 
Hip Hop stands on its own as a culture grown within the dominant Western culture and from its 
inception is critically conscious and anti-oppressive. I intend to illustrate the unique and 
independent value of Hip Hop and suggest a synergistic relationship with critical pedagogy.  
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4.4.3.1 Shakespeare v. Tupac 
Utilizing Hip Hop education not just about how teachers can use hiphop products to 
engage students. It’s about what educators and students can learn together from Hip Hop 
culture. Hip Hop is knowledge and movement, facts and feeling, explicit and tacit (KRS-One, 
2009). Education has the hip (i.e., knowledge - but not always the important and culturally 
relevant knowledge) but it doesn’t have the hop (i.e., feeling, movement, action). It’s not action 
oriented, it’s banking oriented (depositing knowledge for economic success).   
Obligatory readings of Shakespeare in high school English classes are not generally 
framed as a way to get students interested in reading, but as the study of important canons of 
English literature. However such are the canons of a dominant and domineering culture that 
does not speak to many youth but to derogate them or enforce their invisibility. The discourse 
of literary canons seems to render traditional culture historic and static and popular culture as 
contemporary and fleeting. What remain as canons are the works that speak to idealized 
notions of timelessness. However, as Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) pointed out popular 
culture has always been a topic of academic inquiry for the academic elite. 
Maybe rather than making Shakespeare relevant by aligning it with modern popular 
culture, we should be studying the canons of the cultures that students affiliate with including 
traditional cultures and contemporary popular cultures. I say we replace (or at least augment) 
Shakespeare with Tupac, if Tupac speaks to our students’ own experience. To do anything else is 
to weaponize literary canons as tools of colonization by enforcing dominant culture and ignoring 
the important and relevant works of non-dominant cultures. As I have already argued the 
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knowledge of and from non-dominate cultures found in such works, provides critique and 
counter-examples to the degradation attributable to dominant Western culture.  
Regardless of idealistic notions of what education should be, educators have a duty to 
balance the important work of facilitating meaningful education with the instruction necessary 
to get them through the gauntlets of the academy such as standardized testing. Duncan-
Andrade and Morell (2007) are teacher-researchers who utilize popular culture in their English 
classes. They wrote: “Regardless of our philosophical foundation, we understood that our 
students existed in a world where they would be expected to take and perform well on 
standardized tests that served as gatekeepers to post-secondary education and, by 
consequence, professional membership” (p.185). I argue that education relevant to students’ 
own experience focused on identity and elements of popular and traditional culture meets 
learning objectives just as pedagogy of hunger does. More importantly pedagogy of identity, as 
explored through the example of Hip Hop, helps students explore their own identity and 
become empowered rather than marginalized by an education that does not render them 
invisible.  
Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) pointed out that in order for students to effectively 
critique power structures and become critically conscious, students must understand the 
language of power and familiarize themselves with the dominant texts. Thus, studying the 
literary canons can be a subversive effort and studying culturally relevant materials could 
provide tools to critique dominant works. However, such a critical reading of dominant texts 
does not prevent students from making connections between these texts and their own lives. In 
fact, part of a rich academic conversation could focus precisely on exploring if/how students 
 
236 
relate to the literary canons62. Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) wrote that they were only 
able to motivate some students to engage with such literature through centralizing a 
commitment to freedom and social change. 
4.4.3.2 Wouldn’t some students inevitably feel left out? 
Pedagogy of identity is about exploring identity together and certainly seeks a pluralistic 
approach to identity. This means questioning Eurocentric dominance in the classroom and 
working to more equitably represent non-dominant cultures. Only dominant, racist ideology 
leads to the suggestion that an exploration of Hip Hop would speak only to those most severely 
marginalized by dominant Western culture and exclude students of privileged identities. 
Everyone has culture, and everyone benefits from exploring their own identity, cultural 
experience, and ethnicity as well as the diverse identities present in the classroom and in 
broader communities. Building such relationships with oneself, one’s culture, and broader 
communities connects and empowers everyone.  
Pedagogy of identity aims to be no more or less relevant for whites than People of 
Color, or heteronormative students than queer students, or any other binary pairing of 
dominant and marginalized identities. Furthermore, through exploring our own identities and 
experiences together, we see that despite very real structural injustices enacted in society, the 
binaries are false. As I have argued throughout this paper, socially constructed realities are real 
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 This could be an excellent Youth-led participatory action research project. In fact, I’ve heard middle 
school students clearly articulate the Eurocentric curriculum in American schools. 
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only in their consequence. Thus, through studying identity in the paradigm of relevant 
culture (and multiple cultures) students can learn to appreciate both the similarities and 
differences in experience associated with identity in their classrooms and their communities and 
challenge binary conceptions of identity and oppressive ideologies63.  
Only dominant Western culture has the privilege of marginalizing and ignoring other 
cultures. As such, considerations of inclusion are not transitive. “When we recognize the 
contingent nature of justice … the impact of identity becomes apparent, and it’s here that 
justice becomes slippery, unstable, and controversial” (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.300). As 
certain culturally-constructed markers of identity are imposed on individuals rather than 
claimed, relations of power are significant in the construction of identity. 
Identity not only defines, but also facilitates certain interactions and power 
relationships. Because of these power differences, justice is not always 
transitive: fair ways for person A to treat person B are not necessarily fair ways 
for person B to treat person A (e.g., boss-subordinate or doctor-patient 
relationships. (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.299) 
 
An example of the intransitivity of justice in its relation to power and culture relates to the very 
real existence of racism and the imaginary existence of reverse-racism64 and affirmative action. 
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 I want to note that while discovering, challenging and resolving conflicts related to strict conceptions of 
identity that one may hold of themselves or others, it is not innately so ‘intense.’ Sometimes it’s just the 
culmination of multiple subtle experiences or a few lyrics from a hiphop track. The big challenges and 
breakthroughs are important, but I want to emphasize pedagogy of restoration is meant to be 
challenging, but also fun and empowering and beautiful. I firmly believe that if it weren’t there would be 
no point.  
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If affirmative action sought to create more opportunities exclusively for white men, that 
would be extremely racist. However, given the continuing history of overt and structural 
discrimination, attempts towards ‘equal opportunity’ that reconcile the imbalances by centering 
people of color are not reverse-racism. 
Similarly, failure of the curriculum of dominant Western culture to speak to young 
People of Color does not reflect prejudice on the part of People of Color in the same way that a 
member of dominant culture may assume that the curriculum of non-dominant culture could 
not speak to them. The first instance represents a failure of dominant culture to speak to people 
whose identities are marginalized65 (rather than a failure to listen), and the second represents a 
failure of dominant listen to speak to people whose identities are marginalized (rather than a 
failure to speak). Failing to listen to someone does not imply that they failed to speak and failure 
to speak to someone does not imply that they haven’t listened. I made the mistake for much of 
my life of thinking that Hip Hop didn't speak for or about me and assuming that it didn't speak to 
me (as an affluent, suburban, white). By making this mistake, I have not grown to appreciate Hip 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
64
 Racism is unilaterally enacted by the dominant group. Spring (2014) provides a very simple definition of 
racism : “prejudice plus power. This definition distinguishes between simple feelings of hostility and 
prejudice toward another racial group and the ability to turn those feelings into some form of 
oppression.” However, both enactors and targets of oppression internalize racist ideology and perpetuate 
it. For a humorous explanation of the distinction between racism and “reverse racism” see Aamer 
Rahman’s routine on reverse racism. http://poetry.rapgenius.com/Aamer-rahman-reverse-racism-
annotated 
65
 Significantly the identities of People of Color are frequently marginalized. However, this failure in 
education does not apply exclusively to People of Color, many identities are institutionally marginalized. 
Additionally, I want to be clear that no one’s identity is innately marginal (see 2.1.1  Oppressor-oppressed 
dichotomy p. 33) 
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Hop until recently. Not only did I rob myself through such prejudice of esthetic pleasure, I 
have missed what could have been an important opportunity to become more critically 
conscious at a younger age.  
When certain elements of a unit on non-dominant popular or traditional culture do not 
seem to speak to a student of privileged identity, there is a significant lesson to be learned 
about equitable redistribution of power. I’ve seen white students so quickly outraged, insulted, 
and felt as if they had been excluded when a single lecture (or discussion) did not feel like it was 
about them or relevant to their experience. However, the other 23 hours of their day are exactly 
about them and center their experiences and identities. Such a shift in power is not oppression, 
it is not reverse racism, it is justice. Beyond the initial shock that justice may be for whites, such 
inclusion has no cause to threaten whites’ identities, but rather, it should enhance everyone’s 
sense of identity.  
If at some point Hip Hop spoke primarily to Black youth, it has certainly grown in its 
appeal to youth worldwide. Maybe in part because Hip Hip so often speaks to the urban 
experience, power, and real life struggle. That said, any pedagogy of identity, including Hip Hop 
has to be founded in popular education and led by those who identify with the culture being 
explored. I have no right, and neither am I capable to choose the important works of Hip Hop for 
study because I am not Hip Hop. I’ve grown to enjoy it, but I am not it. This is a line that would 
be crossed with much insult in the exploration of any lived experience. One can be 
knowledgeable, respectful, and appreciative of an identity but never entitled to any lived 
experience but their own. This doesn’t mean that an educator, such as myself, should shirk their 
duty as an educator to develop curriculum and search for works that their students may connect 
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with. The educator must be a co-learner and the students must be co-teachers. As 
experienced scholars, educators also have the opportunity model their own learning process. In 
this way not only the content of Hip Hop, but the approach to studying Hip Hop facilitates 
redistribution of power in the classroom by empowering those who Hip Hop speaks most 
profoundly to (often students more frequently disempowered by standard curriculum).  
4.4.3.3 The educators role 
This approach can develop rich, robust questions and understandings about 
specific groups, their histories, and their traditions. However, if the topic of a 
certain cultural group is approached merely as “adding color” to the curriculum, 
teachers run the risk of stumbling into any one of a number of pitfalls that run 
counter to the critical multicultural approach. … “Such pitfalls include 
perpetuating stereotypes by painting a group of people with a broad brush; 
“exoticizing” the “other” through a shallow “tourist” approach; or, even more 
damaging, developing new pigeonholes by reinforcing a limited understanding 
of the experiences of a group of people” (Bode, 2012, p.343). 
 
The duty of the educator is to come to the students and begin the process “using a 
problem-posing approach and constructing curriculum with students on topics that both 
teachers and students want to explore” to create “an authentic learning experience” (Bode, 
2012, p. 343). This means that an exploration of Hip Hop must focus on the works that are 
relevant and meaningful to students. In such a learning collaboration new meanings and 
connections are formed and emergent paths of inquiry may be followed. As the learning 
community explores the materials together and makes connections to their own cultures, 
opportunities would arise to expand horizons through exploring those connections.  
It is also the obligation of a teacher to share their own passions with students and to 
reciprocate the students’ contributions of meaningful pieces relevant to their own experiences 
within or beyond Hip Hop. In that way, a committed educator has no cause to shy away from an 
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exploration of Hip Hop with their students for lack of expertise in Hip Hop. In fact, “when the 
teachers announce their own curiosity and model their own struggle with ignorance, students 
are empowered to ask previously hushed questions and uncover misconceptions” (Bode, 2012, 
p. 344). However, Bode (2012) certainly did not suggest that such an inquiry process relieves an 
educator of their obligation to prepare for class. In my own experience guiding student inquiry, I 
have found that it takes significantly more preparation than teaching a standard curriculum.  
4.4.3.4 Praxis 
 This is not a theoretical idea, Hip Hop has been successfully brought into the classroom 
by educators such as Duncan-Andrade and Morell. Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) are not 
writing theory, they are writing praxis based on their own classroom experience and research. 
One fantastic unit focused on reading lyrics, books and magazines associated with Hip Hop and 
popular culture along with classical works (Duncan-Andrade & Morell, 2007). The unit focused 
on language comprehension, critical analysis, and prominent cultural issues. Again learning 
objectives were met and students were empowered. In the course of studying popular culture 
and current events, race and racism, power, and justice, emerged as dominant themes. Students 
became involved in working towards change in their schools and communities. At the 
culmination of this unit the students initiated a school magazine project which included articles, 
poems, and drawings focused on the social conditions of their school. They even interviewed 
local politicians (Duncan-Andrade & Morell, 2007). 
As with hunger as explored in pedagogy of basic needs, I use Hip Hop as an example of 
engaging students with culturally relevant materials, but I do not suggest that Hip Hop is the 
best or only way to do that. A practice inspired by pedagogy of identity could just as well center 
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punk rock, world music, visual arts (from street art to ‘fine’ art), performance, film, popular 
culture or traditional culture. Likely, exploring identity and engaging in activities that connect 
with students sense of identity or cultural studies designed to inspire a sense of connection with 
other world cultures, would engage students with a variety of topics.  
The sense of connection to and appreciation of cultures, identities, and experiences 
beyond one’s own allow one to see a larger, more complex, and nuanced world where one can 
begin to develop a sense of community and sense of place locally and globally. As culture shapes 
the environment (especially urban) and the environment shapes culture, the process of 
exploring culture and identity has the potential of enlightening our ways of being in the world. 
At the very least, gaining an appreciation for the culture in our communities likely influences 
how one values their community. I posit that developing one’s self concept through explorations 
of identity, culture, and connectivity fosters engagement and thus contributes to the project of 
restoration, in part, by establishing the foundations for one’s sense of purpose. 
4.5 Pedagogy of Purpose 
A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he [sic] 
is to be ultimately happy. (Maslow, 1943) 
 
This section identifies the importance of purpose as an element of restoration and 
considers how educators can help students seek purpose. The section begins with an 
exploration of what purpose is and why a sense of purpose is important. Next I suggest that 
purpose is not the profound and noble pursuit of the highly enlightened, but often a more 
grounded and humble commitment anything one finds meaningful. The following section 
explores how we develop a sense of purpose and how educators can support students on their 
path to purpose. The section concludes with a consideration of the positive youth development 
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approach which ultimately circles back to pedagogy of basic needs establishing a synergy 
among the elements of pedagogy for restoration. 
 “Purpose is a stable and generalized intention to accomplish something that is at the 
same time meaningful to the self and consequential to the world beyond the self” (Damon, 
2009, p. 33). It is a source of resilience and it provides a sense of meaning, a source of 
motivation, and contributes to one’s identity. Additionally when students see purpose in their 
education or how their education supports their own sense of purpose, they will be more 
invested in learning. In this way, students will be better equipped to overcome barriers to their 
success. For example, if a student feels that a high school diploma will help them achieve their 
goal, they may be more motivated to get through classes that do not appear to directly serve 
their purpose or speak to their experience. However, we need to be helping students see 
purpose in all of their education, as discussed in pedagogy of identity, we have to help kids get 
through the gauntlets as long as the gauntlets exist66. Despite often lacking clear attention to 
student identity and purpose, many core subject areas do importantly serve students purpose 
later in life. Mathematics may be a common example. Mathematics can certainly be taught it a 
                                                          
 
66
 I want to be clear about my position on the gauntlets and the oppression perpetuated in schools: public 
education, can, will, and does happen with or without schools (cf. Illich, 1970/2011). As outlined by Illich 
(1970/2011) in a society that values children and education above all, schools would be unnecessary. 
However, I want to make it clear that I am absolutely and unquestionably a proponent of public 
education. I see all of the elements of pedagogy for restoration as both radical and pragmatic. In other 
words all of the suggestions that I have made are possible within existing public schools or as an 
addendum to the process through community efforts such as after-school programs. Unquestionably, my 
dream is to establish a fully democratic public education system free from the problematic structures of 
the existing public education system, but until that is possible, I think we have no choice but to work 
within the existing systems.  
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way that is relevant to students lives and serves important purpose, but many students 
dislike math precisely because they struggle with the topic and are not motivated to overcome 
their struggle by a clear understanding of the importance of mathematics.  
The fundamental need for purpose was something Kurt Hahn (1960) sought to fulfill by 
creating a moral equivalent to war (Hahn, 1960). In a speech to the Outward Bound Trust, Hahn 
(1960) said ”[William] James hated war but he admits that war satisfies a primitive longing of 
men [sic] which will never be extinguished, to lose yourself in a common cause, which claims the 
whole man [sic]” (Hahn, 1960). Hahn (1960) was inspired by his perception of despondency 
among youth at the time, which he attributed to the lack of a “moral equivalent to war.” This is 
little more than a poetic sentiment and Hahn’s work far surpasses any equivalency with war. 
Hahn (1960) suggested that 
there are three ways of trying to win the young. There is persuasion, there is 
compulsion and there is attraction. You can preach at them, that is a hook 
without a worm; you can say “You must volunteer,” that is of the devil; and you 
can tell them, “You are needed.” That appeal hardly ever fails. (Hahn, 1960) 
 
Thus, through Outward Bound, Hahn (1960) appealed to young people’s duty to serve. Outward 
Bound provided young people with a sense of belonging and purpose through emphasis on 
fitness, expedition, projects (especially service projects) and rescue services (e.g., search and 
rescue). 
Hahn (1960) shared an inspiring story of a boy who found purpose: 
There was a wild and ruthless boy. I received daily deputations urging me that I 
should get rid of him. But I hesitated, wondering whether his undefeatable spirit 
could not be directed towards worthwhile aims. I persuaded him to join the 
agricultural guild. One day he came to me in great excitement and said, “Mr. 
Hahn, something terrible has happened. They want to kill our cow because she 
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has swallowed a piece of wire. Now I know from my father, who is a doctor, that 
in such cases you can operate on humans, and a cow is a much tougher animal 
than a man or woman. May I find a vet who will operate?” In my stupidity, I said 
to him, “Well, if you find a Vet, who will operate on this cow, she shall live." He 
disappeared for twenty-four hours, then came back with a Vet who lived 30 
miles away. His coming cost more than the cow. I shall never forget what 
happened then. I was in bed at that time with a broken leg, and the stable was 
200 yards away – suddenly I heard a cry. It was the cry of a savage, but it was 
not the cry of fear, it was the cry of jubilant mercy. What had happened? The 
boy had been allowed to assist at the operation; he had poured much iodine 
into the wound made by the surgeon's knife. The arm of the vet, buried in the 
recesses of the cow had extracted the piece of wire from near the heart. When 
he held it up the boy emitted that triumphant cry which I had heard. He has 
since become a distinguished surgeon. 
 
When students find meaning and purpose, regardless of what that meaning and purpose is, they 
engage with life in a way that is constructive and creative rather than destructive and they 
contribute the project of restoration rather than degradation67.  
Regardless of how and where each individual takes their passion, when humans find 
purpose and dedicate themselves to it, the environment (social and ecological) will take care of 
itself. When people are engaged and passionate about any prosocial or pro-environmental 
cause it potentially benefits all causes by uplifting everyone (see 3.2.1 Prosocial motivation 
p.62). Furthermore when someone engages at any level of our collective identities (e.g., family, 
community, nation, or planet) they will inevitably intersect with other engaged individuals who 
are active in other levels of the collective. In this way, all restorative efforts are interconnected 
                                                          
 
67
 Antisocial purposes also exist both in the context of ‘evil’ and complicity with social injustice. Certainly 
Manifest Destiny provided a sense of purpose to American settlers. This is certainly worthy of further 
exploration in light of human morality, but I will not be dipping back into deviance or outlying behavior in 
this discussion. Damon (2009) provides some exploration of deviant purpose. 
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and synergistic and contribute to the broader project of restoration. If everyone is engaged 
in doing something to benefit life, regardless of what it is, we will see positive large scale 
change. For that reason, pedagogy of purpose is about helping people to find their own sense of 
purpose rather than advocating any specific cause. Pedagogy of basic needs and pedagogy of 
identity are both aimed at helping people reach an emotional and physical place (near the top of 
Maslow’s hierarchy) where they may discover purpose. Both Pedagogy of basic needs and 
pedagogy of identity already facilitate the development of purpose (e.g., helping others meet 
their basic needs).  
4.5.1 Purposes of grandeur 
Purpose does not have to be grandiose. Damon (2009) shared a story about the 
manager of a fast food restaurant who took pride and found purpose in that work. Although one 
could just as easily succumb to prevalent cultural notions of such a position as a meaningless, 
short-term, low wage job, the manager saw purpose and meaning in treating each transaction 
as an opportunity to make people smile. The manager felt that anything that they could do, 
however small to make a customer’s day better mattered. This sentiment rubbed off on the 
young adults working there as well, and the entire staff became engaged in the meaningful 
effort to make restaurant patrons happy. Rather than a meaningless short term job, the young 
employees found a sense of purpose and a source of pride in their work. Damon (2009) 
suggested that the manager’s employees were not only positively influenced at work, but 
through the experience at the restaurant, their personal lives benefitted. 
The manager’s sense of purpose was likely independent of their job and they would 
probably find a way to positively influence people’s lives in any position. The manager seemed 
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to have aligned the position with what was almost certainly a previously existing desire to 
positively affect others (beyond any mandate of customer service professionalism). One may 
suggest, that such purpose within certain structures perpetuates degradation. Certainly the fast 
food industry is a significant producer of environmental and social degradation. A neoliberal 
ideologue might even suggest that the manager and restaurant patrons are complicit in such 
degradation (if such degradation were to be acknowledged). I see this as a conflation distinctly 
separate processes. The manager clearly works, as we all do, within a problematic structure. 
Who is to say that such a positive and genuine person (as the restaurant manager was 
described to be) would have more or less influence in any other career? In fact, as illustrated by 
the story of the manager’s story and certainly millions of individuals working in service 
industries, one can have a profound impact on the others in many careers68. Education certainly 
provides opportunity to encourage commitment to prosocial and pro-ecological causes and 
there is a strong tradition of such efforts in liberal arts. However, formal education is not the 
only way to find meaningful, prosocial or pro-environmental purpose. We need restaurant 
managers, gas station attendants, and construction workers, dedicated to a better world 
(including ecological and social causes) just as much as we need teachers, academics, and 
politicians. We also need to be more consistently collaborating across such professional divides. 
We need everyone to engage everywhere. 
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 Additionally, such direct social interaction is not the only way positive contributions are made to 
society. Our entire society rests on the shoulders of those working in service industries. Our lives and 
dedication to ‘higher’ purposes are made possible by millions of people who to ensure that we are able to 
do things like buy food in the grocery store. 
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4.5.1.1 Career vs. calling and higher education 
Damon (2009) described a sense of calling as a realistic awareness of one’s own ability, 
an interest in how those abilities can be used in service of meeting the needs of one’s 
community (at any level from family to planet) and a feeling of enjoyment associated with using 
one’s abilities to meet those needs. One’s career and one’s calling can be fully aligned or 
entirely independent (potentially even at odds).  Furthermore, one’s career is not their entire 
life. Education needs to holistically focus on helping people live a good and meaningful life not 
just on career preparation. We place too high an emphasis on economic preparation in schools 
and by so heavily emphasizing the necessity of college, we derogate those who choose not (or 
are unable) to attend college. This belittles the important and necessary work that the majority 
of people do which does not require a college education. We need to be working to make it 
possible for everyone (who wants to) to attend college without devaluing those who do not 
attend college. Furthermore, if we concentrate all those who are purposeful and motivated to 
make the world a better place in careers that are most frequently recognized as helping 
professions (e.g., medicine, education, and social work) we diminish the reach of social efforts. 
We risk losing great and important teachers such as the fast food manager who reach folks that 
classroom teachers may not. Many of the teachers who have been influential in my own life 
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have been those I encountered in retail, factory, and warehouses jobs that I worked before 
attending college69.   
4.5.2 Development of purpose 
Purpose isn’t just about what someone finds their purpose to be but also why it matters, 
why they care, and how they intend to achieve such a goal. Educators must be careful to focus 
on and support young people’s own goals rather than our goals for them. Educators cannot 
become passive or complacent, though. Instead we should encourage and guide students in the 
search for purpose. We need to help students develop and work towards their goals and offer 
our opinions, perspectives and direction (how) and help them to clarify their own values and 
interests (why). We need to help students explore their interests through volunteer 
opportunities with established organizations and through helping them design and implement 
their own projects. We should also connect them with positive role models and mentors in the 
community who can offer different perspectives, opportunities, and show students what the 
work really looks like.  
4.5.2.1 Exploration 
Although purpose is stable over some period of time, it is subject to change (Damon, 
2009). It may be that someone’s purpose is focused on accomplishing a specific goal and upon 
                                                          
 
69
 The point is that great educators (or otherwise positively influential people) are found in all facets of life 
and that attempts to concentrate such people into specific fields would diminish opportunities for 
education. I hope that it is implicit, but I will make explicit the fact that I also recognize and appreciate the 
profound and important role of all of the formal educators in my life from elementary school to 
community college to graduate school.   
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completion they will set a new goal (e.g., raising $1000 for a local food bank) that may or 
may not share a general thematic purpose (e.g., fighting hunger). For others purpose may be a 
lifelong ambition. Damon (2009) emphasized the long term benefits of a life of purpose, but 
shared many stories of how short term, specific goals have led to life-long purpose. Educators 
must support students in their efforts to find purpose whether it is through exploration and 
short term efforts or more focused guidance in the direction of an already developed interest. 
Explorations and short term efforts should be encouraged and reflected on in order to 
determine whether and how the student might explore that cause further or investigate a 
different interest.  
Even when students become engaged with a particular pursuit, we must remain open 
and sympathetic to the fact that interests, passions, and purpose are not static and may shift. 
We need to help students stay on track to a certain extent but be prepared and willing to 
explore new directions with students. We should encourage and support students not to give up 
when they encounter barriers or abandon a cause when an initial surge of passion wanes in 
pursuit of some fleeting interest. However, even fleeting interests are worthy of exploration and 
through such exploration students may discover deeper interests or common themes among 
their interests and develop or clarify their sense of purpose. Additionally, this is not to suggest 
that we should expect every student at any grade level to discover profound long term purpose 
– that is a lifelong pursuit. Our aim should be to help students on to a path to purpose and help 
them develop tools to discover and develop it. 
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As Damon (2009) suggested, educators must “listen carefully for the spark and then 
fan the flames.” We must allow students to discover their own sense of purpose while 
supporting them in the process. What is inadmissible is for educators to take students’ power 
from them by too eagerly grabbing the wheel in attempt to support their efforts. The balance is 
one between showing support by being involved, attentive, and engaged and becoming 
domineering through the same behaviors (Damon, 2009). Continuing Damon’s (2009) metaphor, 
we must be very carefully that we don’t smother the spark in our effort to support students. 
One way that we extinguish the flame is by focusing too heavily on achievement. Achievement is 
not equal to purpose. Damon (2009) suggested that it is not the achievement that is a source of 
joy but the long and sustained effort towards a meaningful aim. Achievements are little more 
than checkpoints along the way and dedicating oneself to a purpose is about more than 
personal achievement. Such economic goals of personal achievement often emphasized in 
schools are short sighted and unconducive to deep contemplation of meaningful lifelong 
purpose (Damon, 2009). In fact, by suggesting that such purposeful or purpose building efforts 
as community service primarily serve the student as a measure of academic (or extracurricular) 
achievement and as a means for economic (or other personal) success (e.g., getting into college) 
we undermine the true benefits of service. Such extrinsic motivation may sap intrinsic 
motivation. By shifting a young person’s budding sense of duty from a truly altruistic effort into 
a discrete, one-time effort, focused on their personal gain, we rob them of what may develop 
into a lifelong source of meaning and fulfillment.  
4.5.2.2 Supporting purpose 
As explored by Jackson (1993) everything that we say and do (or don’t say and don’t do) 
around young people matters. Students often don’t realize how deeply educators care about 
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them and their success and teachers should explicitly discuss their own sense of passion, 
pride, and purpose in teaching70 (Damon, 2009). By sharing our purpose, we build the student-
teacher relationship, support our students, and inspire their own senses of purpose. However, 
supporting kids on a path to purpose is more than uncritically or disingenuously encouraging 
them. Students know (even if not explicitly) when adults in their lives do not genuinely believe in 
them and support them. We can’t idly promise that they’ll achieve all of their hopes and dreams 
(cf. Duncan-Andrade, 2009 on hokey hope and mythical hope). We have to genuinely know that 
students can accomplish their dreams while at the same time being honest and critical with 
them and avoiding meaningless platitudes.  
The nature of the relationship between teacher and student significantly affects 
performance. Even measures of IQ, which are largely considered to be static have been long 
known to vary according to the effect of the demeanor of the examiner on the emotional state 
of the test subject. Subjects who are treated more warmly by the examiner or have a previous 
relationship with the examiner score higher on IQ tests71 (Sacks, 1952). Sacks (1952) also 
discussed a 1936 study finding that African American children scored lower when tested by 
white examiners than when tested by African American examiners and that the opposite was 
true for white children.  
                                                          
 
70
 One who cannot genuinely express such a sentiment may need to reassess their own sense of purpose 
as an educator. 
71
 Although this example is intended to highlight the importance of the student teacher relationship, other 
considerations of education bias on intelligence tests and cultural bias on standardized tests shouldn’t be 
ignored. 
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Teachers expectations for a student become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Rosenthal & 
Jacobson, 1968). Rosenthal (1968) informed teachers that certain randomly selected students 
were ‘growth spurters’ who were expected to be more successful in class based on a fictitious 
Harvard Test of Inflected Acquisition. Those students displayed greater intellectual growth than 
the control students (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). The implications and validity of this study 
are hotly debated, however, it importantly raises the issue that despite our intentions, our 
expectations of our students almost certainly influence them. Rosenthal (1987) summarized the 
implications of this research by saying, 
When our children were in school we didn't want them taught by teachers who 
"knew" they couldn't learn. Now that our children are grown, we don't want our 
grandchildren taught by teachers who "know" they can't learn. Sometimes 
assigning some Bayesian priors seems simply prudent.  
 (Rosenthal, 1987) 
 
Rosenthal (1987) is suggesting that even if one challenges the statistical validity of the finding, 
we accept that teacher expectations have some subjective or uncertain but certainly 
undesirable influence on students.  
Damon (2009) described how low expectations can become developmentally formative. 
For example, when a dream is deferred, one may interpret it as a personal failure which could 
lead to feelings of inadequacy that may influence one to defer or decline future dreams and 
ultimately result in hopelessness and self-defeat (Damon, 2009). It boils down to the old cliché, 
whether you think you can, or think you can’t, you’re right. Educators have a significant 
opportunity to positively intervene in this cycle. We have to maintain high expectations for our 
students and encourage them to have high expectations of themselves. Instead of deferring 
dreams, lowering expectations, and losing hope, we should encourage students to follow the 
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wise mantra of The Little Engine That Could which has propelled me to the top of many 
mountains: “I think I can. I think I can. I think I can… I thought I could.”  
4.5.2.3 Critical hope 
“Children can survive – and thrive- in the hardest of circumstances. The children most 
likely to thrive are those who move towards positive goals without letting hardships deter 
them” (Damon, 2009, p. 171). As educators, we must help students avoid catastrophic thinking, 
defeatism, panic and blame. We must focus instead on what control we do have. We need to 
help students gain the confidence to change the world (even in the smallest of ways).  
The concept of critical hope as introduced in section 1.1 Positive Approach (p.15) is a 
composition of two distinct processes: (1) “critical social analysis of inequities and actions taken 
to achieve greater social justice” and (2) “a sense of personal efficacy or perceived capacity to 
effect change” (Christens et al., 2013). The goal is to achieve both. 
The achievement of critical consciousness … requires people to attain an 
understanding of structural and historical forces that impinge on and constrain 
collective action for social justice, yet to simultaneously maintain their hope 
that—despite these forces—their own participation in justice-focused action 
can be effective. (Christens et al., 2013) 
 
Christens et al. (2013) identified four clusters of students based on the relation between their 
social critique and sense of hope and efficacy: critical and hopeful, critical and alienated, 
uncritical and hopeful, and uncritical and alienated. The conceptualization of these four clusters 
may offer some insight useful to our teaching practice. As mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis, it is likely (but contested) that humans are more motivated by a greater emphasis on 
positive solutions than identifying problems. However, differential emphasis on problems and 
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solutions may be effective based on one’s assessment of a student in consideration of the 
four clusters. 
Positive psychology is important for everyone, and a balance must be maintained. In 
order for youth to find purpose they must be encouraged to think positively in order to believe 
that they could have any effect towards their purpose. However, it seems likely that those who 
are critical and alienated would benefit from a greater focus on positive solutions and less focus 
on identifying problems. But a different understanding of the problems may be more conducive 
to hope. While those who are extremely hopeful but uncritical may need to focus more heavily 
on critique in order to direct their hope toward solving real problems.  
4.5.3 Positive youth development 
Beyond positive expectations and critical hope we need to broadly consider the way 
children are viewed in Western society. Damon (2009) suggested that we have a “tendency to 
perceive children as fragile and inept creatures, who need constant protection from the 
ordinary challenges of everyday living” (p.170). Damon (2009) suggested that “it is one thing to 
warn children about dangers of the playing in traffic, and another thing entirely to prohibit 
activities that, in all but freak incidents lead to little more than bumps and bruises" and asked, 
“what kinds of messages are such prohibitions sending to children about what they are able to 
handle” (p.169).  
As already explored (4.3.3.2 A case for educational action p.212) young people, “if given 
the opportunity, can become … active participants, and powerful agents of social change” 
(Nygreen et al., 2006, p. 108). Therefore we shouldn’t infantilize children by protecting them 
from failure or from unpleasant realities, preventing them from taking risks, or declining to 
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assign them responsibilities. Because if we fail to treat young people as capable human 
beings, we engage in the self-fulfilling prophecies that Rosenthal (1968) identified. 
The positive youth development approach embraces risk and opportunity and 
emphasizes the manifestation of the youth’s assets and potential over their (externally and 
internally) perceived deficits (Damon, 2009). “The positive youth approach aims at 
understanding, educating, and engaging children in productive activities rather than correcting, 
curing, or treating them for maladaptive tendencies or so called disabilities” (Damon, 2009, 
p.168). In accordance with such an approach, opportunities need to be facilitated in such a way 
that youth are inspired to become involved and initiate their own projects with an authentic 
sense of purpose rather than pushed into predetermined activities. Positive youth development 
mandates youth-led participatory action research. Thus, pedagogy of restoration comes full 
circle. Moral education and the three elements of pedagogy of restoration (pedagogy of basic 
needs, pedagogy of identity and pedagogy of purpose) complement and reinforce one another. I 
have proposed that it has to start with meeting basic needs, but beyond that restoration is not a 
linear process. We find purpose in meeting our basic needs, we develop our identity in seeking 
purpose, etc. 
Finally, purpose is not a strictly individualistic concept. It has been primarily explored as 
such   because pedagogy of restoration has been primarily conceptualized as an approach 
focused on the whole child. However, the section began with Kurt Hahn’s (1960) speech as an 
illustration that purpose is often about being part of something larger. In fact, just as suggested 
in pedagogy of identity that we can form new group identities without sacrificing individual 
identities, we can forge group purposes that may be composed of many differing individual 
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senses of purpose. Although I reject Hahn’s (1960) thesis of a moral equivalent to war, he 
was correct in identifying the value of finding a common cause and devoting oneself to it 
entirely. We do occasionally see this when as communities respond to natural disasters. As 
climate change becomes a more salient and life threatening issue in a greater portion of the 
world, my hope is that rather than chaos we will pull together for the common cause of 
sustaining life on Earth.  
4.6 Tie back to EE 
When we honor the hidden aquifer that feeds human knowing, we are more 
likely to develop capacity for awe, wonder, and humility that deepens rather 
than diminishes our knowledge. (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 22) 
 
 
This section reconnects with the introduction of this work proposing that the project of 
restoration is, in fact, a restoration of EE, congruent with its historic dictate (i.e., Belgrade 
Charter and Tbilisi Declaration). Throughout this work I have focused on the broad process of 
education maintained that all education is environmental education. However, in this section I 
examine the specific field of environmental education. I begin by exploring a few significant 
themes in EE which can and should inform traditional education and the project of restoration. 
In the end of this section I make recommendations to the field of EE informed by pedagogy of 
restoration. 
4.6.1 Beauty and wonder 
Our consciousness must be neither poetry nor science, but a transcendence of 
both into a new realm of theory and practice, an artfulness that combines fancy 
with reason, imagination with logic, vision with technique. (Bookchin, 1982, 
p.20) 
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We need bread but we need roses, too. All too often, it seems that bread and roses 
are assigned to different disciplines. Environmental education, more than traditional education, 
maintains an emphasis on esthetic. Rachel Carson and more recently David Sobel (both 
following a long tradition of nature writers) emphasize a connection to nature rooted in 
something deeper than understanding. Both Carson and Sobel have sought to foster a sense of 
wonder that is not explicit to pristine wilderness, but experienced in one’s own community. In 
my interpretation this approach is fundamentally one where love for life encourages wonder 
fuels their imagination. Certainly educators in all fields should help students experience nature 
and wonder, but wonder and nature are everywhere.  
I’ll share a brief story about how I came to love chemistry. I’ve always been intimidated 
by chemistry. I never learned it in high school and in college, even at the introductory level; I 
was utterly lost within the first week of class. In fact, in high school, community college and 
university I have enrolled in chemistry classes and quit within a week or two. That all changed 
because of one wonderful/wondrous chemistry professor. In this course, we distilled brandy 
from wine, generated electricity through chemical reactions, and made explosives. The 
professor seemed, at all times (and especially in the lab) to be grinning and barely able to 
control their laughter. In fact, my lab partner and I once boiled over a beaker of who-knows-
what onto a hot-plate and filled the lab with terrible fumes. The entire lab had to evacuate and 
our professor laughed and laughed, and never showed any sign of anger or frustration.  
It was not this single experience, but the consistent demeanor of my professor that 
shifted my perception of chemistry from a discipline of strict rules that I was intimidated by, to a 
vast source of wonder, curiosity and excitement. Furthermore, I was no longer terrified of 
 
259 
making a mistake. One time I overheard this professor say to a colleague, “it’s still magic, 
isn’t it?” It has always stuck with me that an experienced chemist with such expansive 
knowledge of chemistry still felt a sense of wonder even when overseeing mundane lab 
exercises. I think that is clearly the secret of education. If we maintain our own sense of wonder 
and love of knowledge, we inspire it in students.  
The best lessons that I have shared have always been in situations where I was not 
formally the teacher, but a student or friend, and always as an equal. Such lessons have taken 
place when a learner has displayed an interest or started making inquiries about a particular 
topic (that I happen to be passionate about) on their own. I’ve found my role is more often to 
quietly watch and support a student while they share their wonder and explain their discovery. 
Sometimes I may ask leading questions or provide some additional information and based on 
their interests and suggest related areas of exploration that may be of interest. However, I don’t 
want to demystify the world. I don’t want to diminish the magic of learning to satisfy my own 
joy of teaching. Sometimes explicit knowledge can be a barrier to tacit knowledge whether that 
knowledge is about the natural environment or part of a moral induction.  
I’ve often made the mistake of so enthusiastically sharing my explicit knowledge about a 
particular plant, rock, or animal a child is observing that their own process of inquiry and sense 
of wonder are diminished. I consider this to be selfish teaching. Selfish teaching satisfies the 
educator’s love of teaching at the expense of the student’s passion for learning. I’ve frequently 
made the mistake of approaching a young person showing interest in a rock launching into a 
lecture on that particular rock (e.g., “This rock is called granite, it formed deep below the earth’s 
surface as magma cooled and hardened. All of the different colored specs are called minerals 
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and the slower the rock cools the larger they can grow… and on I go). In these cases, I 
generally talk until the kid loses interest and moves on to something else, probably not daring to 
let me catch them pick up another rock. A quartz crystal can be a magical, valuable treasure if 
there’s not a geologist around to spoil it (not that we inevitably spoil it). When we are so quick 
to name, define, and discipline knowledge, we destroy wonder. The joy of learning is in feeling 
wonder, making inquiries, and creating meaning.  
 The natural sense of wonder experienced in nature may be the most powerful and 
meaningful element of environmental education. Both in nature and in the classroom sharing 
our sense of wonder and helping students explore their own is important.  Whether in nature or 
a classroom we should attend to the lessons that are naturally present and waiting to be 
learned. We often refer to such lessons as teachable moments, but I think they’d more aptly be 
called natural lessons. A mentor once said to me that as environmental educators, we are not 
the teachers. The Western Red Cedar, the Sword Fern, the deer, and all the other plants and 
animals are natural teachers. Our only job is to help students meet them and learn their lessons. 
Certainly this is an underemphasized way of learning that relates to all of education. Certainly 
such natural lessons are present in the classroom as well as in nature. 
4.6.2 Systems approach and specific ecological knowledge 
EE generally emphasizes a holistic and systems thinking approach to the natural 
environment compared to the emphasis in fields like biology on a narrow segment of the natural 
world. The sort of molecular and atomic thinking which is often prevalent in scientific research 
must be integrated with a broader, holistic and observational understanding of ecosystems. This 
is illustrated by recent developments in wilderness management efforts tending towards 
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adaptive management practices in consideration of trophic cascades (Eisenberg, 2011). The 
adaptive management approach relies on both scientific knowledge and careful observation of 
ecosystems with a focus on the interdependence of diverse species and abiotic elements72.  
In environmental education, we generally emphasize the basic ecological knowledge 
necessary to understand the natural world as a system of interdependent processes. The 
systems approach facilitates both explicit knowledge and tacit understanding that ecosystems 
are interconnected and important and likely motivates to a greater degree than specific 
ecological knowledge does. A key application of the moral research is that some specific 
ecological knowledge is beneficial to building environmental ethics, but it’s probably not the 
most significant motivator for pro-environmental behavior. Environmental education programs 
generally do aim to facilitate experiences beyond the basic ecology lessons of their curricula 
focused on helping students connect with and grow to love the natural environment. However, 
environmental education must extend its systems thinking approach to more significantly 
include the ecosystems and social-systems students live in. 
4.6.3 Sense of Place 
Sense of place is not exclusive to environmental education, however environmental 
education places a high emphasis on sense of place which may inform other educational 
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 Indigenous peoples in America have understood and practiced their own form of adaptive management 
for thousands of years. However, management may not be the most appropriate term for the relationship 
between the Indigenous peoples and the land. Native peoples didn’t make the same distinction as 
Europeans between wild and domestic. Nevertheless, there was likely no wild/unmanaged land in what is 
not US by the time European settlers arrived.  (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). 
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practice. Here, I explore what sense of place is, how it motivates people, and how sense of 
place may develop. Finally, I suggest that EE should avoid a greater emphasis on the value of 
natural places (i.e., pristine nature) than the places where participants live.  
4.6.3.1 Definitions 
Sense of place can be conceptualized as a composition of our attachment to place and 
the meaning we associate with place. Place attachment refers to our emotional connection to 
place and relates to our dependence on place and the relationship between identity and place 
(Kudryavtsev, Stedman, & Krasny, 2011). We may depend on a place as a setting for certain 
activities or as a means or as a means of survival. We may identify with place such that a specific 
place becomes part of our self-concept. The meaning that we associate with place “is a 
multidimensional construct and may reflect an individual’s environment, social interactions, 
culture, politics, economics, and esthetic perspectives,… a mix of reinforcing or contradictory 
personal experiences, … as well as history of places” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238). 
Individuals construct their own meanings of place and such meanings differ among individuals 
and peoples inhabiting the same place. 
As an illustration, one person may think of the Bronx in New York City as the 
birthplace of hip-hop culture, low-income housing projects, and his [sic] close 
friends, while another person may hold different place meanings for the Bronx 
such as her73 [sic] community garden, the wildlife in waterways, environmental 
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 See footnote 47 on page 224  for a discussion on use of alternating pronouns. Here, I will simply raise 
the question: What implications is this quote making about gender roles and social expectations of 
women, men, and non-binary or trans gender identities? 
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injustice, and her community-based organization. (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 
232)  
 
 Attachments to and meaning of place are not always positive and aspects of place may 
conflict with one’s self conception or their ability to meet their needs. For example, “collective 
memories of slavery and sharecropping may negatively influence African Americans’ place 
attachment to wildland recreation areas … and parks” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238). 
Similarly, many Indigenous peoples’ sense of place reflects deep meaning of and affiliation with 
place central to their identity and culture. However, the recent history of colonization of 
America and attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples (cf. Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014) likely 
influences Indigenous peoples’ place affiliation and meaning. Immigrant, refugee, and diasporic 
peoples may also experience significant conflict regarding sense of place. The bilingual children’s 
book Recuerdo mis raíces y vivo mis tradiciones / Remembering My Roots and Living My 
Traditions (a fantastic result of a youth-led participatory action research project (Nygreen et al., 
2006)) discussed the experience of youth who have homes in US and in Mexico. In the end of 
the story, a child reflects on leaving their family’s rancho in Mexico to return to US and says to 
their sibling:  “you were crying and saying, ‘I don’t want to go, but I don’t want to stay’” (TNL, 
2003, p. 26). The lesson is that we have meaningful and conflicted connections to place and 
sometimes to many places,    Similarly, sense of place among other diasporic and Indigenous 
peoples  
4.6.3.2 Fostering sense of place 
Numerous studies have correlated sense of place and pro-environmental behavior 
related to preservation and stewardship in valued environments, and cleanup in response to 
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human caused environmental problems such as oil spills (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Thus 
fostering a sense of place is likely to be conducive to pro-environmental behavior. 
Fostering place attachment 
“Place attachment can be developed through both (1) direct experiences with places, 
especially long-term, frequent, and positive experiences and (2) learning about places from 
indirect sources rather than direct contact”(Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 236). In the first case, 
active engagement with a place tends to increase one’s attachment. All of our experiences take 
place in place. Everything from visiting a national park to an urban city park or community 
garden contributes to our sense of place. Additionally, our experiences with place include our 
diet, daily life in cities, and cultural events. Actively engaging with place refers to not passively 
experiencing place by observing it but interacting and manipulating place. In cities, actively 
engaging with place could include activities such as participating in (rather than observing) 
cultural events, planting gardens, and social interactions. In nature (including urban natural 
areas), actively engaging means getting off the trail, building forts, digging holes, swimming, 
building fires, feeling, smelling, and tasting the environment, and generally poking around.  Such 
experiences both include and encourage service in natural and urban places ranging from 
stewardship of natural environments to community service in urban environments.  
Our attachment to place is related to the way we experience place. For example, those 
who frequently visited an urban park feel a greater attachment to the specific park than 
volunteers engaged in stewardship of an urban park who are more likely to generally feel 
attached to the ecosystem that the park represents (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Additionally, 
among ‘environmentalists’ attachment to place is often associate with childhood experience 
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related to “a sense of security, the ability to influence the environment, and the opportunity 
to be a functional community member” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 237). Social interactions, 
experiences with animals, and esthetic preference also contribute to one’s attachment to place. 
Finally, individuals may develop a sense of place for somewhere they have never been through 
study. For example geology students who actively studied the Grand Canyon showed some 
attachment to that place despite having never been there. But, their sense of place was 
generally weaker than students who had visited the Grand Canyon (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). 
Fostering place meaning 
Similarly to the two primary mechanisms by which we attach with place, there are two 
processes by which we assign meaning to place:“ (1) creating place meanings through first-hand 
experiences in places and (2) learning place meanings from written, oral, and other sources, 
including communication with other people” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 237). The meaning we 
make of place is related to the structure of our experiences and social activities. 
Experiencing unique attributes of places –including geographical features such 
as rivers and lakes as well as cultural attractions– may facilitate the creation of 
particular place meanings … In this case the physical environment, although not 
deterministic of meanings, sets bounds for the possible experiences and place 
meanings … For example, through experiencing an urban place it may be 
possible to create such place meanings as ‘concrete jungle’ or ‘well-maintained 
public parks,’ but less likely ‘wilderness’ or ‘native landscapes.’ (Kudryavtsev et 
al., 2011, p. 237) 
 
Additionally, the frequency and variety of our experiences, pivotal moments, and feeling of 
safety influence the meaning we make of places. We may also develop meaning of local places 
through experiences away from those settings.  
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The meanings we associate with place is also socially constructed. Place meaning is 
“created, cultivated, and modified not only through direct place-based experiences but also by 
such means as stories, myths, literature, promotional materials, folklore, paintings, music, films, 
history, casual conversations, and memory” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238). Thus, narratives 
and conversations with others actively shape our perceptions of place. Such narratives may even 
be more influential than our direct experiences with place (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Finally, the 
meanings of place likely evolve over time. “For example, young people may directly experience 
places yet take them for granted and realize their unique ecological meanings only when they 
grow up” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238). 
4.6.3.3 Environmental education and valuing places 
Environmental education is quite influential in the process of developing senses of place 
and has significant opportunity to shape both participant’s attachment to place and their 
meaning of place. These are certainly positive qualities of EE and education more broadly should 
put greater emphasis and attention towards developing sense of place with students. However, 
certain practices in EE related to developing a sense of place certainly have room to grow. 
Maybe, especially relating the narratives (overt or implicit) related to the value of ‘pristine’ 
natural areas such as National Parks and Wilderness. We have to work to avoid contributing to a 
greater value of pristine nature than the places kids are already attached to and engaged with 
including: neighborhoods, back yards, city parks, and school grounds.  
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This is not to say that we should not facilitate experiences in remote or distant 
locations. Experiences in other environments and ecosystems, beyond one’s own community, 
such as timber-lands, agricultural areas, and even sewage treatment plants74 also contribute to a 
broader understanding of place. Certainly we should also facilitate experiences in the most 
pristine natural environments available. As Kahn (1999) pointed out, the environment where we 
grow up influences our baseline concept of nature and each generation’s baseline lowers as 
natural environments are degraded. It is important, then, for young people to experience our 
exemplary natural areas such as Natural Parks. In all cases, we should critically engage with 
students in discussions about land management. Additionally, as mentioned above, experiences 
away from those places can be important and formative for meaning related to children’s sense 
of place in their own community. However, environmental education programs that take place 
in such remote or ‘pristine’ locations must actively work to connect with and value children’s 
own experience and continue in children’s own communities. 
Environmental education can and should take place in urban environments and city 
parks. Although urban areas are ecologically degraded, every environment on Earth is degraded, 
and we can’t value space only in terms of the myth of pristine nature. Such a fallacy implies that 
any perfect environment would be ruined simply by being observed by a human. We have to 
recognize that a walk in an urban park can be a really huge adventure for kids if we don’t let our 
                                                          
 
74
 Sewage treatment facilities represent fantastically unique ecosystems. Additionally, one of my 
community college environmental science professors used to say that every citizen should know where 
their community’s resources come from (e.g., water, food, electricity) and where their waste goes (e.g., 
landfills, sewage treatment). These are important elements of human eco-systems. 
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stubborn arrogance prevent it from being. By dismissing or overlooking children’s own 
narrative related to wildness, we detract from the meaning of their experience. We must truly 
be with them and understanding that they are experiencing the situation significantly differently 
than we may have planned and attempt to support their experience rather enforce our own 
narrative. Whether in a national park or urban city park, we must avoid establishing a hierarchy 
of place where local parks and communities are lesser than the places many environmental 
educators live and work.  
I think a story may best illustrate this point. I was recently bird watching at Deception 
Pass State Park in Washington and met a family from New York City. One might suggest that 
Deception Pass is ‘better’ than New York City for bird watching or generally observing and 
connecting with nature. However after a brief conversation, the child was obviously 
unimpressed and bored with the list of species I’d seen and said, “you should see the Peregrine 
Falcons dive from the Empire State Building.” Their eyes lit up with their sense of excitement 
and wonder and they commenced to rattle off what was presumably every fact that they knew 
about falcons. The story serves as a reminder that urban environments are rich with both 
natural and cultural experience and that connection with the natural world isn’t about names of 
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species and measures of biodiversity, it is about wonder and excitement for the natural 
world75. Environmental Educators only have to be open to the value of such environments and 
adjust their narrative of nature. We can’t fake it either. We can’t secretly think that our ‘pristine’ 
nature is better. We have to know that such environments are not lesser and feel the same 
wonder for the nature in urban environments as the nature in National Parks. 
4.6.3.4 Place, value, and service learning 
I recently attended a service learning project where we made improvements to a 
campground. None of the kids (of those who I was able to ask) had ever camped there. The only 
kids who had been there before (of those I asked) had been there the previous year to make 
improvements to the campground. A political representative attended to observe the program 
and had the audacity to proclaim how great it was to see ‘at-risk’ youth engaged in community 
service efforts. These kids were indeed ‘at-risk.’ At the time they were at risk of two things: (1) 
learning that community service is nothing more than free labor for the benefit of others and, 
(2) being derogated by the assumptions of some politician who didn’t bother to get to know 
them for the sake of political posturing. However, these kids do struggle and cope with things 
that I don’t think they deserve to struggle with despite their resilience. Part of that struggle is 
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 I do not mean to suggest that conservation and preservation efforts are unnecessary since one can 
observe nature in urban environments. Instead, the underlying assumption is that helping people value 
and connect with local environments would encourage a broader concern for the natural world, especially 
when paired with basic ecological knowledge. If one grows to love Peregrine Falcons in New York City and 
learns about the species migration pattern and how DDT historically endangered the falcons, they may 
become passionate about preservation and conservation efforts. 
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how frequently adults both openly and covertly hold low expectations them, see them as 
‘at-risk,’ disadvantaged, and hopeless.  
We cannot expect those who society has systematically silenced to raise their voice for 
the issues that those who have silenced them define to be important. This is where many 
service learning efforts fail. Service needs to start in kids own communities and address needs 
that kids recognize. Otherwise, the meaning of service is lost and the efforts reduce to little 
more than free labor. The joy of service is in the meaning and sense of purpose found in 
identifying a need and addressing it. The kids did potentially learn that working outside can be 
fun and about possibilities for future careers, however, I suspect few felt like they had solved a 
problem or that they would see any of the benefits of their hard work (e.g., camping there).  
When we view people and places as lesser, disabled, and irreversibly degraded, we 
undermine our intentions to inspire folks to become actively engaged in purposeful pursuits. If 
the environments to be protected are ‘other environments’ and not their own, then 
conservation-preservation is for the benefit privileged others who get to live in National Parks, 
but not for the communities that they live in. 
We certainly advocate a symbolic association with public lands (e.g., the National Parks 
belong to everyone). In the case of the service project, most of us opted to work for a couple 
hours and spend the rest of the day enjoying nature, making art, and playing in the lake. This 
was a marvelous success because at least for the afternoon public land was more than 
symbolically theirs. However, much of the public lands in US are no more accessible for folks in 
economic poverty than private attractions such as Disney Land.  
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Service learning must be focused on the potential that each space offers and the 
value that it already represents. Pristine nature does not exist and it never has ever existed. 
Certainly our consumption and exploitation of natural resources has gotten extreme, but we’ve 
rarely, if ever, intentionally left nature untrammeled. I don’t think we should frame 
environmental issues as protecting nature from humans, but as an effort to teach ourselves how 
to constructively interact with the rest of life. Neither can we frame social justice as strictly 
focused on protecting the vulnerable. We need to focus on the assets that peoples vulnerable to 
oppression have and ending the systems of oppression that render them vulnerable and 
targeted.  
4.6.4 Restorative experiences in nature 
Any effort to get people outside and enjoying nature, whether in urban parks or more 
remote and ‘pristine’ environments, may have intrinsic value beyond the experience. Certainly 
this is an assumption that EE rests on. One such intrinsic benefit of spending time in nature is 
that it may uniquely benefit our health and well-being. Attention Restoration Theory (ART) 
suggests 
interacting with environments rich with inherently fascinating stimuli (e.g., 
sunsets) invoke involuntary attention modestly, allowing directed-attention 
mechanisms a chance to replenish (Kaplan, 1995). That is, the requirement for 
directed attention in such environments is minimized, and attention is typically 
captured in a bottom-up fashion by features of the environment itself. So, the 
logic is that, after an interaction with natural environments, one is able to 
perform better on tasks that depend on directed-attention abilities. Unlike 
natural environments, urban environments contain bottom-up stimulation (e.g., 
car horns) that captures attention dramatically and additionally requires 
directed attention to overcome that stimulation (e.g., avoiding traffic, ignoring 
advertising, etc.), making urban environments less restorative.”(M. G. Berman, 
Jonides, & Kaplan, 2008, p. 1207) 
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It is the environment’s capacity to attract involuntary attention softly while at the same time 
reducing the hard capturing of voluntary or direct attention that makes it restorative (Kaplan & 
Berman, 2010).   
Natural environments, such as parks, gardens, and lakefronts are restorative (Kaplan & 
Berman, 2010). They provide the necessary balance of stimulation and ability to let one’s mind 
wonder with little that requires immediate direct attention. However, it is not strictly the 
qualities of an environment that make it restorative, it must be compatible with one’s own 
interest and experience. 
Thus, if one is in a hurry to get home before it rains, an otherwise lovely creek 
that stands in the way of the route home would fail the compatibility test. It also 
helps if the environment appears to be large enough to permit one to explore it 
or at least imagine exploring it. Thus, a single potted plant would fail the 
requirement for extent. And finally, a store filled with flowering  plants would 
not meet the requirement for ‘‘being away’’ if it looks just like the workplace 
one is seeking a break from.”(Kaplan & Berman, 2010, p. 49) 
 
However, if the experience is compatible and one is not distracted by other stressors, time in 
nature has restorative capacity. Berman et al. (2008) observed that attention and memory 
improved when students took a walk in a peaceful arboretum (compared with a walk on city 
streets). They additionally found that looking at pictures of nature had restorative affects. 
Patients wellbeing and recovery time in hospitals also improves when their rooms overlook 
natural settings or display images of nature (Ulrich, 1993).  
It does seem that the ‘quality’ or ‘authenticity’ of nature do influence its restorative 
capacity (as far as stress-reduction) despite the fact that images of nature have been found to 
be restorative.  Peter H Kahn et al. (2008) found that recovery rates from low-stress situations 
(measured by heart rate) decreased when participants were able to view a natural setting 
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through a window and that the benefit increased the longer they looked. However, using 
plasma screen televisions, they displayed nearly identical live footage of nature and observed no 
more benefit to recovery rates than a blank wall. Increased time viewing the television did not 
improve recovery rates. Thus, time in or observing authentic natural environments is important. 
However, Kahn (1999) suggested that “people may take the natural environment they 
encounter during childhood as the norm” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, p.2). Thus, the restorative 
capacity of an environment may relate to our own expectations and values of nature.  
Environmental educators seem to be intrinsically aware of the restorative quality of 
nature and EE programs often facilitate experiences such as sit spots and silent hikes that draw 
on the restorative properties of nature. This is a practice that can and should inform education 
more generally. Whether in urban city parks, back yards, gardens, or school grounds, time in 
nature is an excellent way to recover from stress and fatigue. When one experiences such 
restorative effects of nature it gives them reason to value natural areas and feel a sense of 
connection to the earth. 
4.6.5 Conclusion 
Environmentalism, environmental justice and social justice movements all grew in large 
part out of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 70s (Anguiano et al., 2012). I have argued 
throughout that the needs of humanity and the needs of the planet are and must be singularly 
considered. However, I firmly believe in a world where many worlds fit. What I consider vital is 
that everyone finds their own passion and purpose and engages in their own way. I do not 
believe we will ever eliminate conflict and as I have suggested, when resolved constructively, it 
is an important source of growth. For that reason, it is important, for example, that 
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environmental justice activists keep environmentalists in check and vice versa. Through the 
resolution of conflicting interests, we work towards a greater good as parts of a whole in an 
effort for restoration. In the following section I propose an epistemology of restoration as a 
reaffirmation of the congruence of such efforts with respect for other ways of knowing.  
Conclusion 
It is necessary to go beyond rebellious attitudes to a more radically critical and 
evolutionary position, which is in fact a position not simply of denouncing 
injustice but of announcing a new utopia. Transformation of the world implies a 
dialectic between two actions: denouncing the process of dehumanization and 
announcing the dream of a new society. (Freire, 1998, p. 74) 
 
I found it imperative that I begin and end this project in a very personal way in order to 
communicate that this is not my thesis, this is myself. This work is imperfect because it is 
personal and in a sense it is little more than an exhaustively documented glimpse of the current 
stage in my own continuing development. I want to conclude by discussing the limitations of this 
work in an open way and in my own voice. Given the limitations and the incompleteness of this 
document, I reflect on the process I’ve been immersed in and conclude that the process has 
been valuable, but that I need to put what I’ve learned to work in a practical setting.  
Limitations  
This project was never value-neutral. From the beginning, I have sought understanding 
entirely for the sake of action. I have been guided by my own sense of morality and my own 
vision of utopia. Thus, my investigation was hugely influenced by my own preconceptions and 
intuitions; confirmation bias is undeniably present in this work. With that in mind, I started with 
the conclusion that social and ecological degradation exist as part of a single process and sought 
understanding surrounding that conclusion.  
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The lack of neutrality is deeper than confirmation bias, though. Much of the topics 
of this work are deeply related to my most fundamental beliefs about life. I’ve always prided 
myself as an extremely rational person, but throughout this process I’ve both discovered and 
developed a certain faith in life that exists beyond rationality or empiricism. I believe that there 
is a greater potential for life on Earth than is currently or has ever been realized. This is not an 
unwavering and uncompromisingly belief; it is something that I struggle to know because I need 
to know it. I wouldn’t know how to live in the world that is without faith in the world that can 
be. Throughout this paper and throughout my life I have been consumed with a struggled to 
believe that humans are good. At the outset of this paper, I adopted a positive approach and 
simply refused to deviate from a position that humans are good. This bias surfaces most 
obviously in my considerations of moral relativism and outlying behavior. I will say that on both 
the topics of relativism and antisocial behavior my own beliefs and understanding have 
significantly developed. But I maintain, more than ever, that people are good.  
Finally, I am well aware that the thread of my thinking may be difficult to follow. I felt 
very strongly that the understanding I sought could not possibly be found within a single 
discipline, nor could it be strictly empirically or even academically explored. Thus, I’ve 
investigated in lots of directions in disciplines ranging history to Hip Hop. I can only suggest that 
I think I’ve found several pieces to a puzzle that I haven’t entirely solved; some of the pieces 
might be not fit together and some might not even belong to this puzzle, but I feel like I can just 
barely make out the picture.  
A Demand for action 
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As I have written this thesis, others have fought and died for the ideals that I 
tentatively defend only with words. A Zapatista educator, known as Galeano, was murdered by 
paramilitaries on May 1, 2014, for practicing the closest present day manifestation I am aware 
of the ideals that I have discussed. In fact, I was in the library taking a break from reading one of 
Freire’s books when I read the news. That day, I said to a friend that if I had any guts at all I 
would quit graduate school and head down to Mexico. My thought was that if nothing else the 
presence of a US American witness may reduce aggression. In my less dramatic moments, I have 
often thought that my time volunteering at after school programs has been the most 
meaningful part of graduate school. At the same time, I have a constant feeling that I could 
spend my entire life in the library seeking a greater understanding of life. 
Because our library is … effectively infinite- no one person can ever read more 
than a tiny fraction- we face the paradox of abundance: Quantity undermines 
the quality of our engagement. With such a vast and wonderful library spread 
out before us, we often skim books or read just the reviews. We might already 
have encountered the Greatest Idea, the insight that would have transformed 
us had we savored it, taken it to heart, and worked it into our lives. (Haidt, 2006, 
p. ix) 
 
I have had to ask myself, at what point does more knowledge and more understanding offer 
diminishing returns towards solving our problems? How much of my acquired knowledge simply 
put a name to something that I already felt, or empirically proven what I knew from life 
experience? How much evidence is necessary to make an effective argument that humans need 
to treat each other and the planet better? What did I already know, but fail to deeply 
contemplate? What have I failed to savor by devouring so much?  
While I doubt I will ever be able to put the books down, I recognize that the time has 
come for action. It may be that through further academic investigation, I could extend my 
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understanding and communicate it more clearly. However, this has never been about the 
writing.  I do hope that this work may inform or inspire other educators, but my goal was always 
to inform and inspire my own action. At this point, I am satisfied with my experience researching 
and writing this thesis. In fact, I expect to continue occasionally writing and revising this 
document as I continue my learning process in the real world. But I know, as much as I know 
anything that I’ve learned through this process, that it is time to take a pause from studying 
change to go out in the world and do it. 
The Unfulfilled Promise 
The historic foundation of America is filled with atrocity from colonization to the genocide 
of Indigenous peoples and slavery and we need to face history and our roles in history as a 
continuing process. We have to do so in order to collectively heal and begin to fulfil the promise 
of our idealized foundation: liberty and justice for all. The Statue of Liberty is the personification 
of America. She stands over our Eastern border as a symbol of welcome, a beacon of freedom, 
and a promise of protection from imperialism. The poem inscribed on the statue, and 
memorized by many young Americans says: 
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, 
With conquering limbs astride from land to land; 
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand 
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame 
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name 
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand 
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command 
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. 
"Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she 
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” (Lazarus, 1903) 
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This was a promise that was largely fulfilled for my family and so many European immigrants, 
who entered United States through Ellis Island, but it is disgracefully unfulfilled for many 
longtime residents and recent immigrants. What welcome do those entering United States on 
the Mexican border receive? What New Colossus awaits them? 
Aside from some insight on how and why we’ve failed to deliver on our promise and 
what an effort to reach it might look like, I haven’t said much that Lazaus (1903) didn’t cover in 
those fourteen beautiful lines of positive psychology. Lazarus didn’t focus on the American 
reality but the American potential. With equal parts rage and hope, I have tried to do the same 
in this work. I want to end by sharing one of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s final speeches before his 
assassination in 1968 as he organized the Poor People’s Campaign: 
In a few weeks some of us are coming to Washington to see if the will is still 
alive … in this nation … Yes, we are going to bring the tired, the poor, the 
huddled masses … We are going to bring those who have come to feel that life is 
a long and desolate corridor with no exit signs. We are going to bring the 
children and adults and old people who have never seen a doctor or dentist… 
 
We are not coming to engage in any historic gesture. We are not coming to tear 
up Washington … We are coming to ask America to be true to the huge 
promissory note that it signed years ago… 
 
We are coming … to engage in dramatic nonviolent action, to call attention to 
the gulf between the promise and fulfillment; to make the invisible visible. (as 
cited in Smiley & Ritz, 2014, pp. 226-227) 
 
We are coming 
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